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Background: Although innovation can improve patient care, implementing new ideas is often challenging.
Previous research found that professional attitudes, shaped in part by health policies and organisational
cultures, contribute to differing perceptions of innovation ‘evidence’. However, we still know little about
how evidence is empirically accessed and used by organisational decision-makers when innovations
are introduced.
Aims and objectives: We aimed to investigate the use of different sources and types of evidence in
innovation decisions to answer the following questions: how do managers make sense of evidence? What
role does evidence play in management decision-making when adopting and implementing innovations in
health care? How do wider contextual conditions and intraorganisational capacity inﬂuence research use
and application by health-care managers?
Methods: Our research design comprised multiple case studies with mixed methods. We investigated
technology adoption and implementation in nine acute-care organisations across England. We employed
structured survey questionnaires, in-depth interviews and documentary analysis. The empirical setting was
infection prevention and control. Phase 1 focused on the espoused use of evidence by 126 non-clinical
and clinical hybrid managers. Phase 2 explored the use of evidence by managers in speciﬁc technology
examples: (1) considered for adoption; (2) successfully adopted and implemented; and (3) rejected
or discontinued.
Findings: (1) Access to, and use of, evidence types and sources varied greatly by profession. Clinicians
reported a strong preference for science-based, peer-reviewed, published evidence. All groups called upon
experiential knowledge and expert opinion. Nurses overall drew upon a wider range of evidence sources
and types. Non-clinical managers tended to sequentially prioritise evidence on cost from national-level
sources, and local implementation trials. (2) A sizeable proportion of professionals from all groups,
including experienced staff, reported difﬁculty in making sense of evidence. Lack of awareness of existing
implementation literature, lack of knowledge on how to translate information into current practice, and
lack of time and relevant skills were reported as key reasons for this. (3) Infection outbreaks, ﬁnancial
pressures, performance targets and trusted relationships with suppliers seemed to emphasise a pragmatic
and less rigorous approach in sourcing for evidence. Trust infrastructure redevelopment projects,
and a strong emphasis on patient safety and collaboration, appeared to widen scope for evidence use.
(4) Evidence was continuously interpreted and (re)constructed by professional identity, organisational role,
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team membership, audience and organisational goals. (5) Doctors and non-clinical managers sourced
evidence plausible to self. Nursing staff also sought acceptance of evidence from other groups. (6) We
found diverse ‘evidence templates’ in use: ‘biomedical-scientiﬁc’, ‘practice-based’, ‘rational-policy’. These
represented shared cognitive models which deﬁned what constituted acceptable and credible evidence in
decisions. Nurses drew on all diverse ‘templates’ to make sense of evidence and problems; non-clinical
managers drew mainly on the practice-based and rational-policy templates; and doctors drew primarily on
the biomedical-scientiﬁc template.
Conclusions: An evidence-based management approach that inﬂexibly applies the principles of
evidence-based medicine, our ﬁndings suggest, neglects how evidence is actioned in practice and how
codiﬁed research knowledge inter-relates with other ‘evidence’ also valued by decision-makers. Local
processes and professional and microsystem considerations played a signiﬁcant role in adoption and
implementation. This has substantial implications for the effectiveness of large-scale projects and
systems-wide policy.
Funding: The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.
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Glossary
Academic Health Sciences Centre (AHSC) A partnership between one or more universities and
health-care providers focusing on research, clinical services, education and training.
Biomedical Research Centre (BRC) It was set up by the National Institute for Health Research in 2007, and
based in ‘the most outstanding’ university teaching NHS trusts across the country. It promotes translational
biomedical research and innovation in the NHS. Currently there are 11 BRCs (some continued from the
period 2007–12, and some newly established since April 2012). See URL: www.nihr.ac.uk/infrastructure/
Pages/infrastructure_biomedical_research_centres.aspx (accessed 10 October 2012).
Biomedical Research Unit (BRU) It was set up by the National Institute for Health Research in 2008,
and based in the UK’s leading university teaching NHS trusts. It conducts translational clinical research,
focusing upon seven high-priority areas. Currently there are 20 BRUs (some continued from the period
2008–12, and some newly established since April 2012). See URL: www.nihr.ac.uk/infrastructure/
Pages/infrastructure_biomedical_research_units.aspx (accessed 10 October 2012).
Care Quality Commission (CQC) The independent regulator of all health and social-care services
in England.
Department of Health The department of the UK government with responsibility for government policy for
England on health, social care and the NHS.
Director of infection prevention and control (DIPC) He or she has authority and is responsible for the
reduction of health-care-associated infections in a health-care organisation. This includes reporting directly to
the chief executive and the trust board, producing an annual report on the state of health-care-associated
infections in the organisation, and local control and implementation of infection prevention and
control policies.
Evidence-based management (EBMgt) A term adopted from medical science (particularly evidence-based
medicine) to describe the practice of management based on empirical evidence.
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) A scientific approach that aims at applying the best available evidence
gained from scientific methods to clinical decision-making.
Foundation trust (FT) Organisational type of some hospitals in NHS England. Foundation trusts have a
significant amount of managerial and financial freedom compared with other NHS hospitals.
Health-care-associated infection (HCAI) An infection caused by any infectious agent associated with a
person’s medical treatment, or acquired by health-care workers in the course of their duties. A hospital HCAI
is one that is neither present nor incubating on admission to hospital.
Health Protection Agency (HPA) A non-departmental public body set up in 2003 to offer specialist
support and expert advice to local authorities and the NHS for the protection of the health and well-being of
the population of the UK in relation to infectious diseases and environmental hazards. It became part of
Public Health England (new executive agency of the Department of Health) on 1 April 2013. See URL: www.
hpa.org.uk/AboutTheHPA/ (accessed 10 October 2012).
Health Protection Agency Rapid Review Panel recommendations (HPA RRP) An independent panel,
set up by the Department of Health in 2004, that offers ‘prompt’ evaluations of new product technologies to
tackle HCAIs.
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Infection prevention and control (IPC) In relation to health care, the term is generally used with
reference to preventing patients from acquiring those infections most often associated with the provision of
health care and preventing the transmission of microorganisms from one patient to another (referred to
as cross-infection).
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (formerly the National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence) (NICE) It was set up as a Special Health Authority in 1999, and initially named the
National Institute for Clinical Excellence, to offer guidance on best practice (i.e. current health technologies
and clinical management of specific conditions) to the NHS. On 1 April 2005, it became the National Institute
for Health and Clinical Excellence, and on 1 April 2013 NICE became the National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence, at which point it changed its status to a non-departmental public body and began offering
guidance to ensure quality and value for money. See URL: www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/about_nice.jsp;
www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2000/02/9900230.pdf (accessed 10 October 2012).
National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) An organisation developed with the aim of creating a
health research system through which the NHS can support outstanding individuals, working in world-class
facilities, conducting cutting-edge research focused on the needs of patients and the public.
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) An organisation set up as a Special Health Authority to monitor
patient safety incidents in the NHS. On 1 June 2012, its key functions were transferred to the NHS
Commissioning Board Special Health Authority. See URL: http://npsa.nhs.uk/ (accessed 10 October 2012).
NHS The publicly funded health-care system in England.
NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement A body whose purpose is to support the transformation
of the NHS, through innovation, improvement and the adoption of best practice.
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) A public–private partnership that seeks private capital to fund public sector
infrastructure projects and service developments.
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List of abbreviations
aHP aerosolised hydrogen peroxide
AHSC Academic Health Sciences
Centre
ATP adenosine triphosphate
BRC Biomedical Research Centre
BRU Biomedical Research Unit
CEO chief executive ofﬁcer
CQC Care Quality Commission
DBO Design Bugs Out
DIPC director of infection prevention
and control
E&F estates and facilities
EBM evidence-based medicine
EBMgt evidence-based management
FT foundation trust
HCAI health-care-associated infection
HPA Health Protection Agency
HPA RRP Health Protection Agency Rapid
Review Panel
HS&DR Health Services and Delivery
Research
IPC infection prevention and control
NHS PASA NHS Purchasing and Supply
Agency
NICE National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence
NIHR National Institute for Health
Research
NPSA National Patient Safety Agency
PFI private ﬁnance initiative
RBDS Room Bio-Decontamination
Service
UV ultraviolet
VHP vapour hydrogen peroxide
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Plain English summary
Background and methods
Innovation can improve patient care, but health-care managers’ use of evidence when considering change
in hospitals is not well understood.
We systematically looked at decisions about technologies available to help ﬁght infections in hospitals.
We selected nine NHS hospitals across England of different size and research experience and, through
191 interviews and 27 different technology examples, aimed to ﬁnd out which decisions were made, who
made these decisions and how the decisions were made. We were especially interested to learn about
which forms of evidence were used by managers and looked at factors within and outside the hospital
that may affect evidence use.
Findings and conclusion
We found that different professional groups of managers looked for, and used in decisions, different
forms of evidence from each other, including research and own experience. For example, nurse managers
looked at a wider range of evidence than doctors in management roles. Doctor managers and non-clinical
managers were concerned with evidence that helped their own decision-making, whereas nurses were
also concerned with providing evidence to others to aid decision-making. Many factors within and outside
the hospital helped or hindered the use of evidence. For example, infection outbreaks sometimes
highlighted the need for evidence but, at the same time, added a time pressure to make decisions quickly.
A lot of existing evidence held centrally in the NHS was not used in actual decision-making but, instead,
evidence from suppliers and evidence gathered at the hospital level was used.
This study provides a learning opportunity for how policies intended for system-wide change can
be implemented.
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Scientiﬁc summary
Background
It is increasingly accepted that patient care can be improved through the implementation of evidence-based
innovations and the mobilisation of research ﬁndings informing ‘best practice’. Successfully implementing
innovations in complex organisations, such as the UK’s NHS, is often challenging, as multiple contextual
dynamics mediate the process. Research studies have explored the challenges of introducing innovations into
health-care settings and have contributed to a better understanding of why potentially useful innovations are
not always implemented in practice, even if backed by strong scientiﬁc evidence. Mediating factors include
health policy and health system inﬂuences, organisational factors, and individual and professional attitudes,
which include perceptions of decision-makers of innovation evidence. These studies further suggest that the
nature and deﬁnition of evidence is often ambiguous and contested among diverse professional groups. This
is further exacerbated when multiprofessional teams dispersed across hospital departments must deliver on
cross-cutting deliverables such as infection prevention and control in acute care. Despite substantial research
in the ﬁeld, there has been limited empirical investigation into how different forms of evidence are accessed,
reviewed and used by organisational decision-makers (in contrast to individuals) during innovation adoption
and implementation. These health-care decision-makers have varying backgrounds and include clinical hybrid
managers (e.g. nurses, doctors, pharmacists by training and profession) and non-clinical staff. We also know
little about how these managers from a diverse range of professional backgrounds make sense of evidence
collectively when they come together to take organisational decisions. We also have a limited understanding
of how this collective sensemaking mediates the uptake of health innovations.
Aims and objectives
The study’s broad aim was to investigate the use of different sources and types of evidence, including
research-generated knowledge in health-care management decisions. A key objective was to explore
the process of innovation in health-care organisations and the construction and use of evidence by
decision-makers in this process. The search for, and assessment and use of, evidence by diverse
decision-makers at the different stages of the innovation process was explored, looking at speciﬁc
technology examples. Our analysis also captured the facilitating or constraining inﬂuences on the use of
evidence during innovation decision-making at multiple levels. These were (1) the inﬂuences of wider
macro-level contextual dynamics, (2) the processes by which health-care managers constructed meaning
of available evidence and how they used such evidence when deciding on adoption or rejection, and
(3) implementation of innovative technologies (the micro level).
The study aimed to address the following key research questions:
l How do managers make sense of evidence?
l What role does evidence play in management decision-making when adopting and implementing
innovations in health care?
l How do wider contextual conditions and intraorganisational capacity inﬂuence research use and
application by health-care managers?
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Methods
Our research design comprised multiple case studies and used mixed methods. We analysed both
contemporary and retrospective examples of technology adoption and implementation processes in
acute-care organisations across England. We employed structured survey questionnaires, in-depth
interviews, systematic analysis of relevant secondary data and ﬁeld visits to empirical sites to understand
the rationale and challenges involved in sourcing and using evidence in relation to innovative technologies.
We also incorporated active input into the research process from a multidisciplinary project steering group
that helped to construct meaning and interpret research ﬁndings. We focused our analysis on the empirical
setting of infection prevention and control. We analysed the data using a combination of inductive and
deductive reasoning (with the use of a conceptual framework as a sensitising device on key emerging
themes). We employed theories of organisational innovation adoption and sensemaking in organisations
to interpret the data, informed by our review of the literature.
The research design consisted of two phases. Phase 1 focused on the espoused use of evidence by senior,
mid-career and junior managers, as well as diverse clinical hybrid managers. We employed structured survey
questionnaires (embedded in the interview guide and administered during the face-to-face interviews)
involving 126 informants in nine acute-care organisations (NHS trusts); we also conducted 126 in-depth
semistructured interviews with the same key informants. We purposefully sampled for senior (e.g. medical
director, director of nursing, director of research and development), middle and operational managers and
health professionals (from various backgrounds including medicine, nursing, pharmacy) in managerial roles
across each trust and, speciﬁcally, in infection control. Phase 2 explored the use of evidence in practice and
in context, at the point of decisions, and included informants involved in the adoption decisions and
implementation of particular technologies in infection prevention and control. In phase 2 we conducted
65 semistructured interviews across eight NHS trusts. In each trust we sampled for three technologies
fulﬁlling the following criteria: (1) being considered for adoption at the time of the study, (2) successfully
adopted and implemented, and (3) rejected or discontinued after initial adoption. Using a systematic
options appraisal, we bounded the technology by infection prevention control priority area (environmental
hygiene/cleaning/disinfection) and time frame of the organisational adoption decision (technologies prior to
2007 were not included to avoid recall bias and incomplete data owing to staff turnover).
Findings
l In phase 1, a range of sources and types of evidence were reported as being accessed and used by
non-clinical staff and clinical hybrid managers. Access to and use of evidence types and sources varied
greatly among professional groups. Evidence types included research-generated information on
innovation decisions from national bodies and agencies, local trial data, peer exchange or, less often,
input from external agents such as management consultants.
l No difference was reported in accessing evidence sources by NHS professionals in hospitals when
comparing different organisational types – Academic Health Sciences Centre, foundation trust or acute
trust/district general hospital. The dominant sources across professionals and the organisational sample
were The Cochrane Library, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), National
Service Frameworks, NHS Evidence and the former National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). A regional
network effect was identiﬁed for those trusts participating in the Department of Health Showcase
Hospitals Programme and the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement, and those located in
north-west England, using evidence from the National Technology Adoption Centre and the
Department of Health Smart Solutions Programme.
l In phase 1, clinical staff reported a strong preference for science-based, peer-reviewed and published
evidence, although the extent to which they used such evidence in practice varied, as reported in
phase 2. In addition, all groups called upon experiential knowledge and expert opinion. Nurses overall
drew upon a wider range of evidence sources and types. Non-clinical managers tended to sequentially
prioritise evidence on cost produced by national-level sources, and implementation trials and cost
SCIENTIFIC SUMMARY
xxii
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
information from within their own or other hospital organisations, considering the biomedical evidence
after this form of evidence.
l Research evidence identiﬁed as missing by respondents in our sample included behavioural studies;
implementation research; and organisational or management research. Pharmacists reported a higher
need for behavioural studies, which is in contrast to doctors, who did not perceive these as a priority.
This is despite the fact that a signiﬁcant body of such research evidence exists in health services
research and mainstream management journals. When probed, most respondents were not aware of
these journals, and did not report reading them.
l Respondents highlighted that the very nature of evidence around innovations was emergent, iterative
and changing.
l We identiﬁed no clear observable pattern between adoption or implementation outcomes and
‘evidence strength on efﬁcacy’ or ‘expected budget impact’ of the studied technologies when
considered in isolation. Low perceived practice impact was more likely to be linked with successful
adoption and trust-wide implementation. The combination of all three dimensions of evidence better
explained outcomes and these were consistently considered in tandem by decision-makers across all
microcases in phase 2. In phase 2, we systematically mapped 27 innovation journeys of 18 unique
environmental hygiene technology products across eight trusts. This revealed the types and sources of
evidence used by diverse stakeholder groups along the three substages of initiation, adoption decision
and implementation. There were signiﬁcant differences between the types and sources reported in
phase 2 and those reported in phase 1. For example, sources such as The Cochrane Library, NICE,
National Service Frameworks, NHS Evidence and the former NPSA did not feature in those decisions
concerning adoption – or non-adoption – of these technology products. Although in phase 1 a low
importance for industry as a source of evidence was reported, supplier product documentation and
demonstrations featured most frequently in decisions in phase 2.
l For the particular organisational decisions studied (adoption and implementation of innovative
technologies) evidence generated from research did not offer unambiguous or universal prescriptions
for action, and even did not always emerge as the primary evidence source. In most cases, a plurality
of types of evidence was used, which were contingent on the local context, offering a range of
potential sources to guide decision-making.
l Different types of evidence were interwoven and contributed to local decision-making discourses. In
these discourses research evidence, personal experiences and knowledge, relationships with the
suppliers, politics, resources, national performance targets, national and organisational policies,
organisational and departmental priorities and clinical pressures (infection outbreaks) were
continuously at play and have shaped decision-making outcomes.
l Critical events, external pressures and the trusts’ distinct organisational cultures were widely perceived by
respondents to have a signiﬁcant, but differential, impact on evidence use during the decision-making
process. Infection outbreaks, ﬁnancial pressures, performance targets and trusted relationships with
suppliers seemed to induce an emphasis on ‘what works’ and a less rigorous approach to evidence use,
leading to the adoption of products with an emergent evidence base on efﬁcacy. On the other hand,
trust infrastructure redevelopment projects, a strong emphasis on patient safety and collaboration or
teamwork appears to widen scope for evidence access, review and use in decision-making.
l The different forms of evidence were not simply accessed and applied ‘at face value’ by the
decision-makers. It was necessary to continuously interpret and (re)construct the evidence in some way,
according to one’s own professional identity, organisational role, team members and audience, and
organisational objectives. Far from being merely technical or ‘scientiﬁc’, we found this process to be
highly iterative and ‘messy’. Many questioned what counted as evidence.
l Professional identities impacted upon prospects for meaningful knowledge exchange and individual
knowledge and evidence selection. In these evidence discourses, members of professional groups
viewed and used evidence differently. For doctors and non-clinical managers, plausibility to self of
a type of evidence sufﬁced to bring it into the decision-making process. Nursing staff also sought
plausibility and acceptance of the evidence from other groups, before formally contributing evidence
into decision-making.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02060 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 6
xxiii
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Kyratsis et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
l A difﬁculty is reported in making sense of evidence by a sizeable proportion of members of all
professional groups in our sample, which also includes senior and experienced professionals.
l Overall, we found diverse ‘evidence templates’ in circulation and in use, namely ‘biomedical-scientiﬁc’,
‘practice-based experiential’ and ‘rational-policy’, which deﬁned what constitutes acceptable and
credible evidence in the decision-making process. Informants variably drew on those templates to make
sense of the evidence and of the problem under consideration.
Conclusions
In our empirical cases, we observed that organisational contexts, policy mandates and professional
identities mediated the use of evidence in the adoption and implementation of the speciﬁc health
technology products examined.
In particular, evidence sources and types appeared to be variably prioritised and used by decision-makers
depending on their professional background. Doctors and nurses prioritised evidence on the clinical
efﬁcacy and effectiveness of innovations. Non-clinical managers and nurses relied more on their own, or
peer, experiential knowledge in contrast to doctors, who showed preference for more systematic forms of
knowledge. Non-clinical managers and nurses considered evidence on ‘ease of use’, including local trials of
innovative products and technologies, as highly important. In addition, the various professional groups
drew variably on co-existing evidence templates to help them to make sense of the evidence base. Nurses
drew on all diverse templates and aimed for evidence plausibility to self and others and were the only
professional group who explicitly tried to make the case to other stakeholders. Non-clinical managers also
drew on all diverse templates but aimed primarily for evidence plausibility to self. In contrast, doctors drew
primarily on the biomedical-scientiﬁc template and were exclusively concerned with evidence plausibility
to self.
These observations have obvious implications for decision-making, especially who to involve, the breadth of
the evidence base needed to be considered, the conﬂuence of different templates for making sense of the
evidence and how consensus in a multiprofessional context can be achieved. An evidence-based
management approach that inﬂexibly applies the principles of evidence-based medicine, our ﬁndings
suggest, neglects how evidence is actioned in practice and how codiﬁed, systematised knowledge
generated from research inter-relates with other forms of evidence that are also valued by decision-makers.
Experience, personal knowledge and expertise, perspectives and preferences of stakeholders, policy
mandates and endorsement, and evidence from the local context all may contribute as credible and relevant
evidence sources. The NHS and other health systems have explicit policy goals to promote the uptake of
innovations and systematise new practices across health-care organisations. Our ﬁndings suggest that local
processes and professional and microsystem considerations play a signiﬁcant role in adoption and
implementation. On the basis of this, and signiﬁcant other research, this policy goal of systematisation
appears to be infeasible, because of the idiosyncrasies of situated circumstances and cultures. This has
substantial implications for the effectiveness of large-scale projects and systems-wide policy.
Funding
Funding for this study was provided by the Health Services and Delivery Research programme of the
National Institute for Health Research.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Background
The emergence and increasing popularity of evidence-based medicine (EBM) since the 1990s1 has
provided support for ideas advocating the use of research evidence to improve managerial practice and
decision-making in health care.2,3 It is argued that health policy and management, although admittedly
different from clinical practice in signiﬁcant ways, are lagging behind clinical practice in addressing the
problems of ‘overuse, underuse and misuse’ of evidence related to management practice and that this has
a signiﬁcant impact on the quality of care and patient outcomes.2 Under this perspective, health service
delivery and organisation, as well as decision-making, could be improved by applying robust and relevant
research ﬁndings and other forms of knowledge relating to good practice. More recently, discourse
espousing the principles of evidence-based management (EBMgt) and the idea of using research
evidence to support managerial decisions also emerged in mainstream management and organisation
studies literature.4,5
Following a similar strand of argument, policy-making circles in the UK have been increasingly advocating
the merits of using research evidence to inform clinical and managerial practice. This policy discourse has
particularly emphasised the need to spread ‘best practices’ and implement innovations within the NHS to help
enhance health-care quality and productivity.6 In recent years, the Department of Health has issued a number
of policy reports and has set up agencies with the aim of promoting evidence-based practice and innovation.
The Cooksey report on UK health research funding7 identiﬁed a ‘gap’ in translating innovative ideas and
products into practice. The Report of the High Level Group on Clinical Effectiveness, established by the
Chief Medical Ofﬁcer, reviewed areas of signiﬁcant variation in implementing evidence-based practice.
Among a number of recommendations on enhancing the effectiveness and efﬁciency of clinical care, the
report emphasised the need for increased understanding of the mechanisms that encourage the adoption
of new interventions.8 The Report of the Clinical Effectiveness Research Agenda Group highlighted the
need to develop the capacity of NHS staff to use implementation (and clinical) research in daily practice
and the need for greater understanding of the processes by which managers and others access and apply
implementation and clinical research when making decisions.9
A number of agencies were also created, with the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement and the
NHS Technology Adoption Centre being prime examples. Following the Cooksey report,7 Academic Health
Sciences Centres (AHSCs) and Biomedical Research Centres and Units (BRCs and BRUs) were established to
facilitate the translation of research knowledge into clinical practice. The National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence (NICE) was set up, and in recent years it has become involved in health technology
evaluations. With the publication of the latest report, Innovation, Health and Wealth,10 further
organisational changes are being envisaged as the NHS seeks to provide more effective support for
innovation and adoption.
However, the adoption of new ideas and technologies is regarded as a challenging issue. On the one
hand, there is a need to ensure that, once identiﬁed, effective new technologies are adopted and
disseminated across the NHS, as the policy goals above suggest. The assumption is that relevant and
robust evidence of efﬁcacy and cost-effectiveness produced centrally (i.e. via the NICE or the NHS
Technology Adoption Centre) will facilitate such dissemination efforts. On the other hand, much recent
research suggests that the way in which evidence comes into play during the adoption and system-wide
diffusion is a far more situated and context-mediated process.11,12 Understanding of the actual practice of
how evidence is used in organisational decisions within the multiprofessional setting of NHS is limited.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02060 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 6
1
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Kyratsis et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
We know even less when this process involves non-clinical decisions. This is where our study aims to make
a signiﬁcant contribution to the NHS and to patient beneﬁt.
We empirically focus on infection prevention and control (IPC) in NHS acute care. In this ﬁeld, relevant
NHS policy reports6,13 and legislation14 have highlighted that countermeasures of known effectiveness
have not been universally implemented. In addition, the NHS has commissioned large projects in
recent years to identify new technologies and products which work best. One example in the ﬁeld of
health-care-associated infections (HCAIs) is the Department of Health’s ‘Showcase Hospitals’ programme,
which aimed to evaluate technologies ‘in use’ across a number of NHS hospitals in England and diffuse
such learning among health-care practitioners.
Targets for HCAIs are high on the UK Government’s agenda with performance being monitored carefully
by regulatory agencies, such as the Care Quality Commission (CQC), with powers to issue warnings and
penalty notices to public and private providers. High media attention combined with high public and
patient interest in recent years has demanded transparency of investment and resultant beneﬁt to patients
and the NHS. This accountability to the public is facilitated by formal channels, such as the patient
environment action teams, who assist inspections of NHS sites, as well as the third sector. The complexity
of interorganisational contextual inﬂuences and the multiprofessional, cross-cutting nature of IPC make our
selected empirical setting an information-rich case for investigating the adoption of innovative technologies
and the use of evidence in this process.
In summary, despite the interest in EBM in recent decades, which has led to considerable empirical
research on the use of clinical evidence by health professionals, there has so far been limited empirical
work in health care in relation to the use (or non-use) of management research or other forms of
knowledge in decision-making and the adoption of innovations.
Aims and research questions
The main aim of the project is to investigate the use of research-based knowledge in health-care
management decisions. A key objective is to explore the construction of what is regarded as evidence by
health-care managers when they make organisational decisions. We include general managers (non-clinical
staff) and ‘clinical hybrid managers’ (clinicians in a managerial role) to investigate how health-care
managers draw upon and make sense of different types and sources of evidence when they make
decisions about innovations. Emphasis is also placed on the facilitating or constraining inﬂuences of
contextual factors on health-care managers’ decision-making processes. The research is empirically set
within the context of management decisions relating to HCAIs. In particular, we explored how health-care
managers adopt, and implement, innovative technologies to combat HCAIs in NHS acute trusts.
The study design incorporates multiple levels of analysis: (1) it explores the inﬂuences of wider
‘macro’-level contextual dynamics on managers’ decision-making, (2) it explores decision-making processes
at the ‘meso’ organisational level, and (3) it analyses at a ‘micro’ level the processes by which health-care
managers construct meaning of available evidence and how they might use such evidence when deciding
on the adoption or rejection of innovations.
The study aimed to address the following key research questions:
l How do managers (non-clinical and clinical hybrid managers) make sense of evidence?
l What role does evidence play in management decision-making when adopting and implementing
innovations in health care?
l How do wider contextual conditions and intraorganisational capacity inﬂuence research use and
application by health-care managers?
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Structure of the report
The report is organised as follows. In Chapter 2 we outline a summary of the relevant literature and the
research context linked to the aims of this study. Chapter 3 presents our methodology, including the
study’s research design and methods.
Overall, Chapters 4 to 9 outline our empirical ﬁndings and centre on our research questions, namely:
l How do managers (with clinical and non-clinical backgrounds) make sense of evidence?
l What role does evidence play in management decision-making when adopting and implementing
innovations in health care?
Chapter 4 presents ﬁndings and emergent themes on the challenges to making sense of evidence reported
by health-care managers (including both non-clinical and clinical hybrid managers). The chapter sketches
out the background for the more detailed exploration of empirical processes presented in later chapters
and draws on qualitative interview data from phase 1. Chapters 4 and 5 (drawing mainly on phase 1 data)
reﬂect on what decision-makers ‘say they usually do’ and Chapter 8 (drawing primarily on phase 2 data)
investigates in detail ‘what they actually did’ in speciﬁc empirical cases of innovation adoption and
implementation, thus addressing:
l How do wider contextual conditions and intraorganisational capacity inﬂuence research use and
application by health-care managers?
Chapter 5 explores the sensemaking process for individual professionals in context (organisational and
macro), using data from the interviews and the structured questionnaires. In this part of the report we
review how decision-makers at different levels of the hierarchy within the organisation report on access
and use of various sources and types of evidence related to innovation decisions. We also outline key
contextual inﬂuences at organisational and macro levels with a focus on IPC and the NHS.
Chapters 6 to 8 look at ‘evidence in action’ (how evidence played out in speciﬁc empirical cases).
In detail, Chapters 6 and 7 set the background for the in-depth exploration of the innovation products’
journeys. Chapter 6 draws principally on secondary data sources to present an overview of the eight
‘macrocases’ (the acute-care NHS trusts included in phase 2). Important characteristics of the trusts, such
as size, performance, crises and critical events during the period of the study, the research and innovation
activity, communication and espoused values, are presented in a comparative fashion. The aim is to
sensitise subsequent analysis and inform the reader of the potential impact of local and historical contexts
on the social and organisational processes investigated. Chapter 7 outlines the 27 adoption and
implementation journeys of the technology products, as selected by the trusts (microcases), using interview
data from phase 2 and complementary secondary data on supporting evidence for efﬁcacy and cost. In
this chapter we also provide a typology of the 27 technologies, distinguishing among three important
dimensions: (1) the strength of the evidence on efﬁcacy, (2) perceived impact on practice, and (3) expected
impact on budget.
Chapter 8 reports on the 27 microcases in depth. We look at each technology product journey in
detail along the three key stages of the innovation process, namely initiation, adoption decision and
implementation. We present the interplay among stakeholders involved at each stage, associated evidence
types and sources, and how these were linked to organisational adoption and implementation outcomes.
This is the longest chapter of the report, and the chapter in which the 27 microcases are presented in
detail. We purposely followed the same format across cases to facilitate analysis. The detailed evidence
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presented in this chapter enables the reader to verify the validity of the inferences made in the following
chapters. Chapter 9 outlines key themes from the cross-case analysis (looking at relevant patterns across
the macrocases – eight trusts – and microcases – 27 technology product journeys). In Chapters 10 and 11
we reﬂect on what we have learnt and synthesise the relevant ﬁndings as to how the collective
sensemaking process took place within the multiprofessional empirical setting of our investigation.
The report concludes with a discussion on potential implications for policy and practice and suggestions
for future research.
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Chapter 2 Relevant literature and the
research context
Evidence-based medicine and the spread of innovations
The spread and adoption of innovations re-emerged as an important theme in health care with the rise of
the EBM movement in the 1990s.1,15 A central argument in this literature is that clinical practice should be
based on rigorous and systematic evidence rather than individual opinion. The EBM movement is evident
in a number of health systems, especially in Canada, in the USA and in the UK NHS, with explicit interest
in understanding the diffusion of evidence-based innovations.16–18 One of the central questions in
organisational innovation diffusion literature that aligns with the aims of this study is as follows: ‘Why do
innovations not readily spread, even if backed by strong (scientiﬁcally generated) evidence?’
There has now emerged considerable empirical evidence that argues that the adoption of health
technologies and innovations, even if supported by sound research evidence on effectiveness, is a far more
dynamic and complex process than previously suggested.19–22 The classic innovation diffusion model of
change, which has been particularly inﬂuential in UK health policy, suggests that the adoption of
innovative ideas, practices or products is conditioned by the interaction among the attributes of the
innovation, the characteristics of the adopter and the environment.23 However, this early innovation
diffusion work was criticised for adopting a simplistic rational view of change that ignores the complexities
of the change process: also focusing on individuals rather than organisations. Later work by Rogers24 partly
addressed the criticism by explicitly considering the adoption process within organisations.
Recent studies have departed from the linear model of innovation diffusion23 to offer more dynamic and
interactive conceptualisations25,26 and respond to a need for context-sensitive, contingent approaches.19,27
Building on this latter literature stream, it is suggested that innovation adoption is a process which is highly
dependent on the interactions among the innovation, local actors and contextual factors.11,27–31 These
factors include the interaction among the attributes of the innovation, the organisational context and
leadership;32 an organisational culture encouraging involvement, experimentation and learning;
micropolitical factors; support by peer and expert opinion leadership;23,30,33 social networks;23,34 structural
organisational characteristics;35 organisational capacity for absorbing new knowledge;36 and the existence
of a ‘receptive context for change’.37
Organisational innovation process and the use of evidence
The innovation process in organisations is complex and involves several stages. Damanpour and
Schneider38 suggest that the process can be divided into three broad phases of ‘pre adoption’, ‘adoption
decision’ and ‘post adoption’, also referred to in the literature as ‘initiation’, ‘adoption (decision)’ and
‘implementation’.24 In this report, we use the latter terminology, which is also more commonly applied in
the literature. Different concerns are central at the different phases, from an initial focus on innovation
awareness and information seeking, through innovation use and application to manage a task or solve
a problem, to consequences, and issues of sustainability. Adoption is often viewed as a process in which
organisational members examine the potential beneﬁts and costs or potential negative consequences of an
innovation on the basis of relevant knowledge.24 Potential adopters move from ‘ignorance’, through
awareness, attitude formation, evaluation, and on to adoption: ‘the decision to make full use of the
innovation as the best course of action available’. However, organisations should not be thought of as
merely rational decision-making entities and innovation as an ordered sequential process. Rather, the
adoption process should be recognised as complex, iterative and organic.19,26
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A key element in the organisational decision-making process that underpins innovation and technology
adoption is the availability of supporting evidence of effectiveness. Despite the challenges above, there has
been impetus for the development of EBMgt in health care to improve managerial decision-making
through the use of the ‘best available scientiﬁc evidence’.2,39 The integration of EBMgt with EBM is
advocated to enhance the performance of health-care organisations.3
However, within a health-care setting the evaluation of a technology can take a number of forms
and include technical, economic and social assessments. Adoption decisions involve a number of
stakeholders and thus it is important that the evidence used to support adoption is not just sufﬁcient
but also relevant and addresses the concerns of all parties. The earlier innovation evaluation stages are
concerned with technical assessments of efﬁciency40 – as well as efﬁcacy and safety in health-care
interventions41 – whereas the focus in the later stages includes considerations of ease of use and social
acceptance.42 It, thus, marks a move away from scientiﬁc assessment to consideration of the complete
value system for technology factors relating to types of evidence supporting adoption and contextual
factors that might help or hinder implementation.
Implementation includes local trials and evaluation. The approach taken to implementation needs to vary
according to the type and scale of the technology being adopted and the level and type of consequential
changes it brings about.43 For example, some technologies can be procured and put into service, whereas
others require strategies such as pilots and phased roll outs. Implementation is linked to trialling and
experimentation. For more complex technologies, and for those that require or lead to wider changes,
such as changes in practice of health-care staff and changes to a process involving several stakeholders or
cutting across departments, or even organisations, or need to be rolled out across many locations,
implementation may be more challenging.27 The end point for successful implementation will normally be
the point at which the technology has become integrated into everyday practice.
A different insight on innovation adoption is available in a recent scoping review by Ferlie et al.44 and
Crilly et al.,45 which conceptually synthesised issues of knowledge mobilisation in the NHS and, in particular,
the perceived gaps in the process of translating knowledge from ‘bench to bedside’. The change towards
EBMgt raises key questions such as ‘what evidence is considered as credible (and by whom)?’. And what is
regarded as a legitimate epistemological basis for validating evidence (what is viewed as legitimate
knowledge)? For example, should the evidence base for implementing an innovation into a speciﬁc context
be exclusively focused on scientiﬁc reproducibility? Or alternatively, should the basis of innovation evidence
take into account broader forms of evidence and wider concepts of what constitutes relevant and
acceptable forms of knowledge?
Sensemaking in organisations
When making decisions, managers need to justify these to themselves and to organisational members.
The sensemaking lens allows these two processes to be examined in context.46,47 Sensemaking theory is
a social psychological approach that emphasises cognitions. Sensemaking is about ‘reality’ as ‘an ongoing
accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs’
(p. 635).48 According to this perspective, values, beliefs, culture and language are important concepts.
Central to this approach is enactment: the important role that people play in creating the environments that
impose on them. The implications of a sensemaking lens in the evaluation of critical events is the difference
between action as an ‘individual making bad choices’ and action as a result of an individual in a set of
circumstances at a given time.49 The event is therefore reframed ‘where context and individual action overlap’
(p. 410).47 Thus, this perspective provides an analytical lens that helps understand actions in context.
The sensemaking perspective asks: how does a manager deﬁne his or her role? How is this shaped by the
organisational culture, by peers, by professionals, by patients? Does his or her educational and professional
background draw him or her to a particular paradigm of what constitutes evidence? This perspective is
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also interested in drawing out differences according to who the decision-maker is, and how individuals
inﬂuence the sensemaking of others.
The sensemaking lens has been useful because of the nature of health care, with multiprofessional work in
complex settings where organisational learning is important.50 As Fitzgerald and Dopson51 observe,
a clinical team is one example of an enactment of negotiated order, in which team members learn to
work with each other through repeated interpersonal encounters around joint tasks. Those members with
a higher degree of power are able to inﬂuence ways in which work roles are enacted.51 This interplay
between professionals is described well through nurses’ accounts in the management of hospitalised
babies.47 The nurse makes her case to the attendant physician that a baby requires immediate attention:
‘the ﬁrst nurse translates her concerns for the second more powerful nurse, who then rearticulates the
case using terms relevant to the Attending [physician]’ (p. 413).47
Weick and Sutcliffe,52 in their reanalysis of the inquiry into deaths at the Bristol Royal Inﬁrmary in the UK,
found an environment in which they could further demonstrate how small actions can enact a social
structure that keeps the organisation ‘entrapped in cycles of behavior that preclude improvement’
(p. 74);52 that is, easy explanations of an unusual situation should be challenged – this did not happen in
Bristol. In the study of patient safety, sensemaking provides a powerful lens, as ‘the most fundamental
level of data about patient safety is in the lived experience of staff as they struggle to function within an
imperfect system’ (p. 1556).53 Greenhalgh and coresearchers54 suggest collective sensemaking (developing
shared meaning) as one narrative approach to understanding issues of organisational innovation processes.
For proposed changes to be accepted and assimilated by providers and service users, the change ‘must
make sense in a way that relates to previous understanding and experience’ (p. 447).55
Our research questions aimed to explore ‘sensemaking’ in the local and wider contexts; that is, the
health-care organisation and the NHS environment.56 In addition, we explicitly set out to explore how
individual and collective sensemaking plays out – which is particularly pertinent when making decisions
about innovation adoption and implementation. This lens allows one to focus on an individual’s
sensemaking processes and how these iteratively ‘update’ ways of approaching decision-making and use
of evidence. This also allows reﬂection on how this process differs in ‘everyday’, more passive situations
compared with those of heightened activity owing to the need for decision-making, either because of
funding deadlines or because of external inﬂuences relevant to the empirical setting (in this case, infection
outbreaks or poor performance in the infection rates). In the latter, sensemaking is usefully applied along
Weick’s seven dimensions (grounded in identity construction; retrospective; enactive of sensible
environments; social; ongoing; focused on and extracted by cues; driven by plausibility rather than
accuracy), and emergent from this framework an appreciation of how ‘sense for self’ and ‘sense for
others’ plays out.
Here the concept of ‘making sense for others’ or ‘sensegiving’ is useful. Sensegiving ‘is concerned with the
process of attempting to inﬂuence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others towards a
preferred organisational reality’ (p. 442).57 The concept ﬁrst emerged as an explanatory concept in the
study of strategic change at an American university.57 In this ethnographic study, the researchers observed
the chief executive ofﬁcer (CEO) adopt a ‘sensegiving mode’ whereby his actions and cues were used to
‘make sense for others [organisational members]’. This concept relates to previous literature in the study of
organisational member behaviour, namely ‘impression management’58,59 and ‘self-monitoring’.60 (The
theory of self-monitoring60 proposes that individuals regulate their own behaviour in order to convey
alignment with a preferred behaviour in any given context or situation. High self-monitors monitor and
modify their behaviour to ﬁt different situations; low self-monitors are more consistent in behaviour across
situations.) Sensegiving describes the more purposeful and explicit action rather than implicit cues. The
sense-giver will also make sense of organisational member behaviour and in turn modify sensegiving.
The social production of reality for oneself is a very tacit process which shapes decision-making and
inﬂuences non-deliberate decisions. Sensemaking as justiﬁcation to self and the resulting decision is
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inﬂuenced by other factors such as legitimacy and plausibility to others, that is, the publicly accountable
decision. This lens pays particular attention to the social construction and coproduction of evidence
through the interaction of a range of diverse professional and managerial groups. We engage with this
body of literature summarised above, which has been useful in explaining organisational response to
critical events in the health-care setting,47,52 as well as to strategic change.61,62
Gaps in innovation, evidence-based health care and
organisational sensemaking literatures
In summary, we note four key gaps in the relevant literature streams on innovation, evidence use and
sensemaking in organisations which triggered our empirical exploration in this study.
First, with this study we address a signiﬁcant gap in evidence-based health-care implementation literature.
Namely, we respond to the call for more sustained interpretive work that explores the role and motives of
actors and the inﬂuence of the organisational context and the social construction of evidence.63
Second, despite the progress that has been achieved in our understanding of innovation diffusion and
adoption processes, a consistent issue raised in high-quality reviews of general innovation diffusion
literature26,64–66 and a review of related literature in health care19 is that empirical research has generally
been limited to a single level of analysis – individual, organisational or interorganisational – thus failing to
provide a holistic explanation of the inﬂuence of inter-related factors on innovation adoption and diffusion.
Our study aimed to address the aforementioned criticism by exploring the innovation adoption process and
by reﬂecting on inﬂuences at various embedded levels of analysis: namely, micro (individual), meso
(organisational) and macro (interorganisational) levels.
Third, there are few empirical cases exploring issues of health management decision-making that focus
on non-clinical decisions and particularly innovation, which is characterised by inherently high uncertainty
and ambiguity. Moreover, little primary research exists that links the use of evidence to adoption
decision-making and implementation within service organisations. We currently have a limited
understanding of how pluralist evidence bases (and the associated diverse epistemological bases) might be
reconciled or not in practice. The construction of shared meanings, or collective sensemaking,46 is key for
understanding how new types of evidence may be successfully embedded in certain contexts, or even be
rejected under conditions of innovation uncertainty and ambiguity.
Fourth, in sensemaking theory there is less emphasis on empirical studies that deal with the day-to-day
processes of sensemaking, rather than crises and critical events, and on the sensemaking that occurs
among many and diverse organisational stakeholders as they address a range of issues.46,62 By applying this
theoretical lens to the investigation of managerial decision-making on the adoption and implementation of
innovative technologies, we aim to empirically contribute to the ﬁeld.
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Chapter 3 Study design and methods
This study uses a comparative and processual case study design, that is, the study of organisationalprocesses over time in multiple cases. Speciﬁcally, the research focuses on nine case sites purposely
selected for comprising diverse organisational types, each with a potentially dissimilar level of engagement
with research organisations and internal capacity for knowledge production and utilisation. The research
also comprises 27 embedded microcases of speciﬁc technology products used to investigate the innovation
processes over time and the use of evidence in these processes. This chapter provides the rationale for this
research design and then considers the operational methods applied.
Study design
We employed a comparative case study approach with mixed methods. The employed study design aimed
to develop theory inductively from multiple in-depth case studies combining an inductive search for
emerging themes with deductive reason.67,68 Comparative case studies offer the opportunity for a deeper
insight to generate new conceptual and theoretical propositions or extend existing knowledge through
comparing, linking and integrating different cases. The main aim of this study has been to produce new
understanding of the access and use of research-based and other forms of knowledge by health-care
managers in organisational decisions. This can be achieved through detailed descriptions and a rich
understanding of contexts across the empirical sites. As our study objectives concerned interpretive ‘how’
and ‘why’ questions, our overarching design drew primarily on qualitative methodology.68 To retain the
richness of unique cases and enhance the generalisability and applicability of ﬁndings, individual case
studies were followed by cross-case analysis. Our study comprised nine ‘macrocases’ of acute-care
organisations, and, for eight of them, we further investigated 27 embedded ‘microcases’ of technology
product journeys, which we followed across the stages of the innovation process.
The selection of cases involved theoretical, rather than random, sampling.69 Nine acute NHS trusts were
selected across three broad geographic regions in England: (1) London, (2) northern and central England,
and (3) southern England. The nine research case studies were conducted concurrently. By focusing across
different localities, we sampled for diversity and aimed to explore the inﬂuence of any local network
effects if present, for instance, by comparing London-based institutions to non-London-based institutions,
bearing in mind the fact that London is a major cosmopolitan city which has many health-care institutions,
universities and research centres and in which a plethora of social and professional events take place on a
regular basis. We anticipated that this potential ‘regional effect’ might exert inﬂuence on the behaviour
and perceptions of academics, health professionals and managers.
In our sample of cases, we sampled for diverse organisational types, including examples of
research-engaged health-care organisations, such as AHSCs, university/teaching hospitals and ‘ordinary’
health-care service providers, such as district general hospitals (Table 1). To better delineate the impact of
contextual factors in research use and the application of various forms of evidence by health-care
managers on the same innovation, we included multiple ‘showcase hospitals’ – as selected by the
Department of Health – to evaluate the in-use value of HCAI technologies.
The study was conducted in two phases, looking in detail at processes in context. In phase 1 we ﬁrst
systematically examined espoused use of evidence by potential decision-makers in the studied
organisations; then, in phase 2 we systematically analysed the use of evidence in practice at the point of
decisions in relation to speciﬁc technology products. Phase 1 explored perceptions of senior and
operational managers and health professionals of different backgrounds in managerial roles across each
trust and, speciﬁcally, in IPC. Phase 2 explored those organisational members involved in the adoption
decisions and implementation of particular technologies in IPC. Eight of the nine trusts in our initial
sample participated in phase 2; trust 8 decided to withdraw from the study. This was a result of challenges
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faced by the trust in service delivery during the study period. Two infection outbreaks impacted
signiﬁcantly on the availability of staff to participate in our study.
A robust, systematic and participatory options appraisal (see Appendix 1) was carried out to inform the
sampling strategy of phase 2. This involved input from steering group members, expert advice by
Professor Sue Dopson, and input from peers within the research team and from NHS colleagues working
in IPC. One particular IPC priority area, namely ‘environmental hygiene/cleaning/disinfection’, was ﬁnally
selected. Other IPC areas considered but not sampled included ‘hand hygiene’, ‘diagnostics’, ‘antibiotic
prescribing’, ‘catheter-related care’, ‘training and education’, ‘medical devices/equipment hygiene’,
‘information technology surveillance systems’ and ‘patient hygiene’. Interview respondents at each trust
during phase 1 were asked to select three environmental hygiene innovations/technologies considered by
the trust from 2007 onwards (2007–12) as follows:
(a) A technology that has been selected but not implemented yet.
(b) A technology that has been selected and successfully implemented.
(c) A technology that has been rejected.
The initial selection of a technology may ﬁnally lead to adoption or rejection of organisational decisions.
Following earlier work,22,41 by ‘successful adoption’ we refer to the organisational executive decision to
introduce and make full use of a technology, which results in procurement. By ‘successful implementation’
we refer to the actual introduction of the new technology in the organisation, meaning that the technology
is put into use and operationalised; the extensiveness of implementation may vary from trust-wide use to
use in selected wards. The rationale for the selection of environmental hygiene as the IPC area of focus for
our empirical investigation in phase 2 and the deﬁned time period of 2007–12 are detailed below.
First, the selected time frame (dimension A in Appendix 1) captures the period when major policy
initiatives in IPC were implemented or already in place, for example, The Health Act 2006: Code of
Practice for the Prevention and Control of Healthcare Associated Infections (known as the ‘hygiene
code’);70 the introduction of the evidence-based EPIC-2 guidelines;71 the mandatory reporting of
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteraemia and Clostridium difficile infections
(April 2001 and January 2004, respectively); the Saving Lives programme 2007;72 and the Clean Safe Care
programme launched in 2008.6 We selected ‘environmental hygiene’ technologies because they
represented 50% of selection decisions according to a recent study of innovation adoption in IPC in
TABLE 1 Characteristics of case study site
Trust PFI Foundation AHSC
UH/
TH SH
BRC
2007–12
BRC
2012–17
BRU
2008–12
BRU
2012–17 DGH
T1 ✗ In the process ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
T2 ✓ In the process ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗
T3 ✓ In the process ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
T4 ✓ In the process ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
T5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
T6 ✓ In the process ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
T7 ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗
T9 ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
DGH, district general hospital; PFI, private ﬁnance initiative; SH, showcase hospitals (programme); TH, teaching hospital;
UH, university hospital; ✓, applicable to the trust; ✗, not applicable to the trust.
Source: trusts’ annual reports and ﬁnancial accounts.
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS
10
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
England.43,73 In addition, environmental hygiene is a cross-cutting intervention for various HCAIs. Such
interventions range from an inexpensive poster and basic cleaning products to expensive cutting-edge
technologies including hydrogen peroxide robots. This is a growing area in industry and has gathered
particular attention in recent years through regulations, such as the Department of Health’s Deep Clean
Programme. More importantly, a wide range of stakeholders could be involved to debate the evidence in
this area in contrast to a highly specialised or technical ﬁeld, such as diagnostics.
Conceptual framework
Our approach draws primarily on innovation diffusion theory of change.24 We speciﬁcally focus on four
factors (Figure 1) that health-care researchers11,21,22,27,31 broadly agree inﬂuence the adoption decision and
subsequent implementation of health innovations: (1) the perceived attributes of the innovative technologies,
(2) the characteristics of adopters, including both individual health-care managers and their organisations,
(3) contextual factors that include the relevant sector (NHS) and wider societal, political, economic and
institutional (symbolic, ideational and material) environments, and (4) the communication process.
Data collection strategy and methods
We employed a two-phased approach to the ﬁeld work. Phase 1 focused upon senior (director level,
including trust directors of medicine and nursing), middle-level and operational managers involved in
organisational decision-making. We focused on a speciﬁc type of organisational decision, the adoption of
innovative interventions, which entails uncertainty and the risk of newness, and thus offers great potential
for sourcing evidence from the decision-makers. Technology products for phase 2 research were then
sampled, which examined in detail the stakeholders involved in speciﬁc cases of evidence use in practice.
Primary data
In phase 1 the unit of analysis was the individual manager (non-clinical and clinical hybrid managers)
and the level of analysis was each of the nine trusts (macrocases). For phase 1 we used a combination
of semistructured interviews with structured questionnaires embedded in the interview schedules
(see Appendix 4). We employed a multilevel sample of key informants. Informants included senior, middle
and operational managers and representatives from different professional groups, including doctors,
infection control specialists, clinical microbiologists, nurses, pharmacists, allied health professionals and
non-clinical managers with diverse professional backgrounds (i.e. in engineering, science, accounting or
ﬁnance). The categories of evidence used in these questionnaires were informed by a previous study
on HCAI technology adoption funded by the Department of Health which involved 121 interviews with NHS
staff from 12 NHS trusts across England.22,43 The categories were further reﬁned and validated following
expert advice from policy-makers in the Health Protection Agency (HPA) and the Department of Health,
Macro context
Communication
Individual
AdopterInnovation
Health system
Organisation
FIGURE 1 A conceptual framework for the adoption of complex health innovations.
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as well as health professionals in IPC with non-clinical, nursing and medical backgrounds. We further
validated and ﬁnalised the categories in consultation with the members of our project steering group.
The primary focus of phase 2 was the mobilisation and use of evidence in the decision-making for speciﬁc
technology products ‘in context’ and in relation to the task of solving an identiﬁed problem in IPC. The
unit of analysis was the group of stakeholders involved through the innovation journey for each of the
selected technology products and the level of analysis was each of the eight trusts that participated in
phase 2 (macrocases) and each of the 27 embedded technology journeys (microcases).
The longitudinal, real-time design of the study was intended to give a better understanding than short-term
and ‘snap-shot’ methods. As well as these measures of methodological rigour through the study design and
methods of analysis, we used measures of acceptability and relevance of the research as deﬁned by key
stakeholders, namely professional, managerial and patient groups (e.g. patient environment action teams,
the two patient advisors who were members of the project’s steering group).
For both phases we also looked at the wider context through the systematic collection of secondary data
(discussed in more detailed below). For example, we considered for each macrocase the proﬁle of the
population, the institutional conditions (e.g. legislation and regulatory frameworks, the inﬂuence of
professional associations, social norms), intraorganisational factors, including practices and organisational
culture, and trusts’ history and tradition. For the microcases we additionally considered the capacity and
previous experience relating to the technology under consideration and similar innovations.
The research was conducted over a period of 2 years, between November 2010 and October 2012. After
ethical approvals were obtained, ﬁeld work and data collection began in April 2011, and was completed in
July 2012. The recruitment of respondents followed closely the plan outlined in Appendix 3, the study
protocol. YK or KH invited potential participants via e-mail to take part in the study and these e-mails were
accompanied by a participant information sheet (see Appendix 2). Our predeﬁned roles detailed in the
study protocol, suggestions by local study leads and snowballing shaped the actual respondents’ sample.
In addition, for phase 2 the ﬁnal sample of respondents was determined by participation of staff in the
adoption and/or implementation of the selected technology products studied in each of the eight trusts.
Very high respondent recruitment was achieved (> 90% acceptance of invitations with the exception
of T8, as outlined above). We used semistructured interview schedules for both phases of the research (see
Appendices 4 and 5).
Prior to the ﬁeld visits, interviewers familiarised themselves with contextual information on each trust and
information about IPC-related innovations. This enhanced their knowledge on local contexts and enabled
them to ask relevant questions to explore areas of further interest. On average, each interview lasted
60–90 minutes. Face- to-face interviews were conducted at trust sites, and we obtained prior consent to
audio record interviews (see Appendix 3). The total number of interviews was 191, including 126 for
phase 1 (with all 126 informants also having completed the embedded structured questionnaires) and
65 semistructured interviews for phase 2. The detailed breakdown per trust and professional background
of informant is summarised in Tables 2 (phase 1) and 3 (phase 2).
Secondary data
We systematically collected data from secondary sources (both trust speciﬁc and global) for each case
study site to obtain a detailed contextual description for each trust. The trust-speciﬁc sources included the
following: trusts’ annual reports and ﬁnancial accounts (2007/08; 2008/09; 2009/10; 2010/11; 2011/12
where available and applicable), trusts’ quality accounts (2009/10; 2010/11; 2011/12), reports by the
director of IPC (DIPC) (where available), trust board meeting minutes (where available), staff magazines,
and newsletters and/or bulletins that were published up to spring 2011. We also collected publications
from governmental or regulatory agencies, including the CQC (previously the Healthcare Commission),
the Audit Commission, the Monitor and the Network of Public Health Observatories, to highlight wider
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contextual factors that might inﬂuence the innovation decision-making processes at the trusts. We
systematically reviewed a total of > 800 documents derived from the aforementioned sources. The
trust-speciﬁc secondary data sources supplemented and/or triangulated other data sources, including
global secondary data sources and our primary data originating from interviews with trust managers.
Data analysis
Data analysis comprised six interlinked and, to some extent, overlapping stages: (1) transcribing of
qualitative data; (2) initial open coding of interview data focusing around the research questions;
(3) systematic coding of interview data; (4) cleaning, error checking, creation of descriptive summaries
and tabulation of the questionnaire data; (5) individual case study analyses; and (6) cross-case analysis.
Soon after the completion of interviews, the content of audio recordings was verbatim transcribed by
professional transcribers – an independent professional and an agency. The linguistic accuracy of texts was
checked by the interviewers themselves, and, whenever transcribers felt unsure, the researchers who
conducted the interviews conﬁrmed the accuracy of the text and revised it accordingly by paying close
attention to the raw interview data. Interviewees validated most transcripts (the option was offered to
obtain a copy their transcribed interview).
Upon completion of transcription, three researchers thoroughly read through the full transcribed texts
several times to enable understanding of the meaning of the data in their entirety.74 The reviewing of data
prior to coding helped us identify emergent themes without losing the connections between concepts and
the context associated with these concepts. The qualitative data analysis computer software package
TABLE 2 Informant sample for phase 1
Type of informant
Number of respondents per trust
TotalT1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9
Doctor 5 2 3 2 3 2 4 1 2 24
Nurse 10 9 8 5 5 8 6 1 9 61
Non-clinical manager 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 0 1 25
Allied health professional 1 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 6
Pharmacist 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 10
Total 20 16 17 13 15 14 15 3 13 126
TABLE 3 Informant sample for phase 2
Type of informant
Number of respondents per trust
TotalT1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T9
Doctor – – – – – 1 – – 1
Nurse 7 4 5 3 (6) 7 4 7 7 44 (47)
Non-clinical manager 3 4 3 1 – 1 1 2 15
Allied health professional – – – 1 – – – – 1
Pharmacist – – – – – – – 1 1
Total 10 8 8 5 (8) 7 6 8 10 62 (65)
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NVivo 9 (QSR International, Cambridge, MA) was used to systematically code the collected data and assist
analysis. In line with recommendations by qualitative methodologists, we used multiple coders (MI, RA,
KH, YK) to enhance inter-rater reliability of the qualitative study.74,75
Our qualitative analysis followed an integrated approach.76 We employed an inductive approach to open
up new lines of enquiry and then agreed a framework for data analysis based on these ﬁndings together
with our conceptual framework (delineating factors that inﬂuence the adoption process of complex health
innovations, see also Figure 1).
The development of the code structure was ﬁnalised when the point of theoretical saturation was reached
in each of the empirical cases.69,77 Secondary data were used as complementary to the preliminary
interpretation (based on interview data) of each case study and for triangulation, through cross-checking
the validity of claims in interview accounts. Field notes taken by the interviewers during the visits to the
trusts were shared with the other members of the research team during analysis of the interview and
documentary data. The ﬁeld notes provided a ‘feeling’ for each trust, allowed for a better understanding
of the trust context and included explanatory information about the ‘technologies in use’. In particular,
the ﬁeld notes helped sensitise and ‘acclimatise’ the researchers not familiar with the microcases.
Analysis within cases was followed by a cross-case analysis of emergent themes. The cross-case analysis
commenced with a systematic examination of the data based on our research questions. We compared
the data on these questions across the macrocases and across the microcases (technology product
journeys). Individual case study reports with common formats were produced for each of the eight trusts
that participated in phase 2. Summary tables were used to simultaneously compare several categories and
dimensions of the content and context of change implied by the adoption and implementation of the
innovative technologies across the nine trusts. The above strategies helped us to reduce the volume of
primary data. The ﬁnal interpretation was conducted through comparison and integration of seemingly
common or contradictory themes, categories, patterns and cases.
Learning from project challenges
The context of the NHS poses challenges to access to participants. In the ﬁeld of IPC, this is further
exacerbated because critical events can pose high demands on IPC teams and senior management within
trusts. We employed a multifaceted approach to gaining access, building on our previous relationship with
ﬁve of the trusts in the ﬁrst instance. We found that the nature of the research questions prompted
genuine interest and, therefore, engagement in the research. We were able to access a higher than initially
anticipated number of respondents. Nonetheless, these very pressures resulted in incomplete participation
in the study for one of the trusts, T8.
The initial delays in gaining ethics approval and then local access did make data collection challenging.
Internal contingency and a highly ﬂexible approach by the research team was employed to maximise
interview opportunities at each research site visit.
We found that the guidance from our expert steering committee and, notably, our patient advisors helped
with every stage of the research process, enhancing the quality of the research. Perspectives from health
policy, quantitative methods and accounting, organisational management, service users, and IPC and
service managers were present and debated. The multidisciplinary make up of this group reﬂected well
the stakeholders we were studying and allowed a reﬂexive approach to data analysis and will inform
dissemination activities beyond the project.
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Chapter 4 Challenges in making sense of evidence
In this chapter we summarise some key themes from the qualitative study, which drew on primary datacollected through interviews in phase 1. These themes were deemed helpful in providing a conceptual
understanding of the main ‘challenges to making sense of evidence’ reported by the informants. The
emergent issues discussed in this chapter help place individual sensemaking of evidence by health-care
managers in the context of the hospital and wider NHS environment.
Ongoing sensemaking: keeping up with the evolving evidence
The very nature of evidence as emergent, iterative and changing featured in the majority of interviews with
respondents, particularly as the context of this research was innovation. The accuracy of evidence therefore
had a temporal dimension, irrespective of the source of the evidence, or the audience making sense of the
evidence. The need for ‘up-to-date’ evidence, which sometimes needed to be generated locally, was an
important theme in respondents’ accounts:
Well-written trials that have been peer reviewed and written up in trusted journals. But I am also now
old enough to see that some of the things that we took as facts, 10 years ago, have already been
proved incorrect.
T5M4 – doctor
This evolving landscape of evidence posed a challenge, therefore, for individuals and groups when making
decisions about adoption and methods of implementation. Further challenges to making sense of evidence
reported by the respondents ranged from the individual’s internal capacity to process the scientiﬁc data
presented to external factors, such as the lack of evidence in the speciﬁc areas of innovation and IPC.
The lack of ‘high-quality’ evidence was reported by the majority of respondents, although this deﬁnition
of quality varied across the professional groups and is discussed later when we look at the importance
attributed to various sources and types of evidence (see Chapter 5):
As a doctor I go to the medical literature, didn’t find a lot. So my nurses came back with a lot of
nursing literature evidence. Which I felt was of poorer quality evidence, but there was a large volume
of it, so it was put into the mix somewhere.
T3M3 – doctor
In terms of the individual’s internal capacity, respondents across the professional groups cited difﬁculties
in understanding the evidence presented in published papers and reports. Speciﬁcally, 75% of medical
hybrid managers and 77% of nursing hybrid managers said that they sometimes found ‘the content of
presented evidence difﬁcult to understand’. Similarly, the majority in each of these groups found it
‘difﬁcult to relate evidence to practice’: 63% of doctors and 72% of nurses. The non-clinical managers
reported a different experience – 60% stated that they sometimes found the content of presented
evidence difﬁcult to understand, but only 40% had difﬁculty in relating this to practice.
There was consistency among the groups in agreeing that different professional groups have access to
different sources of evidence because of different needs for evidence. This access and need for different
types of evidence was deemed to have direct implications for practice:
If everybody isn’t looking at the same piece of information it can affect how you make the decision
because we can all be coming at it from different points of view. I can say generally speaking within this
organisation when we are looking to do anything we get the relevant people round the table. It’s not
that IPC would make a decision that would impact on the provider without involving, they would involve
our actual service provider and we will be involved as well. And I do think we do that well really.
T2M2 – non-clinical manager
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Missing research evidence
Looking in greater detail at the gap in evidence or ‘missing evidence’ as identiﬁed by the respondents,
there is more consensus than variation on this issue across professional groups and across the trusts.
Challenges arising from the lack of relevant evidence as well as incomplete evidence were mentioned by
the majority of respondents. For example, a laboratory-based/microbiology study may be available for a
given product but no studies relating to cost. Implementation studies may be available, but may only
report a ward-based small study, which may not be relevant to the hospital-wide context. A lack of
product trials was described, the products being either untested in the ‘real-world’ setting or untested in
the locally relevant setting. Particularly among doctors, basing decisions within the context of incomplete
evidence was reported as not just a challenge but undesirable:
There’s damn all evidence most of the time. So we’re very used to doing what seems sensible
from first principles, which may not actually be, so often we do things without a formal level of
evidence basically.
T9M2 – doctor
It’s difficult because some of the things we do I must admit they are based on very little evidence.
T1M17 – doctor
It [personalised care plans for renal patients] was a good idea but it wasn’t trialled anywhere, there
was no sort of pilot study to demonstrate how much time it was going to take to fill these things out,
whether they would actually be useful, did the patients think they were useful, did the doctors think
it was useful.
T5M5 – doctor
These ﬁndings have an important implication as to what managers currently perceive as ‘incomplete
evidence’ in research when making decisions on innovation adoption, and what future research should
focus on to meet such local needs.
Types or topics of research studies perceived as missing by the respondents did vary across the
respondents and across the trusts, but views converged for three types of research study, which were
identiﬁed as missing in the following order: behavioural studies, implementation research and
organisational studies or management research.
Approximately one-third of respondents in trusts T1, T3, T6 and T9 felt a need for behavioural studies to
assist decision-making, implementation and evaluation. Speciﬁcally, interest in behavioural studies was
driven by the need to overcome ‘non-compliant’ behaviour; insights into bringing about change in the way
people work; learning from training and development mechanisms; and better communication. More
importantly, the respondents identiﬁed a need for better understanding of decision-making across the
different levels of hospital staff, from senior management to front-line staff:
I think that there is quite a lot of management research that is missing. Partly because managers
don’t tend to do a great deal of research in this organisation. Then again all the behavioural work
that is done is linked to nursing or medical, I think this is the first research that I have seen that is
linked to managers as well. I would like to see a lot more research based around behaviours and how
managers and clinical staff could work much better together, to deliver a health service, because I see
models out there where they work so well and yet somehow the NHS cannot get it right across the
whole trust.
T1M1 – non-clinical manager
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Yeah not enough is done around the whole decision architecture and influencing behaviours in the
clinical areas. How do we improve behaviours? Not just in the clinical areas, managerial areas,
but how do we improve the way we work which is not around new technologies but how can
we stop wasting huge amounts of time repeating the same things over and over again.
T1M10 – doctor
The ‘missing evidence’ highlighted by respondents is interlinked and demonstrated a need by the hospital
managers not only for applied, meaningful evidence use in adoption decision-making itself, but also more
operational and managerial research. This ranged from effective management to psycho-social research
about behaviour change and receptive organisational culture. The following respondent highlighted a shift
in evidence needs – highlighting what is most useful to managers:
My research brain has gone exponential in the last year or two. I think there needs to be far more
focus on the behavioural and cultural aspects of innovation spread as well as just the subject matter.
Because the understanding ‘how’ to challenge the behaviours and ‘how’ to develop the people who
are involved in the organisations is far more important than the actual evidence that drives it.
Increasingly I’m convinced more and more.
T3M4 – doctor
[. . .] where we’ve got the catheter project, the CAUTI project we’re doing, where we’ve got John
who’s our clinical academic, we’re looking at doing some sort of research around people’s decision
making as to why they’re putting catheters in. [. . .] Why do people make those decisions to do that
or why do people make decisions to move away from the guideline that’s there [. . .] There’s a lot,
from an infection prevention point of view there’s a lot of scientific type stuff we could do but that is
quite difficult already because we don’t want to inject people with, but [. . .] I find that behaviour
really interesting as to why people do make the decisions they do.
T9M1 – nurse
I work with a public health doctor and he was really interested in implementing change, change
methodology. And I think as much importance of thinking about that as thinking about the evidence.
If the evidence stacks up, or evidence doesn’t stack up particularly well. You could have good
evidence and poor implementation and no effect. Poor evidence not even particularly good but with
really good implementation will make it improve but almost, I think there is something there. What I
would say [is] that even if I’d like to assimilate stuff, actually it’s not what other people want to do,
you don’t have the time to do it. Lots of people who are over-committed and busy and sometime go,
I’m sure there is something better unless you tell me what you want to do.
T9M8 – doctor
This type of management literature was not accessible to the respondents largely because of the sources
used by these professionals, and also because of the time constraints faced by these professionals, who
were not able to branch out to wider literature streams.
Of the professionals groups, pharmacists appeared to be more aware of the discrepancy between
recommended practice (through national or local guidelines and protocols) and ‘non-adherence’ or
‘deviation’ of behaviour than the other professionals in our study sample. Approximately two-thirds of
respondents, despite the small sample size, commented on the importance of behavioural studies and the
lack of such studies. One-quarter of nurses and non-clinical managers identiﬁed the importance of studies
to address ‘non-adherence’ to guidelines, whereas this view was less prevalent in accounts from medical
managers and missing in accounts from managers with an allied health professional background. Medical
managers were the ‘outliers’ in terms of being less concerned about understanding behavioural change in
greater depth.
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Making sense of evidence for self and others
Sourcing practice-based evidence was mentioned as being important across professional groups. The
practice of learning from other trusts and peers featured across respondents’ accounts. This was because
of the locally relevant information in practice-based evidence but also because of the exchange of
information which is possible through such means:
A microbiologist in another hospital or someone who has used something in practice and any
research or studies they have done, that is usually the most useful. I guess because you are talking
to them you can ask questions and get feedback straight away, so you know where you are with it.
So that’s a really good source.
T7M3 – doctor
Upon direct questioning, respondents reported a hierarchy of evidence, but this was articulated more as
processual rather than as an objective vertical hierarchy, or means to exclude certain forms of evidence.
Although the ﬁrst port of call may be scientiﬁc randomised controlled trials (when available), this was
assessed in tandem with experiential evidence:
We used that, literature searches for that [Gentamicin (antibiotic) as first line for the treatment of
urinary tract infections]. But we also used experience of other hospitals, our own experiences, we
drew on that. So actually it was probably a decision which was much more of a pragmatic decision
rather than a pure academic-based decision.
T3M17 – pharmacist
The approach described by the majority of respondents was an iterative process of ‘triangulating’ different
types of evidence. There were few reports of an evidence dichotomy within professional groups, but rather
a more complex picture of synthesis across the professional groups. Paradoxically, many respondents
did view other professional groups as having a more dichotomous approach to evidence, as illustrated
by this view of non-clinical managers:
[. . .] if they’re an accountant it will be purely based on cost effectiveness without looking at the wider
picture of your added value this technique may bring.
T1M19 – doctor
This view was reciprocated by non-clinical managers:
Partly because people spend more time critiquing the research paper than looking at how we can
implement it, or not implement it or how we can try it ourselves. That’s how we get stuck sometimes,
people spending too much time focusing on their research, was it true was it evidence-based, did it
have flaws?
T1M1 – non-clinical manager
A contested ground emerged, with each professional group claiming a more rounded view of evidence
and perceiving other groups as taking a one-dimensional approach.
The quest for evidence of doctors was driven primarily by plausibility and accuracy to self. The evidence
sought was largely of a biomedical nature. Doctors appreciated that the cost-effectiveness of interventions
was important but, as shown above, described non-clinical managers’ approach as too focused on the
business case.
Although both the nursing group and the non-clinical managers group reported a relatively balanced
multidimensional view to evidence, the motivation for sourcing a diverse evidence base was different for
these two groups. Non-clinical managers took a multidimensional view to satisfy the major objective in their
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organisational role, that is, to improve performance and outcomes. Nurses were driven primarily by the need
to ‘make the case’ for others and appreciated that different professionals had different evidence needs:
Most of things I do are evidence-based. I would be looking for things such as standard of
construction, standard of validation with processing that sort of thing. I can’t honestly say that I can
think of an instance that I did something where I didn’t actually have the evidence.
T2M12 – non-clinical manager
Non-clinical managers were similar to doctors in that the way they made sense of evidence was driven
primarily by ‘plausibility and accuracy to self’, although their sensemaking was based on different views of
evidence. That is, what came to count as evidence for doctors and non-clinical managers was different,
but what counted most was that they themselves were satisﬁed with the evidence. The nursing group
differed markedly in this respect from the doctors and non-clinical managers. The nursing hybrid managers
focused on the pursuit of evidence for ‘plausibility and accuracy for self and others’. For the nurses, what
counted as evidence to others mattered equally and sometimes more than their own satisfaction with
evidence. This shaped the types and sources of evidence used by nurses.
In the nursing group, we found there was a high awareness of different types of evidence being relevant
to different organisational members. They appreciated the evidence needs of those working both at the
front-line and at more strategic levels, and the needs across professional groups. Nurses were also the only
group to make explicit reference to the perceptions of patients. Plausibility to others thus featured highly in
accounts by nurses. Nurses made purposeful attempts to frame evidence using language which was
meaningful and tailored to the audience. Nurses also were aware of their own professional role and identity
and how they were perceived by others – that is, being reﬂective on their own ‘credibility’ as sources of
evidence. This non-clinical manager articulated this varying credibility of the presenter of evidence:
Although it galls me to say it but I think the medical colleagues within the team are better at
accessing [evidence] and they may come to a meeting and say I have had a look at the evidence.
I don’t think it could necessarily have been a systematic review of the evidence. Stating quite
confidently a particular position and that could be quite influential so that is something they are more
likely to do than nursing members of the team.
T7M13 – non-clinical manager
Nurses therefore approached sourcing evidence in a systematic and comprehensive way in order to ﬁnd
evidence that was meaningful and accurate for themselves as well as for signiﬁcant others. There was a
convergence towards synthesising diverse forms of evidence, but, ultimately, evidence synthesis was
grounded in the biomedical paradigm. This was partly a result of their own training but also reﬂected a
need to resonate with doctors, who were consistently identiﬁed as inﬂuential stakeholders in
organisational decision-making:
You will see it in very specialist nurses that they will do scoping exercises around what the evidence is,
systematic review around evidence of implementing a certain thing and clinical evidence to support it.
I think the reason why nurses do that is because they know that the doctors, that are going to try
and influence [the decision], will ask them for that evidence, so they already do it.
T1M2 – nurse
I think it is the availability of good quality evidence and research something that will convince the
senior members and the medical staff that this is a good quality piece of research, peer reviewed etc.
T6M5 – senior nurse
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I can remember quite clearly presenting to our anaesthetist body, some 200 odd anaesthetists on one
of the clinical audit days, on a topic, [. . .] around line care, and the changes we had made in the
organisation. And there was one consultant, a specific consultant who’d been a problem all the way
through, he’d not engaged well. We gave the presentation, we demonstrated what we’d achieved in
the organisation since we’d introduced our changes in practice, and he actually turned round in
front of the other 200, and he said ‘I change my opinion’, he says, ‘I accept what you’ve been
championing’. And to be honest that was one of the most powerful moments in my career, to get
that individual to, in front of 200 of his colleagues, to turn round and say ‘I’ve seen the light.’ [. . .]
And sort of do, do the St Paul’s Damascus moment, it was just, it was tremendous, [. . .] It was
strongly presented with good, we used, took an epidemiological approach to demonstrate that the
changes we had made had had a significant impact.
T8M1 – nurse
Nurses were aware of the use of evidence for different agendas, but overall perceived that evidence was
used primarily for the beneﬁt of patients in the context of ﬁnancial constraints. This, in turn, led to the
need for combining different types of evidence (i.e. clinical effectiveness, cost, usability) to satisfy the
perceptions and priorities of key organisational stakeholders – from doctors to managers.
Doctors and non-clinical managers were both mindful of issues of cost-effectiveness, particularly given that
our sample in phase 1 comprises senior managers.
The ﬁndings from the qualitative interviews are validated by quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis
shows that nurses were aware of, and utilise more widely, the full range of centrally available evidence
sources when compared with the other professional groups (see Chapter 5). In addition, nurses were more
formally engaged across the phases of the innovation process, whereas doctors were more formally
involved in the later phases of technology adoption decisions and post-implementation evaluation. The
nursing group was, across the trusts, more formally tasked with ‘making the case’ to diverse groups.
Across respondent groups, plausibility to self was closely linked with perceived ‘accuracy’ of the evidence.
This was inﬂuenced by social and personal identities situated within a wider organisational context. For
example, ﬁnancial considerations were evident in the sensemaking of the majority of respondents. The
inﬂuences of the local and macro context of ﬁnancial parsimony added to the challenges of making sense
of evidence:
Financial viability [. . .] that has rapidly changed, we have to justify everything that is new in terms
of spending.
T1M2 – nurse
Reﬂection on this chapter
In summary, all respondents reported that they experienced challenges in making sense of evidence.
Key issues that contributed to this were reported as a lack of capacity or skills to process presented
evidence, a lack of time to thoroughly search for and review the evidence base, unawareness of
appropriate literature on management and implementation research and poor perceived quality of
available evidence. Professional background and training coupled with differential access to different
evidence reinforced some of the divergence in the type of evidence accessed. Pursuit of evidence to satisfy
oneself or others was found to guide action and explained some of the complexity in the process of
decision-making. Looking across the professional groups, what counted as evidence for doctors and
non-clinical managers was different, but what counted most was that they themselves (doctors
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and non-clinical managers) were satisﬁed with the evidence. For the nurses, what counted as evidence to
others mattered equally and sometimes more than their own satisfaction with evidence. This shaped the
types and sources of evidence used by nurses.
As regards perceived missing evidence, three research study types were identiﬁed by respondents:
behavioural studies, implementation research, and organisational and management research. Pharmacists
were particularly mindful of the need to understand behavioural change within organisations, particularly
in relation to non-compliance with guidelines.
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Chapter 5 Making sense of evidence in the
health-care organisational and macro context
In this chapter we summarise ﬁndings on how non-clinical and clinical hybrid managers from variousprofessional backgrounds reported on how they make sense of evidence within the health-care context.
We review how they access and use different sources and types of evidence related to innovation decisions
and outline key contextual inﬂuences at organisational and macro levels within IPC and the NHS. This
chapter draws on data from, ﬁrst, the structured questionnaires embedded in the phase 1 interview
schedule and, subsequently, from the semistructured interviews themselves.
We outline the espoused use of evidence by the decision-makers. First, we look at the reported use of
more general sources of evidence (such as peer-reviewed journals, professional networks, peers, the
industry) to inform the decision-making of different professionals. Second, we outline the reported
awareness and use of central evidence sources including sources directly linked to IPC. Third, we outline
responses on the use of different types of evidence (such as systematic reviews, guidelines, economic cost
analyses and expert opinion). In the ﬁnal sections, we delineate important inﬂuences on the use of
evidence by health-care decision-makers from the organisational context (main level of analysis) and the
wider context.
In the proceeding chapters we ﬁnd out how this espoused use is actioned.
Innovation decisions: evidence sources
Figure 2 presents the use of more general sources of evidence, such as peer-reviewed journals,
professional networks, peers and the industry, in decision-making by different professionals.
Few non-clinical managers sourced peer-reviewed journals, either management or clinical. This group
clearly veered towards centralised and standardised sources of evidence (Department of Health agencies),
internal updates and also locally derived evidence from other health-care organisations. They were the
only group to source management consultants. These sources align well with the organisational role of
non-clinical managers as well as the diversity in professional background of this group. Non-clinical
managers were reported to show the least preference (15/25) for accessing evidence through their
professional networks out of the different professional groups: doctors (22/24), nurses (53/61), pharmacists
(10/10) and allied health professionals (6/6).
Nurses reported a uniform and consensus view within this group, reporting use of a wide range of sources.
Doctors, allied health professionals and pharmacists displayed very similar patterns of reported evidence use
with a strong preference for professional networks and most making use of academic institutions.
Across the professional groups, and not surprisingly given the context of the interviews was innovation,
text books were not reported as an evidence source. Mass media was evident as a source for only a few
nurses and non-clinical managers. Peer-reviewed management journals were mentioned as a source by
only a few of the allied health professionals.
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FIGURE 2 Evidence sources – breakdown by professional group. (a) Doctors; (b) nurses; (c) non-clinical managers;
(d) allied health professionals; and (e) pharmacists. DH, Department of Health. (continued)
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FIGURE 2 Evidence sources – breakdown by professional group. (a) Doctors; (b) nurses; (c) non-clinical managers;
(d) allied health professionals; and (e) pharmacists. DH, Department of Health. (continued)
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Innovation decisions: awareness and use of central evidence
sources including sources concerning infection prevention
and control
Figure 3 details the reported awareness and use of central evidence sources, including sources directly
linked to IPC. Central here refers to those sources available across professional groups, generated by the
Department of Health or one of the Department of Health’s arm’s length bodies.
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FIGURE 2 Evidence sources – breakdown by professional group. (a) Doctors; (b) nurses; (c) non-clinical managers;
(d) allied health professionals; and (e) pharmacists. DH, Department of Health.
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FIGURE 3 Knowledge and use of central evidence sources – breakdown by professional group. (a) Doctors; (b) nurses;
(c) non-clinical managers; (d) allied health professionals; and (e) pharmacists. NHS PASA, NHS Purchasing and Supply
Agency; NPSA, National Patient Safety Agency; SDO, Service Delivery and Organisation programme. (continued)
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FIGURE 3 Knowledge and use of central evidence sources – breakdown by professional group. (a) Doctors; (b) nurses;
(c) non-clinical managers; (d) allied health professionals; and (e) pharmacists. NHS PASA, NHS Purchasing and Supply
Agency; NPSA, National Patient Safety Agency; SDO, Service Delivery and Organisation programme.
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The majority of respondents across the ﬁve professional groups reported awareness of the NICE, the
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) and National Service Frameworks. In addition, the majority reported
using these sources and all nurses, pharmacists and allied health professionals reported using NICE
guidelines. Comparatively, NHS evidence was less known and, consequently, less used. The majority, with
the exception of non-clinical managers, were aware of The Cochrane Library. Non-clinical managers
reported use of National Service Frameworks less frequently, which is broadly in line with their non-clinical
roles. Overall, pharmacists and allied health professionals displayed very similar patterns of reported
awareness and use of central sources.
With regards to central sources speciﬁc to IPC, non-clinical managers, allied health professionals and
pharmacists were least aware, with the former NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency (PASA) being the only
source known, or reported to be used, by these respondents. Half of the doctors were aware of the
former NHS PASA, Clean Safe Care website, HPA Rapid Review Panel (RRP) and the Department of
Health’s Showcase Hospitals programme, with fewer reporting using these sources. A larger proportion of
nurses were aware, and reported use, of these sources. Across the professional groups, a small minority
were aware of the Smart Solutions programme, Smart Ideas, Product Surgeries, Centre for Evidence Based
Purchasing and the National Technology Adoption Centre.
Innovation decisions: perceived importance of evidence types
Figure 4 details responses on the perceived importance of different types of evidence (such as systematic
reviews, guidelines, economic cost analyses and expert opinion).
As demonstrated in the qualitative analysis, high importance was accorded to economic cost analysis
(including cost-effectiveness, cost–beneﬁt, cost-minimisation and cost–utility analyses) by the majority of
respondents across the professional groups. Overall, nurses gave high importance to a wide range of
evidence types. Doctors’ responses peaked on guidelines and systematic reviews; quantitative research was
accorded high importance by the majority of doctors.
Non-clinical managers were reported to place high importance on the business case and related evidence.
They also reported high preference for locally generated evidence, such as empirical trials in other trusts,
and the personal experience of colleagues.
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FIGURE 4 Perceived importance of evidence types – breakdown by professional group. (a) Doctors; (b) nurses;
(c) non-clinical managers; (d) allied health professionals; and (e) pharmacists. (continued)
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MAKING SENSE OF EVIDENCE IN THE HEALTH-CARE ORGANISATIONAL AND MACRO CONTEXT
30
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
Guidelines
Cohort studies
Cross-sectional surveys
Economic cost analyses
Empirical trial in
other trusts
Experience of
colleagues
Expert opinion
Implementation research
Laboratory studies
Mixed-methods
research studies
Multiple case
studies research
Own research
Qualitative research
studies
Quantitative research
studies
Rapid Review Panel
recommendation
Systematic review and
meta-analysis
Supplier marketing
Business case
Medium importance
High importance
(d)
Use by esteemed health care
Trial and piloting by your trust
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Guidelines
Cohort studies
Cross-sectional surveys
Economic cost analyses
Empirical trial in
other trusts
Experience of
colleagues
Expert opinion
Implementation research
Laboratory studies
Mixed-methods
research studies
Multiple case studies research
Own research
Qualitative research studies
Quantitative research
studies
Rapid Review Panel
recommendation
Systematic review and
meta-analysis
Supplier marketing
Business case
Medium importance
High importance
(e)
Use by esteemed health care
Trial and piloting by your trust
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Organisational context: inﬂuences on the use of evidence
The temporal dimension emerged as a strong theme inﬂuencing the use of evidence, but particularly so in
the hospital context. The macro environment of infection control in England was widely reported to have
affected the nature and speed of decision-making in the hospitals studied. Notably, pressures to make
decisions did not always allow the ‘preferred’ evidence synthesis to inform decision-making:
Change is forced upon you from my own personal experience in infection prevention and control. For
example, a few years ago we had a huge outbreak of C. difﬁcile, so we had to do something
immediately in response, or people’s lives were at risk. You can’t sort of gather evidence and then go
through all the processes; you have to make an instant decision. I had to make a decision overnight,
what we were going to do to prevent this outbreak escalating. So obviously I was aware of the
Department of Health Guidance, other people’s experience. I had to make reasonable rapid decision.
T4M1 – doctor
The use of evidence stemming from policy mandates featured, not surprisingly, in the accounts from
non-clinical managers; in addition, similar accounts were reported by other respondent groups with
reference to non-clinical managers. The use of this type of evidence was inﬂuenced not only by the
organisational role of non-clinical managers, but also by the wider policy context and pressures. These
pressures, although evident to other respondents to varying degrees, were nonetheless more acutely
relevant to non-clinical managers.
Respondents across all groups mentioned that the pressures in IPC were intensiﬁed by an organisational
and sometimes departmental drive to urgently respond to IPC issues:
Well again it comes, if you have individual areas within an organisation for whom a change is
perceived by them as being very important, and so therefore they will, if in a sort of unrefined way a
development results in increased patient benefit, the people that practise in that area will
undoubtedly push very hard for that. They will not necessarily be concerned about what the
organisational consequences of that change will be. And so you require, that’s the role of senior
management, is to try and, if you like, harmonise laudable ambition in some areas with what can be
practically achieved for the best good of the patients as a whole.
T3M14 – doctor
High importance was reported to be given to meeting the organisational IPC targets, as they constituted
one of the key performance indicators for the trusts. In the respondents’ views, such pressures often
resulted in staff feeling the necessity to ‘act’ and make decisions rapidly. This had a temporal dimension,
narrowing the time frame in which evidence could be gathered, synthesised and used to inform decisions.
As the quotes below illustrate, many respondents perceived such pressures to adversely affect the quality
and effectiveness of organisational decision-making:
[. . .] I suppose the pressures often force rapid reactions which are often not particularly evidence
based. And I think what we often find, is we respond quickly, in a let’s do something way and then
we look back that actually after a time the evidence for that wasn’t fantastic, actually we didn’t really
look at the evidence what we could have done.
T1M8 – doctor
For IPC, I just think sometimes they (the pressures) can act as a distraction and therefore prevent the
proper level of thoroughness we want around looking at plans and seeing.
T7M10 – allied health professional
However, for other respondents a thorough approach to evidence gathering and reviewing was primarily
conditioned by intrinsic individual motivation and organisational impetus for continuous improvement
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and critical thinking. Hence, according to this group of respondents, policy and organisational pressures
in IPC incentivised staff to look out for innovations and source evidence in their quest to ﬁnd solutions
to problems:
I would say, [the pressure] incentivises the use of evidence; so if you take C. diff[icile] for example
we’ve tried to tap into all sorts of evidence to get on top of our C. diff[icile] rate. So if you take the,
hydrogen peroxide, the cleaning, we’ve nearly exhausted all sorts of evidence base now to try and get
on top of that figure. So I think it incentivises. You’re always striving, aren’t you? Is there something
else out there that we haven’t thought about that tackles a particular infection?
T4M5 – nurse
I think they (the pressures) incentivise. Because we’re constantly under pressure, pressuring ourselves
and pressure externally to improve things, it is an incentive to constantly look for, to review our
processes and ways of working.
T9M1 – nurse
I don’t think they inhibit I think there is more incentive to look at new products to see what you are
doing to critically analyse where you are going and look at the new innovations that are out there
and what other trusts are doing. And constantly keep your eye on the ball so to speak. I think
10 years ago it was we have always done this, we’re always going to do it, it has always worked
there is no problem and it was a bit like putting your head in the sand. Whereas now you have
constantly got to look at what you’re doing and why you’re doing it.
T6M5 – nurse
Data from the research interviews also indicated diverse attitudes towards the use of evidence in decisions
between the university-afﬁliated trusts (especially T1, T5, T7 and T8) and the non-afﬁliated ones (T4 and
T6). The latter are classiﬁed as less-research-orientated organisations, as documented in Chapter 6. It was
reported by respondents in all university-afﬁliated trusts that there was an organisational norm of high
expectation to use evidence (or to show the use of evidence to others) to justify innovation decisions and
change in practices. This organisational norm was criticised as contributing to slowing down decisions:
If you’re looking at, making change then it has to be justified, and therefore it is the quality of the
evidence that supports that change. So without that then it is unlikely you’re going to really make
much headway in an organisation, particularly in an organisation like this. The big teaching hospitals,
teaching trusts pride themselves on their academic status. The downside of that often is the academic
attitude that they want the evidence to the highest degree, whereas intuitively you’re saying this will
work and will make an improvement. And sometimes you really have to sort of ‘cross every t [and]
dot every i to get there’. [. . .] it slows, it really slows the process down sometimes.
T8M1 – nurse
Financial pressures were viewed by the respondents as a double-edged sword with regards to the use of
evidence. On one hand, such pressures were perceived to promote and incentivise the sourcing of evidence:
When you’ve got financial constraints I think if there is a good thing about financial constraints, I
think it then actually pushes you to look for the evidence more to make the best of the resource that
you have got . . . We have had, like everywhere else, difficult financial terms both within our research
centre here and the trust itself over a couple of years. And it does make you look much more
carefully at what you do. It is not altogether a bad thing to have financial constraints because it does
make you reassess whether what you are doing is really the most valuable and what’s the evidence,
and what you are doing works the best and is there a better way of doing it.
T5M2 – allied health professional
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A prime example of how ﬁnancial constraints promote the use of evidence in organisational
decision-making was found in T4. The trust experienced signiﬁcant internal ﬁnancial turmoil during the
study period (see Chapter 6 for more information). This inﬂuence from the organisational context was
reported to have nurtured the standardisation and formalisation of innovation decision mechanisms,
increasing the demand for business cases, as well as requiring a more systematic and thorough assessment
of the innovation evidence base:
[. . .] maybe three years ago when I started here it was pretty relaxed in a sense that it was a trust
that was in profit, [. . .] now we’re a trust in deficit. We have a large financial deficit and therefore the
mechanisms for innovation and change have become more formalised, which isn’t necessarily a bad
thing because I think before perhaps they were too informal and perhaps parochial. So, would go up
to the medical director and say, I think this is a good thing, and, yes, it seemed a good thing and it
would happen. But the process now is more rigorous and therefore there is a financial element,
everything has a formal business case, lardy, lardy, lardy la.
T4M2 – pharmacist
On the other hand, organisational ﬁnancial pressures were also perceived to have inhibited the use of
evidence, with a potentially adverse impact on patient safety and care:
It (the pressure) is a disincentive to use evidence when, for example, severe financial targets are likely
to reduce the number of stool specimens we send for C. diff[icile] testing and that could ultimately be
harmful to patients.
T9M11 – pharmacist
Non-clinical managers were widely reported to focus on performance and tangible organisational
outcomes. The non-clinical managers in our sample have a range of educational and professional
backgrounds including engineering, management, ﬁnance and accounting. More than any other
professional group in our study, they reported high preference for local ‘testing’, and the generation of
local data to enable them to identify ‘real’ improvement in service performance or cost-savings:
If we were installing a new type of light fitting or new type of control and it would reduce our
energy consumption then the evidence would be reduced energy consumption, so evidence is the
outcome really.
T1M9 – non-clinical manager
[. . .] Improvement in performance. What I would see as evidence probably wouldn’t be seen, as a
scientist would, I want to see the qualitative and quantitative evidence. Or quantitative measures of
some improvement in a service that adopts an innovation.
T2M11 – non-clinical manager
A research paper, a presentation, an abstract, something associated with a real outcome – any
tangible or real outcome is assessed on the basis of the documentation that goes with it.
T1M1 – non-clinical manager
If you are trying to put a case forward for something in particularly anything that is going to cost
money you have to be able to provide fast and hard evidence that is going to make a difference or
what the different is whether it is quality and improvement in standards.
T2M2 – non-clinical manager
When asked about the use of evidence for assessing speciﬁc new products or activities, non-clinical
managers almost unanimously reported that they used as evidence primarily quantitative, ‘hard’ data
presented in documentary form. More importantly, they reported that what counted as evidence for them
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was information demonstrating organisational productivity improvements in their area of service. Their
formal organisational accountability and role conditioned the acceptance as evidence of those sources of
information that allowed them to identify such efﬁciency improvements.
Macro context inﬂuences on the use of evidence
This section looks at how, and to what extent, the macro context was reported in the research interviews
to mediate the use of evidence. The quick pace of change, policy, ﬁnancial and clinical targets, public
expectations and patient fear constituted the widely reported external pressures inﬂuencing the use of
evidence in IPC.
Some IPC policy interventions, particularly infection targets, were perceived as being ‘imposed’ and, at
times gave rise to ‘clinical scepticism’, as this doctor reported:
Imposed targets usually are a disincentive to serve innovation I would say. [. . .] I think with infection
control there is a clinical scepticism about the evidence base for a lot of the policy. [. . .] Bare below
the elbows which is national policy a lot of the infection diseases experts say there is no evidence
for this at all. And this is an example of a national policy that was imposed without providing
any evidence.
T1M19 – doctor
Such ‘clinical scepticism’ was also seen among senior doctors towards central guidelines:
I suspect that it, a lot of change that is put down from above in terms of the ways in which hospitals
function, the way in which we are expected to do things, often does not seem it, anyway, to come
with a massive basis of evidence base behind it, tends to be, we think this would be a good idea,
sometimes with the brackets after it, we suspect this is what our politicians would like us to do, and
kindly do it. And I think we are sometimes very bad at stopping and saying, let us pilot this and see
whether it actually does produce an advantage, although there are downsides that have not yet been
thought about, it’s great until we did it would be a word that comes to mind.
T6M3 – senior doctor
I think we are now are being bombarded, is a slightly strong word, but certainly the number of NICE
guidelines that appear on a monthly basis is quite substantial and those are pretty much, by the trust
anyway, simply accepted at face value. It isn’t really possible to question NICE guidance now . . . I do
have some concerns that whatever [the] NICE says is what must happen. I think that can, under
certain circumstances, be a bad thing.
T5M5 – doctor
In response to the perceived top-down approach, particularly in relation to policies such as ‘bare below the
elbows’ and ‘no tie’ – which were included as part of good practices, for example, in the Department of
Health’s 2010 uniform and work wear guidance78 – some doctors insisted on seeing the evidence in
support of this guidance, which was often seen by others as a tactic to justify their inaction in following
such guidelines:
We convince people that they need to wash their hands. There has been quite a few debates around
that. Some of the consultants were saying it was not proven that you have to wash your hands. [. . .]
It kind of makes sense, doesn’t it, to wash your hands in between everything that you do. It’s got to
be better than not do it. So it’s one of those things you just say, ‘don’t be silly’. But for example, the
issues about ties, the consultants were told that they couldn’t wear a tie, so the neurologists all
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brought in a tie that they regularly used and they all cut the end off it. And they all had them
cultured to prove that is no infection on the end of their tie I am quite sure they all washed them in
the washing machine before they did it, but anyway.
T5M1 – allied health professional
The following respondent indicated what motivated him to justify local decisions (i.e. stick to local
antibiotic policy) through exercising a greater level of local autonomy and not following a national
recommendation by the Department of Health at face value:
I suppose they incentivise evidence when we have to justify not following a recommendation from
the Department of Health. So for example in certain areas we continue to use cephalosporin and
‘quinolone’ antibiotics which are considered to be quite high risk for C. diff[icile]. We had to research
the literature to argue that there were potential to detrimental consequences to switching to low risk
antibiotics in certain populations.
T9M11 – pharmacist
In other cases, respondents talked about ‘breathing space’ after some years of intense focus upon the
implementation of certain innovations. Revalidation of innovations is seen under these circumstances to
justify continuous use or discontinuance:
[. . .] I suppose they (the pressures) often force rapid reactions which are often not particularly
evidence based. And I think what we often find, is we respond quickly, in a let’s do something way
and then we look back that actually after a time the evidence for that wasn’t fantastic, actually we
didn’t really look at the evidence maybe what we could have done. We had an experience of that
where we thought maybe we should use this hydrogen peroxide in response to outbreaks of
C. diff[icile] and there was a lot of activity around getting access to the machines etc., and then we
looked at it after a period of time and thought hang on actually the evidence of this making any
long term difference is not robust so let’s not do that.
T1M8 – doctor
External drivers, including sudden ﬁnancial constraints, appearance of competing alternative innovations or
central policy changes, can also act as triggers for rethinking and innovation. The following respondent
indicated how ongoing sensemaking of locally produced evidence was used to justify budgeting in T8:
I think it is important when you’re implementing a major change in a trust’s hygiene policy or
whatever that you put in place some kind of robust surveillance internally so that you can confirm
and so that you know when it comes to the next round of financial budgeting that you’ve actually
got data internally that allows you to justify.
T8M2 – doctor
Some other IPC practices were seen as ‘common sense’ without the expectation of ‘evidence’ to back up
action in this highly systematic way demanded by others:
It did seem very logical from our knowledge having an aseptic non-touch technique you can look at
the research. But also from our knowledge of an aseptic non-touch technique it did, the methodology
it reduced the risk of introducing infections into wounds or introducing infections into lines. You
could even say a no brainer this is just common sense that it’s packaged around a methodology.
T9M7 – nurse
The majority of respondents perceived either external or internal pressures to improve IPC performance;
however, most respondents identiﬁed more ‘external’ rather than ‘internal’ pressures to play an important
role. Regarding ‘external’ pressure at the national level, targets or trajectories set by the Department of
Health or compliances regulated by the CQC or Monitor were the main source of concern for trust staff,
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being expressed as a concern by approximately half of respondents; these were often pressures mandating
prescriptive action by NHS staff.
The expectations of patients or the public were the second largest pressure, being voiced as a pressure
by approximately one-third of respondents. Public expectations are often instigated or voiced through
the mass media. The historical context also played a part. Other trusts’ poor performance on infection
was publicly severely scolded; as a result, this created a ‘high proﬁle drive’ to maintain or raise the
organisational image:
[. . .] a raised profile, I think as people then started to get the education from the infection team that
went along with that high profile drive, and I think a lot of this was down to the fact a number of
other trusts had been hit quite hard nationally and were being very publicly berated for their poor
infection performance.
T9M3 – nurse
The third largest source of perceived ‘external’ pressure was from regional authorities or commissioners,
who impose ﬁnancial penalties if the trust’s performance is not met; this was identiﬁed by approximately
one-quarter of respondents.
A few respondents also commented that their pre-foundation-trust (FT) status became part of the
environmental pressures at the time of the interview. As the trusts’ performance on the main HCAIs can
be key for successful application for FT status, this theme was considered to be of importance in relation
to other external pressures such as targets.
Some respondents gave qualitative signiﬁcance to unrealistic targets:
Well MRSA rates were dropped down dramatically some years ago. It’s somewhat irritating really we
have a million patient come to us a year because our MRSA absolute number was about six. They said
we need to half that. You say hang on a minute there you have given an organisation somewhere
else the same size as us a target of 106, how does that stack up. They said it’s about improving on
your own performance, that’s right but there is a point you get to when you say actually if we hit
three total how we gonna get to one and a half out of a million patient contacts per year. That’s just
comes a bit absolute but nobody else accepts the argument but that’s what it’ll be.
T5M15 – doctor
Overall, the pressures in the views of respondents incentivised more than inhibited evidence sourcing for
decision-making:
I actually think it has, I think it’s improved the use of evidence because as the pressure’s come on, and
it’s got harder and harder to meet the target, you start to look more and more at what the evidence
actually is showing you and where you best target your resources.
T4M10 – nurse
The evidence was often required to demonstrate ‘very quick wins’ to persuade and convince others at
some trusts:
I think undoubtedly that the targets that we have to meet in terms of achieving certain goals within
infection prevention are kind of here and now targets. So any innovations, any changes made have to
be very kind of very quickly tangible. And I think it would be more difficult for the trust or
departments to introduce changes that have a longer term affect. Because it would be more difficult
to kind of demonstrate the evidence potentially or more difficult the justification to making changes
that would have effect 12 to 15 months down the line.
T4M11 – nurse
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Respondents also reported their reactive organisational attitude through a ‘fire-fighting’ attitude towards
problem-solving:
But I think we have to turn our activity to the prevention side. It’s difficult because you need to
dedicate the time to the prevention that involves control. The ‘fire-fighting’ stuff is still happening so
it’s really difficult to kind of, to balance it. I think we need to invest more in the prevention side of it.
T1M3 – nurse
However, T9 respondents indicated their more proactive organisational attitude towards evidence use:
I think our track record is that we’ve taken a completely systematic approach to try and, to improve
the infection control performance within the organisation. And I think that’s been right the way
through from ensuring basic practice is improved, so things like the, you know, naked below the
elbow, you know, appropriate dress code, hand washing policies, audits and compliance around
administration of IV [intravenous] antibiotic. All those, all those things where the evidence points to
potential for introduction of sources of infection. Isolation policy, those type of things. So getting
some of those fundamentals right, auditing them, and having a sustained programme of education,
engagement and performance management. And we’ve done that over several years. So I think the,
the state of play in this organisation is one of, you know, long term sustainability in terms of the way
that we’ve used evidence.
T9M5 – nurse
Others reported mixed attitudes towards evidence use:
[. . .] we fire-fight at the moment as an interim period but there are people looking forward at the
future. So we are kind of taking a two-pronged approach. So we do have people working on
the long-term.
T3M9 – non-clinical manager
The attitude of hospital staff was affected by priority shifts at an organisational level:
We have improved a lot recently in our infection control, so the pressure has eased, a lot of it,
because that’s what makes you worry sometimes, if the pressure from outside ease then the focus
might ease. I’m not saying that here, what will be introduced is complacency, and people are just in
status quo, nothing is happening and we’re not going to improve, and there’s a lot of pressure from
the financial side because to do something better you need financial support, and you’d be arguing, I
need this, I need this and, because they’ve not got priority now, yeah. And then the infection control
will move down [. . .], I’m quite sure we have seen a lot of complacency creeping in.
T6M6 – doctor
Thus, the perceived impact of ‘external’ pressures was often viewed to inﬂuence evidence use in
decision-making either directly or indirectly. Nurses and non-clinical managers linked use of evidence to
justiﬁcation of own decisions or persuading others, frequently referring to the need for generation of
local evidence.
Reﬂection on this chapter
Evidence sources and types were portrayed as variably prioritised and used by decision-makers depending
on their professional background. Doctors reported a strong preference for science-based, peer-reviewed
and published evidence. Nurses drew upon a wider range of evidence sources and types than all other
groups in our study sample. Non-clinical managers tended to prioritise evidence linked to productivity and
cost improvements. They also reported a preference for benchmarking information on implementation
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produced by national-level sources, and from local trials in their own or other hospitals. Doctors and nurses
prioritised evidence on the clinical efﬁcacy and effectiveness of innovations. Non-clinical managers relied
more on their own or peer experiential knowledge than doctors, who showed a preference for more
systematic forms of knowledge. Non-clinical managers and nurses considered evidence on ‘ease of use’,
including local trials of innovative technologies, to be of high importance.
The quick pace and high magnitude of change in IPC, policy, ﬁnancial and clinical targets, high public
expectations, the pursuit of creating a positive organisational image, a drive for continuous improvement,
intensiﬁed media pressures and scrutiny on hospital infections constituted the widely reported
organisational and external pressures inﬂuencing the use of evidence in IPC. According to the accounts of
most respondents, such pressures incentivised and promoted the use of evidence in organisational and
clinical decisions. An additional contextual pressure linked to research-engaged organisations was the
reported organisational norm of high expectations for the use of evidence, or the public demonstration of
engagement with evidence for maintaining credibility.
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Chapter 6 Organisational context: the macrocases
of the eight NHS trusts studied
In this chapter, our analytic attention focuses mainly on the organisational context (also exploring keyinﬂuences beyond it) to elicit a historical and local contextual dimension for each empirical site to help
better situate contemporary issues during the study period (2007–12). The ﬁndings presented in this
chapter draw mainly on secondary data sources and are summarised in a cross-case comparative account.
Contextual data helped us to outline key characteristics and recent trends of important factors in each of
the eight ‘macrocases’, including trust size, locality, resources, espoused values and vision, critical
contextual events, research and innovation activity, and communication patterns. Changes in key areas of
trust performance, the magnitude of shocks and continuity in leadership are outlined. The aim is to
sensitise analysis in subsequent chapters of the potential impact of local and historical contexts on the
social and organisational processes related to evidence access and utilisation. In addition, this chapter
provides the audience with a means of translating ﬁndings to own context by comparing these wider
contextual factors.
Trust size and ﬁnancial and human resources
Table 4 shows basic characteristics of each trust – trust size and number of site(s) and ﬁnancial and human
resources. This information was gathered from trusts’ annual reports and ﬁnancial accounts for 2007/08,
2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12; trusts’ quality accounts for 2009/10; and the CQC inspection
reports on the prevention and control of infections for 2009 and 2010.79
Based on the number of staff, there appeared to be three different clusters by trust size during the study
period: (1) T1 and T7 as relatively large organisations; (2) T5 and T9 as medium; and (3) T2, T3, T4 and T6
as relatively small. This was reﬂected in the ﬁnancial turnover.
Regarding the number of sites, T5 is the only trust that operates in a single site; T1 has three main sites
and the remaining six trusts have two sites. The last column of the table shows the ratio of the number of
staff on the IPC team to the total number of trust staff. These ratios appeared to be associated with the
number of sites in each trust to some degree; for example, a single-site trust, T5, had the lowest ratio
(0.12%), whereas the trusts that run more hospitals in multiple sites had higher ratios.
Organisational values, vision and aims
In this section, we assess organisational values, vision or aims for each trust, based on largely trust-based
secondary sources, but also supplemented by qualitative interview data from phase 1. This is to provide
some contextual background regarding principles (espoused and actioned) and perceived legitimacy
and creditability.
Organisational values, vision or aims varied across the different trusts. Nevertheless, high-quality, safe and
integrated care was noted as the overarching core element of the publicly declared values, visions or aims
for the majority of participating trusts. T7 was an exception and did not explicitly articulate these aims but
placed emphasis on ‘patient-centred’ care or ‘patient experience’. Value for money or ﬁnance-related
elements were expressed by T2, T4, T5 and T6.
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Research and/or innovation were also a popular value expressed in the majority of trusts. Exceptions were
T3 and T6: T3 placed a stronger focus and efforts on teaching as a less mature university-afﬁliated NHS
trust, whereas T6 has shifted towards a focus on innovation but not research. T1 placed importance on
innovation, coupled with a focus on pride and achievement; respondents reiterated this desire and
pressure to be seen as leaders and a centre of excellence for research.
As part of their vision, values or aims, T1 and T3 included staff attitude/behavioural change elements. T3
collaborates with the local medical school, and had a research strategy including ‘behavioural medicine’.
Therefore, these organisations were highly conscious of heterogeneous behaviour in their practice – a
crucial element in the pursuit of effective and sustainable implementation of innovations. Staff
engagement or teamwork is also an important element for the realisation of behavioural change and
enhancing a sense of ownership; notably this theme constituted the values or vision of T2, T6, T7 and T9.
The question arises of whether, and to what extent, these formally set out organisational values, vision or
aims were shared or trickled down to individuals or teams and how they then affected the use of evidence
in managerial decisions. One senior respondent from phase 1 commented:
[. . .] the culture of the organisation is that we do want to be leading edge and we want to be
innovative and we want our practice to be evidence base. But some of them are [. . .] either about
personal about me because I’ve an enquiring mind [. . .] but also executive group and the team I work
with are also sort of have that culture. So the infection control team for example if we are looking
at a solution for something I would work with Dr XXX, the Director of Infection Prevention and
Control, and we would talk about something, and then she would look for either an evidence-based
or if one didn’t exist we’d set something up. So there is something around the people and the
teams you work with and that generates sometimes from the bottom up.
T7M5 – nurse
These informal, personal, as well as formal, ‘rational-policy’ paradigms (which aligned with organisational
objectives, aims or values) were important aspects in helping to better understand how staff made sense
of evidence within the organisational context. An approach of ‘inquiring minds’ was viewed to be linked
to local creativity, local trials or ‘ﬁrst-line innovation’. In these cases, decision-making did not necessarily
TABLE 4 Trust size and ﬁnancial and human resources
Trust
Number
of beds
(2009/10)
Population
covered (M)
Number
of staff
(2007/08–
2011/12)
Financial
turnover (£M)
(2007/08–
2011/12)
Number
of sites/
campuses
IPC
staff : trust
staff ratio
a
(2010/11)
T1 1600 1.9 (S), 3.0 (T) 9100–10,500 840–940 Multisite 0.23%
T2 1200 0.3 (S), > 2.0 (T) 5500–6000 340–420 Multisite 0.17% (2008)
T3 900 0.5 (S), 1.0 (T) 5700–7000 350–570 Multisite 0.14%
T4 1400 0.5 (S), 2.0 (T) 5800–6900 410–450 Multisite N/A
T5 1400 0.2 (S), > 1.0 (T) 8500–9900 570–760 Single site 0.12%
T6 900 > 0.5 3700–4500 270–350 Multisite 0.31%
T7 2300 0.5 (S), 1.7 (T) 11,900–13,700 690–860 Multisite 0.30%
T9 1100 1.3 (S), > 3.0 (T) 6700–7800 440–540 Multisite 0.25%
M, million; NA, not applicable; S, secondary care; T, tertiary care.
a ‘IPC staff’ refers to staff within the IPC team including the DIPC.
Sources: trusts’ annual reports and ﬁnancial accounts for 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11, 2011/12; trusts’ quality
accounts for 2009/10; and CQC’s inspection reports on the prevention and control of infections for 2009, 2010.79
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involve an externally produced evidence base, but rather local generation of evidence was encouraged.
The same respondent articulated further:
Obviously my role is around leading nursing but also leading the clinical operations of the hospital. So
when we are making decisions ideally we would look for an evidence base for those decisions which
isn’t always possible. And we would try to use innovations from other centres, or the evidence from
the research base. [. . .] I wouldn’t always say it was research based or we would look for another
innovation that had some evidence of success in another organisation or in another country. Of
course that doesn’t always happen and decisions don’t always come with evidence base and some
things we try, are sort of first-line innovations. So we think of the idea and we’ll try it.
T7M5 – nurse
Another respondent, with a non-clinical background, suggested that managers’ strategic communication
was articulated around relevance to ‘patient experience’, which was one of the organisational aims at T7,
as a means of convincing or persuading others (making sense for others):
[. . .] inevitably, we work with front line teams and we choose certain ways of working there. We
obviously present at formal executive meetings and that often requires a different type of
communication. I suppose going back to an earlier point kind of presenting things from the patients’
experience can be something that unites from there to there. And that for me is an important
consistency, it’s about how you use patient experience and patient stories to improve communication.
T7M13 – non-clinical manager
Thus, using relevant language led to effective interconnectedness in engagement across different levels of
people, from front-line to senior management, at T7.
Trust performance and patient experience
Table 5 shows the trusts’ recent performance on ﬁnancial management and degree of quality of care as
well as the incidence of major HCAIs. The former was assessed through the Annual Health Check, which
was conducted by the Healthcare Commission (replaced by the CQC80 in April 2009). The performance
data on the incidence of MRSA bacteraemia and C. difficile infection came from the Healthcare
Commission81/CQC82 as part of the Annual Health Check in earlier years (2007/08 and 2008/09), and from
the trusts themselves through their annual reports and/or quality accounts in later years (2009/10
onwards). Major HCAIs have been subject to mandatory surveillance, for example, MRSA bacteraemia
since April 2001 and C. difficile infection since January 2004.86 The number of cases for these HCAIs was
assessed against their annual reduction targets (under mandatory surveillance) set externally by the
Department of Health. There was also a local target for each trust set by their respective strategic health
authority or primary care trust (as part of the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation scheme), which
was stricter than the national targets set by the Department of Health for each trust.87,88
We assessed the last indicator in the table, ‘patient experience’, by using annual inpatient survey data that
were reported by the CQC. As shown in the table footnotes, seven IPC-related questions were selected in
the following areas: (a) cleanliness of rooms and wards; (b) cleanliness of toilets and bathrooms; (c) posters
regarding hand wash gels; (d) availability of hand wash gels; (e) hand cleaning (doctors); (f) hand cleaning
(nurses); and (g) having enough nurses on duty.83–85 Each of these indicators is assessed against the
country’s average; in other words, each datum falls into the category of either ‘better’, ‘about the same’ or
‘worse’ than country average. Sample size for the annual inpatient survey (CQC) varied across the trusts,
ranging from 292 to 508 patients (average 400 patients) in 2009, 2010 and 2011.83–85 T1 had the lowest
response rate (average 37%, 316 patients) during the aforementioned period, whereas T4 tended to have
the highest response rate (average 55%, 469 patients). The sample size in this survey appears to be very
small, when compared with the actual number of inpatients (elective and non-elective) treated at each
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TABLE 5 Trust performance and patient experience
Trust
Annual Health
Check – quality
of care
(2007/08, 2008/09)
a
Annual Health
Check – use of
resources/ﬁnancial
management
(2007/08, 2008/09)
a
Incidence of MRSA bacteraemiab
(2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10,
2010/11, 2011/12)
Incidence of C. difficile
infectionb (2007/08,
2008/09, 2009/10,
2010/11, 2011/12)
Adult inpatient survey
results regarding
IPC-speciﬁc questions
(2009, 2010, 2011)
c
Overall rating
T1 Good (2007/08);
good (2008/09)
Good (2007/08);
good (2008/09)
Achieved (2007/08); achieved
(2008/09); achieved (2009/10);
underachieved (1.5 times higher)
(2010/11);d underachieved
(1.4 times higher) (2011/12)d
N/A (2007/08); achieved
(2008/09); achieved
(2009/10); achieved
(2010/11);d underachieved
(1.1 times higher)
(2011/12)d
‘Worse’ in (c) and (d);
‘better’ in (e) in 2009.
Improved from 2010
onwards – ‘about the
same’ for all
2, 2, 0, 1, 1 = 6†
T2 Good (2007/08);
excellent (2008/09)
Excellent (2007/08);
excellent (2008/09)
Underachieved (1.7 times higher)
(2007/08);e achieved (2008/09);
achieved (2009/10); achieved
(2010/11);f achieved (2011/12)f
N/A (2007/08); achieved
(2008/09); achieved
(2009/10); achieved
(2010/11);f achieved
(2011/12)f
Consistently ‘about the same’
for all indicators throughout
2009–11
2, 2, 1, 2, 2 = 9†††
T3 Excellent (2007/08);
good (2008/09)
Fair (2007/08);
good (2008/09)
Underachieved (1.5 times higher)
(2007/08); achieved (2008/09);
achieved (2009/10); achieved
(2010/11);f achieved (2011/12)d
N/A (2007/08); achieved
(2008/09); achieved
(2009/10); achieved
(2010/11);d achieved
(2011/12)d
‘Worse’ in (e) in 2010.
‘About the same’ for
remaining indicators
during 2009 and 2010
2, 1, 1, 2, 1 = 7††
T4 Excellent (2007/08);
excellent (2008/09)
Good (2007/08);
fair (2008/09)
Achieved (2007/08); achieved
(2008/09); achieved (2009/10);
achieved (2010/11);f achieved
(2011/12)d
N/A (2007/08); achieved
(2008/09); achieved
(2009/10); achieved
(2010/11);f achieved
(2011/12)d
‘Worse’ in (c) during 2009 and
2010, but improved in 2011.
‘About the same’ for remaining
indicators throughout 2009–11
2, 1, 2, 2, 0 = 7††
T5 Fair (2007/08);
good (2008/09)
Good (2007/08);
good (2008/09)
Achieved (2007/08); achieved
(2008/09); achieved (2009/10);
underachieved (1.2 times higher)
(2010/11);e achieved (2011/12)d
N/A (2007/08); achieved
(2008/09); achieved
(2009/10); achieved
(2010/11);e achieved
(2011/12)d
Consistently ‘about the same’
for all indicators throughout
2009–11
1, 2, 1, 2, 2 = 8††
T6 Good (2007/08);
good (2008/09)
Fair (2007/08);
good (2008/09)
Underachieved (1.4 times higher)
(2007/08); achieved (2008/09);
achieved (2009/10); achieved
(2010/11);d underachieved
(1.4 times higher) (2011/12)d
N/A (2007/08); achieved
(2008/09); achieved
(2009/10); achieved
(2010/11);d achieved
(2011/12)d
Consistently ‘about the same’
for all indicators throughout
2009–11
2, 1, 0, 2, 2 = 7††
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Trust
Annual Health
Check – quality
of care
(2007/08, 2008/09)a
Annual Health
Check – use of
resources/ﬁnancial
management
(2007/08, 2008/09)a
Incidence of MRSA bacteraemiab
(2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10,
2010/11, 2011/12)
Incidence of C. difficile
infectionb (2007/08,
2008/09, 2009/10,
2010/11, 2011/12)
Adult inpatient survey
results regarding
IPC-speciﬁc questions
(2009, 2010, 2011)c Overall rating
T7 Excellent (2007/08);
excellent (2008/09)
Excellent 2007/08);
excellent (2008/09)
Achieved (2007/08); achieved
(2008/09); achieved (2009/10);
achieved (2010/11);d achieved
(2011/12)d
N/A (2007/08); achieved
(2008/09); achieved
(2009/10); achieved
(2010/11);d underachieved
(1.3 times higher)
(2011/12)d
‘Better’ in (g) in 2010 only.
Consistently ‘about the same’
for the rest throughout 2009
and 2011
2, 2, 2, 1, 2 = 9†††
T9 Good (2007/08);
fair (2008/09)
Good (2007/08);
good (2008/09)
Underachieved (1.5 times higher)
(2007/08); underachieved (1.1
times higher) (2008/09); achieved
(2009/10); achieved (2010/11);d
achieved (2011/12)d
N/A (2007/08); achieved
(2008/09); achieved
(2009/10); achieved
(2010/11);d achieved
(2011/12)d
Consistently ‘about the same’
for all indicators throughout
2009–11
1, 2, 0, 2, 2 = 7††
N/A, not applicable.
a Care Quality Commission 2008/09 NHS performance ratings: overall and component level scores.80
b Healthcare Commission Data set for the 2007/08 new national targets assessment;81 CQC 2008/09 NHS performance ratings: existing commitments and national priorities
indicator scores.82
c CQC’s annual inpatient survey 2009, 2010 and 2011.83–85
d Trusts’ quality accounts 2010/11, 2011/12.
e Trusts’ infection (prevention and) control annual report 2007/08, 2010/11.
f Trusts’ annual reports and ﬁnancial accounts 2010/11, 2011/12.
For the assessment of adult inpatient survey results, seven IPC-related questions were selected in the following areas: (a) cleanliness of rooms and wards; (b) cleanliness of toilets and
bathrooms; (c) posters regarding hand wash gels; (d) availability of hand wash gels; (e) hand cleaning (doctors); (f) hand cleaning (nurses); and (g) having enough nurses on duty.
Score 0, two outcomes in sub-optimal performance (i.e. fair/underachieved/worse); score 1, one outcome in sub-optimal performance; score 2, no outcome in sub-optimal performance,
but all in optimal or good performance (i.e. good/excellent/achieved/better/about the same).
Overall rating for ‘trust performance and patient experience’: †, worse, score 6; ††, moderate, score 7–8; †††, better, score 9.
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trust; for example, in the case of T3, the sample in the survey represented approximately 0.6% of the
inpatients during 2010/11 and this itself has attracted mixed reactions from NHS organisations over the
years. Nevertheless, these were the only ofﬁcially available inpatient survey data that allowed comparison
across the trusts.
The overall rating shows the result of the aforementioned indicators around trust performance and how
patients thought about the trust in relation to IPC practices. T3, T4, T5, T6 and T9 achieved relatively
moderate scores on performance and patient experience. T2 and T7 had a better overall rating, whereas
T1 had the worst overall rating among the participating trusts. Notably, T1 appeared to be struggling to
meet the targets for MRSA bacteraemia and/or C. difficile infection between 2010/11 and 2011/12.
The results in Table 5 masked some realities and additional pressures faced in IPC. First, the targets for
MRSA bacteraemia and C. difficile infection have become tougher in recent years. All trusts had the MRSA
bacteraemia target of 10 or less, and half the trust cases (T2, T4, T6 and T9) set MRSA bacteraemia targets
of ﬁve or less during 2011/12. This embodied an enormous external pressure for these trusts, which was
echoed in the interviews with managers in each trust (previously discussed in Chapter 5). One respondent
explained as follows:
Well they get tighter based on previous year’s performance when you come in under last year’s target
and then you find that it has been brought way, way lower.
T7M2 – nurse
These HCAI issues were perceived to be of higher importance in trusts submitting FT applications.
Second, improvements in the reduction of HCAI cases can be masked by setting higher targets; as a result,
despite a reduction in HCAI cases the relative performance score against targets might show deterioration.
Third, through technological advancement towards a more sensitive and accurate test, including new assay
kits for C. difficile that used improved molecular techniques, more C. difficile cases were detected in the
laboratories. This can have negative add-on effects on the trust; in other words, the trust could not meet
the target and, therefore, had to seek a more realistic target and negotiate with commissioners.
Fourth, as a result of restructuring, including mergers, the standardisation of processes and systems
became all the more important. The delay in the standardisation/streamline of information systems across
the different sites, as well as the standardisation of assay methods for microorganisms across the different
sites, raised serious concerns in some trusts, as they could not simply merge the data between the sites for
analysis and management and, moreover, could not compare the data and spot the negative outliners for
action within the trust.
Fifth, in a more globalised world, the emergence and threats of pandemics of new microorganisms have
posed a huge challenge to NHS trusts. Finally, other microorganisms were recently added to mandatory
surveillance: for example, methicillin-sensitive Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) bacteraemia since
January 2011 and Escherichia coli bacteraemia since June 2011.86 This imposed extra pressure on trusts. As
explained in Chapter 5, according to the interview data, some trust managers voiced concerns that these
new targets, as well as increasingly unrealistic/tougher targets, contributed
to signiﬁcant external pressures.
Magnitude of shocks, crises and critical events
Table 6 gives a picture of the magnitude of shocks, crises and critical events at each trust during the study
period. The ﬁrst (mergers, redevelopments/expansions, FT application/status attainment) and the third
(continuity of leadership – CEO and DIPC) indicators represent inner shocks, and the last indicator (health
ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT: THE MACROCASES OF THE EIGHT NHS TRUSTS STUDIED
46
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
TABLE 6 Magnitude of shocks, crises and critical events
Trust
Mergers, redevelopments/expansions,
FT application/status attainmenta,b
Trust ﬁnancial crisisa (a trust’s year-end
position 2007/08–2011/12) [deﬁcit as
percentage of NHS trust turnover (%)]
Continuity of leadership
a
(CEO, DIPC)
Health proﬁle
c
(the Network of
Public Health
Observatories)
(2008–12) Overall rating
T1 Merger of two trusts and integration with a
local university in the mid to late 2000s;
a series of improvements of infrastructure
and equipment, costing £60–70M annually
during the late 2000s. Expected to submit
a FT application in 2013
Dramatically ﬂuctuated over recent years,
with deﬁcits of £59.3M [7.1%] (2008/09)
and £20.5M (2011/12)→ adjusted retained
deﬁcit of £8.4M [0.9%] (2011/12)
Unstable CEO position (changed
twice in the mid to late 2000s
and early 2010s); stable DIPC
(from the mid to late 2000s
onwards)
0.0 (2008–09),
2.0 (2009–10),
0.0 (2010–11),
–3.0 (2011–12)
3, 2, 1, 3 = 9†††
T2 Merger in the mid-1990s; a series of
redevelopment projects over recent years,
including a £90M redevelopment of hospitals
that was completed in the late 2000s; the new
hospital redevelopment project (under PFI
scheme) was under way at the time of the
study, costing over £400M and to be ﬁnished
in the mid-2010s. Expected to be approved
as a FT shortly after the study
2009/10 saw a deﬁcit of £15.9M (adjusted
retained surplus of £4.0M), followed by a
recovery with consecutive surpluses of £4.8M
(2010/11) and £6.0M (2011/12) → adjusted
retained surpluses of £4.4M (2010/11) and
£5.5M (2011/12)
Unstable CEO and DIPC position
in the mid to late 2000s and
then became stable
–2.6 (2008–09),
4.8 (2009–10),
–1.0 (2010– 11),
0.0 (2011–12)
2, 0, 2, 3 = 7††
T3 In the late 2000s, the redevelopment, expansion
and refurbishment of facilities and buildings
occurred through the investment of over £50M
altogether. A £400M hospital redevelopment
with new state-of-the-art facilities newly
approved by a strategic health authority in the
early 2010s. The main construction work was
expected to begin in 2013. Aimed to submit a
FT application in 2013
After some consecutive years of retained
deﬁcits the trust achieved a stable position
in the late 2000s, but has experienced
difﬁcult ﬁnancial years recently, with deﬁcits
of £12.1M [2.2%] 2010/11 and £16.2M
[2.8%] 2011/12
CEO changed twice in the
mid to late 2000s and in the
early 2010s; DIPC changed
twice in the late 2000s and
early 2010s
2.6 (2008–09),
–4.0 (2009–10),
0.4 (2010–11),
1.3 (2011–12)
2, 2, 2, 3 = 9†††
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TABLE 6 Magnitude of shocks, crises and critical events (continued )
Trust
Mergers, redevelopments/expansions,
FT application/status attainmenta,b
Trust ﬁnancial crisis
a
(a trust’s year-end
position 2007/08–2011/12) [deﬁcit as
percentage of NHS trust turnover (%)]
Continuity of leadership
a
(CEO, DIPC)
Health proﬁlec
(the Network of
Public Health
Observatories)
(2008–12) Overall rating
T4 Through a > £250M major redevelopment
under PFI scheme, the creation of a modern and
‘ﬁt-for-purpose’ hospital with state-of-the-art
facilities completed in the late 2000s.
Established the FT Project Board during study,
and aimed to submit its application by 2013
Plunged into deﬁcits of £6.1M [1.4%]
(2008/09) and £77.1M [17.8%] (2009/10);
this was followed by a swift recovery with
retained surpluses of £6.0M (2010/11) and
£1.8M (2011/12)→ adjusted retained surplus
of £0.1M (2011/12)
Stable CEO (from the mid-2000s
onwards); DIPC changed in the
early 2010s
1.3 (2008–09),
–1.3 (2009–10),
–1.4 (2010–11),
–0.3 (2011–12)
2, 3, 1, 4 = 10†††
T5 Merger of two trusts in the early 2000s. In the
late 2000s, many hospitals/services relocated
under new hospitals development (£500M
under PFI). Became a FT in the late 2000s
The 2009/10 saw a huge deﬁcit of £179.8M
[27.2%], followed by a great recovery with a
deﬁcit of £3.6M [0.5%] (2010/11) and a
surplus of £56.1M (2011/12)
Stable CEO (from the early 2000s
onwards) and DIPC (from the late
2000s onwards)
–0.5 (2008–09),
3.1 (2009–10),
–1.2 (2010–11),
1.1 (2011–12)
2, 4, 0, 2 = 8††
T6 Merger of two trusts in the late 1990s. Became
one of the ﬁrst trusts that breached the Hygiene
Code; warned by the Healthcare Commission in
the mid to late 2000s. Expected to become a FT
shortly after the study
Recorded relatively gradual consecutive falls
from 2007/08 to 2009/10, with a deﬁcit of
£9.6M [2.9%] in 2009/10; however, 2010/11
saw a healthy recovery with a surplus of
£3.1M, followed by an adjusted retained
surplus of £2.2M during 2011/12
Unstable CEO position in the
early 2010s; DIPC changed in
the late 2000s
3.5 (2008–09),
0.0 (2009–10),
–0.5 (2010–11),
0.0 (2011–12)
1, 1, 2, 1 = 5†
T7 Merger of two trusts in the early 2000s.
Became a FT in the mid-2000s. A series of
redevelopment, expansion and refurbishment
projects across the hospitals, costing approx.
£100M over recent years; the majority of new
hospital facilities opened in the late 2000s
Recorded consecutive falls, in particular a
deﬁcit of £54.2M [6.9%] in 2009/10; this
was followed by a recovery with surpluses
of £4.4M (2010/11) and £8.0M (2011/12)
Unstable CEO position in the
mid to late 2000s; stable DIPC
(from the mid-2000s onwards)
–2.5 (2008–09),
3.0 (2009–10),
0.0 (2010–11),
1.2 (2011–12)
1, 1, 1, 2 = 5†
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Trust
Mergers, redevelopments/expansions,
FT application/status attainmenta,b
Trust ﬁnancial crisis
a
(a trust’s year-end
position 2007/08–2011/12) [deﬁcit as
percentage of NHS trust turnover (%)]
Continuity of leadershipa
(CEO, DIPC)
Health proﬁle
c
(the Network of
Public Health
Observatories)
(2008–12) Overall rating
T9 The trust was formed in the early 1990s. Major
hospital developments began in the late 2000s
with the investment of £30M. This was
followed by a £60M extension of hospital
buildings in the late 2000s. Became a FT
during study
Recorded relatively gradual consecutive falls
with deﬁcits of £2.3M [0.5%] (2009/10) and
£4.3M [0.8%] (2010/11), but demonstrated a
slight recovery last year, to a deﬁcit of £0.3M
(2011/12)→ adjusted retained surplus of
£3.9M (6 months ended 31/03/12, adjusted
retained surplus)
Stable: CEO (from the mid-2000s
onwards) and DIPC (from the
mid-2000s onwards)
6.0 (2008–09),
–2.0 (2009–10),
2.0 (2010–11),
–1.0 (2011–12)
2, 2, 0, 3 = 7††
PFI, private ﬁnance initiative.
a Trusts’ annual reports and ﬁnancial accounts 2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11, 2011/12.
b CQC’s inspection reports on the prevention and control of infections 2009, 2010.79
c The Network of Public Health Observatories’ health proﬁle data 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.89
Square brackets indicate a deﬁcit.
The transition of ﬁnancial methodology from UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles to International Financial Reporting Standards occurred during 2009/10.
Health proﬁle data consider ﬁve domains composed of 32 indicators: (1) our communities (deprivation; proportion of children in poverty; statutory homelessness; achieved ﬁve A*–C GCSEs
including English and mathematics; violent crime; long-term unemployment); (2) children’s and young people’s health (smoking in pregnancy; breast feeding initiation; obese children year 6;
alcohol-speciﬁc hospital stays under 18; teenage pregnancy under 18); (3) adults’ health and lifestyle (adults smoking; increasing and higher-risk drinking; healthy eating adults; physically
active adults; obese adults); (4) disease and poor health (incidence of malignant melanoma; hospital stays for self-harm; hospital stays for alcohol-related harm; drug misuse; people
diagnosed with diabetes; new cases of tuberculosis; acute sexually transmitted infections; hip fracture in those aged ≥ 65 years); and (5) life expectancy and causes of death (excess winter
deaths; life expectancy – male; life expectancy – female; infant deaths; smoking-related deaths; early deaths – heart disease and stroke; early death – cancer; road injuries and deaths). Each
datum was calculated against the England average. Aggregated number of indicators was counted: e.g. plus 1 for each ‘signiﬁcantly better’, nil for each ‘not signiﬁcantly different’ and
minus 1 for each ‘signiﬁcantly worse’. For trusts that operate in more than one local area, the data from these local areas was aggregated and its average ﬁgure was taken into account for
the ﬁnal assessment. The difference of score between ‘signiﬁcantly better’ and ‘signiﬁcantly worse’ was counted for each year, and then each year was compared against the previous year
to observe the change in score. These scores are shown within the column ‘Health proﬁle’ in an attempt to capture the change in health proﬁle indicators for each year (2008–09, 2009–10,
2010–11, 2011–12). A trust scored 3 if the score change was ≥ –4.0, < –2.7; scored 2 if it was ≥ –2.7, < –1.3; scored 1 if it was ≥ –1.3, < 0; and scored 0 if it was ≥ 0. If the change of
scores against previous year was < 0, this meant the trust had an overall environmental shock locally, and the score represented the degree of shock. The scores were then aggregated per
trust to obtain the ﬁnal scores, which were considered for the assessment of category ‘Health proﬁle’.
Assessment of overall rating:
l Score 0, no mergers, redevelopments/expansions and FT application/status attainment during study period; score 1, either redevelopments/expansions or FT application/status attainment
during study period; score 2, both redevelopments/expansions and FT application/status attainment during study period; score 3, experienced all (merger, redevelopments/expansions
and FT application/status attainment) during study period.
l Magnitude of trust ﬁnancial crisis as aggregated score for ‘Deﬁcit as percentage of NHS trust turnover (%)’ during the study period: the trust scored 1 if it was ≥ 0.5%, < 9.4%; scored 2
if it was ≥ 9.4%, ≤ 18.3%; and scored 3 if it was > 18.3%, ≤ 27.2%.
l Score 0, stable leadership for both CEO and DIPC; score 1, unstable leadership for either CEO or DIPC; score 2, unstable leadership for both CEO and DIPC.
l Overall rating for ‘magnitude of shocks’: †, relatively low level of shocks, score 5–6; ††, moderate level of shocks, score 7–8; †††, relatively high level of shocks, score 9–10.
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proﬁles from the Network of Public Health Observatories89) was selected as an outer constraint.
The second indicator, a trust’s year-end position, considers both inner and outer ﬁnancial shocks.
T1 was the only trust that went through a merger process during the period observed (from 2007/08
onwards). The majority of trusts (except for T6) had gone, or were going, through hospital (re)development,
expansion/extension or refurbishing processes to modernise the hospitals with purpose-built, state-of-the-art
technology buildings and facilities. This coincided with the government’s Deep Clean Programme, which
aimed at enhancing patients’ hospital experience and improving hospitals’ public image. According to the
Department of Health’s Clean, safe care: reducing infections and saving lives, released in January 2008,6
a total of £57.5M was invested in the Deep Clean Programme for all hospitals across the country during
2007/08 and these hospitals were expected to complete the programme by the end of March 2008.
IPC team members were often involved in the planning/designing stages of the redevelopment,
expansion and refurbishment, and gave advice to ensure that the new buildings and facilities were IPC
sensitive/friendly (i.e. T3).
All non-FT hospitals are now attempting to gain foundation status, consistent with government plans.
The FT application involves a long process – mobilising local people and key local organisations, setting up
governors’ councils, all of which requires much energy and effort from the trust as an organisation. Some
trusts seem to have taken a strategic approach to when they should apply for FT status; for example, T3
considered the timing to become a FT, and intentionally delayed its application process, as they were also
considering major hospital redevelopment during the same period. It is logical for T3 to have focused on
controlling the major HCAIs (MRSA bacteraemia and C. difficile infection) before embarking on the
foundation application. An outlier among our sample is T6, which was subject to a signiﬁcant additional
shock as one of the ﬁrst trusts to breach the Hygiene Code and be warned by the Healthcare Commission.
Regarding the year-end ﬁnancial position for trusts, the great majority of participating trusts experienced
deﬁcits during the observed period. Analysis of the degree of each trust’s ﬁnancial crisis, by the borrowing
indicator ‘deﬁcit as percentage of NHS trust turnover (%)’,90 revealed that T4 and T5 portrayed a more
severe degree of deﬁcit, 17.8% (2009/10) at T4 and 27.2% (2009/10) at T5, than other trusts, which
showed deﬁcits < 10% of turnover. This was echoed in the interviews with T4 and T5 respondents during
phase 1. Moreover, ﬁnance as a newly emerged priority was prevalent in the interviews with respondents
from T3. Our ﬁndings from phase 1 were consistent with the secondary sources.
The continuity of leadership is also a key factor when considering the extent of inner shocks. T5 and T9
enjoyed the continuing leadership of both the CEO and the DIPC during the observed period, whereas T2,
T3 and T6 experienced changes of both leaders (CEO and DIPC). The remaining trusts (T1, T4 and T7) had
a moderate inner shock, experiencing changes of either the CEO or the DIPC.
Health proﬁle indicators appeared to be associated with the location of each trust. Trusts within
central/north England had poorer local population health proﬁles than their counterparts in south England
and London.89 The health proﬁle indicators were reviewed for changes over recent years (2008–12).
We attempted to interpret this as part of the outer shock/constraint in the local area(s) where each
trust operated.
According to the overall ratings for each trust, T1, T3 and T4 experienced relatively severe inner and outer
shocks, whereas T6 and T7 experienced much milder impacts. T2, T5 and T9 experienced moderate shocks
and crises during the observed period.
There are some caveats when interpreting the data in Table 6. First, treating each indicator in Table 6
equally can be problematic. There is a risk of underestimating a possible tremendous effect: for example,
the recent merger in T1, which is currently operating ﬁve hospitals across three major hospital sites, may
have varying short-term and long-term shocks. A merger of an organisation is a disruptive process,
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especially when constituent organisations have held strong individual identities and pride. There is a
need to consolidate structural and cultural differences, political capital and power clashes. It is also a
time-consuming process. For example, T5 underwent a merger in the early 2000s and, during the study
period, found itself in a situation in which it had been freed from ‘demarcation’ only recently.
One respondent suggested:
A lot of it (demarcation) is broken down now. When the XXX hospital trust merged with the YYY
hospital trust in [. . . ], it has taken us probably 8 or 9 years to break down our organisational roles.
T5M3 – non-clinical manager
Second, a combination of certain crises might have an exponential effect rather than simply being
aggregated. Third, how quickly the changes in health proﬁle indicators might have an impact on the trust
at an organisational level is unknown. Moreover, the Network of Public Health Observatories warns us that
‘a green circle [better than England average] may still indicate an important public health problem’ in its
health summary chart for each geographical area.89 Nevertheless, one can say that each category within
the table, to a large extent, illuminates the degree of shocks, critical events and crises internally (within the
trust) and externally (in the local areas), and the overall rating can give us a ﬂavour of recent changes of
inner (in terms of structural, ﬁnancial, managerial) and outer (local populations) contextual conditions
where each trust has been operating.
Research activity
To assess the research activity domain at each trust, we selected ﬁve aspects based on secondary data:
(a) university afﬁliation [with medical and/or nursing school(s)]; (b) formal research organisational structure
that looked at the existence of research and innovation divisions, BRC, BRUs, AHSC and other
research-related organisational structures; (c) research-supporting infrastructure and research initiatives,
such as research forums, tools, networks, research training and access to electronic resources; (d) intensity
of research activity reported, as captured by the number of clinical research studies, the number of studies
supported by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR), the number of Research Passports issued
and the number of publications; and (e) IPC-related evaluations or trials reported by the trust, for example,
a trial of the silver alloy urinary catheter.
The ﬁgures in Table 7 show the aggregated number of the data: for example, we counted ‘1’ for ‘formal
research organisational structure’ if the trust reported its AHSC status. Regarding ‘intensity of research
activity reported’, all the data were not always available from all the trusts, but we attempted to compare
the possible maximum available indicators across the trusts.
Within this chapter, the quantitative data set for each variable was divided into three groups according to
tertile distribution. The cut-off points in each scoring table or ‘the formula’ under each table were
calculated based on this approach and each group was given a score accordingly. If it was infeasible to
give the equal scale to these three groups, slightly more weight was usually given to the middle tertile and
the upper and bottom tertiles were always given equal weight. These scores were aggregated per trust in
each domain in order to obtain an overall rating in a similar fashion to scoring through the application of
the tertile distribution. For example, when the total scores for all trusts in the ‘Research activity’ domain
ran from 3 to 12, we assigned ‘†’ to the bottom tertile (3–5) reﬂecting ‘fewer research activities’, ‘††’ to
the middle tertile (6–9) indicating a ‘moderate number of research activities’ and ‘†††’ to the upper tertile
(10–12) reﬂecting ‘a greater number of research activities’.
There is a signiﬁcant difference between two clusters of trusts: university-afﬁliated trusts and non-afﬁliated
trusts. The latter (T4 and T6) were less research orientated, reporting fewer research activities. Among the
university-afﬁliated trusts, T1, T5 and T7 seem to have taken a particularly strong research stride,
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TABLE 7 Research activity (reported 2007/08–spring 2011)
Trust [a] [b] [c] [d] [e] Overall rating (total score)
T1 Medical 29 29 6 11 ††† (1 + 3 + 2 + 2 + 3 = 11)
T2 Medical 17 37 3 3 †† (1 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 = 8)
T3 Medical 5 43 1 2 †† (1 + 1 + 3 + 1 + 1 = 7)
T4 N/A 1 24 3 1 † (0 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 5)
T5 Medical 14 48 8 10 ††† (1 + 2 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 12)
T6 N/A 3 19 0 1 † (0 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 1 = 3)
T7 Medical; nursing 14 45 7 7 ††† (2 + 2 + 3 + 3 + 2 = 12)
T9 Medical 10 40 2 5 †† (1 + 2 + 3 + 1 + 2 = 9)
N/A, not applicable.
[a] University afﬁliation [with medical and/or nursing school(s)].
[b] No. of formal research organisational structures.
[c] No. of research-supporting infrastructures and research initiatives.
[d] Aggregated score for intensity of research activity reported (2009/10).
[e] No. of IPC-related evaluations reported.
The ﬁgures (total scores) within parentheses show the scores calculated based on the table below.
Key [a] [b] [c] [d] [e] Overall rating
Scored 2 when it
was afﬁliated to
both medical
and nursing
schools
Scored 3
when the
aggregated
number was
21–29
Scored 3
when the
aggregated
number was
39–48
Scored 3 when the
score was 7–8: a
greater number of
relevant activities was
reported
Scored 3
when the
aggregated
number was
9–11
Assigned ††† when
the total score was
10–12: a greater
number of research
activities
Scored 1 when it
was afﬁliated to
either medical or
nursing school
Scored 2
when the
aggregated
number was
10–20
Scored 2
when the
aggregated
number was
29–38
Scored 2 when the
score was 3–6:
moderate number of
relevant activities was
reported
Scored 2
when the
aggregated
number was
4–8
Assigned †† when
the total score was
6–9: moderate
number of research
activities
Scored 0 when it
had no university
afﬁliation
Scored 1
when the
aggregated
number was
1–9
Scored 1
when the
aggregated
number was
19–28
Scored 1 when the
score was 1–2: fewer
relevant activities
were reported
Scored 1
when the
aggregated
number was
1–3
Assigned † when the
total score was 3–5:
fewer research
activities
Key for [d] (aggregated score for intensity of research activity reported) to support the above table.
No. of clinical
research
studies
(2009/10)
No. of studies
supported by
NIHR (2009/10)
No. of
Research
Passports
issued
(2009/10)
No. of
publications
[d]
Scored 3 if the
number was
594–870
Scored 3 if the
number was
214–250
Scored 3 if
the number
was 81–110
Scored 3 if the
number was
1948–2870
[d] refers to the aggregated score from all four
elements of research activities (no. of clinical
research studies; no. of studies supported by the
NIHR; no. of Research Passports issued; and no.
of publications) reported by each trustScored 2 if the
number was
317–593
Scored 2 if the
number was
177–213
Scored 2 if
the number
was 50–80
Scored 2 if the
number was
1023–1947
Scored 1 if the
number was
40–316
Scored 1 if the
number was
140–176
Scored 1 if
the number
was 20–49
Scored 1 if the
number was
100–1022
Scored 0 if no
data were
available
Scored 0 if no
data were
available
Scored 0 if no
data were
available
Scored 0 if no
data were
available
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conﬁrmed through the majority of aspects observed. The fact that T1, T5 and T9 were Showcase Hospital
trusts appeared to reﬂect the higher number of IPC-related evaluations reported by the trust.
Table 7 does not capture the transient nature of formal research structures, and does not include the latest
status of BRCs and BRUs, which were renewed in 2012 (see Table 1 in Chapter 3). The majority of trusts
maintained their status, but T7 lost both BRC and BRU status in 2012. No major research structural change
was witnessed at T3, T4 or T6 during the same period. Whereas T3 had a quasiresearch structure, T4 and
T6 did not have BRC or BRU status at any point during the study period.
In phase 1 the respondents were asked about research involvement and experiences. With regard to
conducting research themselves, a number of prompts/triggers were identiﬁed by the respondents – the
most cited were as follows: felt the need to improve services or update practice, which was cited by
one-third of respondents; this was followed by identiﬁcation of (recurring) problems, or a gap in
knowledge, or problem solving, cited by one-quarter of respondents; and better patient outcomes,
beneﬁts, experiences and/or safety, to a lesser degree. Finance as a trigger (i.e. cost-saving, value for
money, cost-effectiveness) was considered by only a few respondents in the non-clinical managers and
nursing managers groups. Organisational role also featured:
I think again it depends on what role they’re in. For me it’s about improving the patient care and
patient flow, so that would be my, you know, that would prompt me to find information, but
for others it may be how to run a more cost effective endoscopy service or something like that.
So it depends on the individual and what they’re managing.
T6M8 – nurse
[. . .] we do, do a lot of research here and we for example may say. I mean it rarely comes from the
management team to be honest. A lot are clinical and clinically driven.
T7M5 – nurse
Other important themes were related to sensemaking for self and others: including veriﬁcation or
validation of existing practice (i.e. verifying something unfamiliar, validating evidence, for proving one’s
own (others’) practice, and value judgement); supporting or justifying decisions on the introduction of
certain innovations; building up an evidence base for proving the effectiveness/beneﬁts of the innovation;
or challenging the product introduced.
The veriﬁcation of existing practice often requires critical thinking and an inquiring mind in selecting the
optimum treatment or innovation as an individual/team. This approach was highlighted by the following
respondent, who echoed also the temporal nature of evidence discussed in Chapter 4:
Either because a new thing has been developed and evidence is needed either way, it is a good or
bad thing, does it work, is it effective, or to answer the things we do on a daily basis, we always do it
this way, why? I think we are getting better in health care in asking why, challenging ourselves and
challenging kind of assumptions we had for long time. H.[elicobacter] pylori causes ulcers, we know
that now – 10 to 20 years ago it was stress. You know it is never assuming things and constantly
questioning and developing a hypothesis and testing it.
T3M2 – nurse
[. . .] I think it is just an inquiring mind, people want to know or test out and then therefore get the
best treatment, so that they can feel assured that they’re doing the right treatment or intervention.
T7M10 – allied health professional
I don’t know [. . .] what makes other people do it. What would make me want to do it is if the
evidence isn’t already out there and strong and you’ve worked on historical practice for so long it
would be actually nice to know scientifically whether what you are doing is making a difference.
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Ultimately it’s around patients’ benefits but I think for me, there is a big gap particularly in infection
prevention control where we have historically done things one way but there isn’t the evidence to
support that one way or another and I think effective practice making practice meaningful I think
there needs to be a lot more in that.
T6M4 – nurse
In relation to patient-centred drivers as a source of motivation, T2 and T3 cited this above other drivers,
which triangulates with espoused organisational culture and vision. The patient-centred element was more
evident among nurses from T2 and T3 (a half of respondents from each trust) than their counterparts
(e.g. one-third of respondents from T7 and approximately one-quarter of respondents from T9). Based on
secondary data analysis, T2 and T3 were beacons for patient safety – these were the only trusts among
our sample to have visited and directly observed international leaders and pioneers of patient safety
models in the USA. Further, documentary analysis revealed the successful transfer of lessons to local
management practices at hospital and ward level through the development of a safe and supportive
culture, and changes in organisational structure and practices.
Innovation activity
This section examines how ‘innovative’ each trust has been, and more speciﬁcally how many IPC-related
innovations have been reported by the trust over recent years. The ﬁgures within Table 8 show the
aggregated number of the data based on trust-speciﬁc secondary sources: for example, we counted ‘1’ for
the ﬁrst column, [a], if the trust reported IPC- or patient-safety-related innovations that were developed by
the trusts themselves, seemingly reﬂecting local innovation capacity. Similarly, we counted ‘1’ for the
TABLE 8 Innovation activity (reported 2007/08–spring 2011)
Trust
[a] No. of locally developed
IPC-/patient-safety-related
innovations
[b] No. of innovations
reported as ‘the ﬁrst in
the UK’; ‘cutting edge’
Overall rating
(total score)
T1 10 13 ††† (2 + 3 = 5)
T2 9 3 †† (2 + 1 = 3)
T3 12 10 ††† (3 + 3 = 6)
T4 7 4 † (1 + 1 = 2)
T5 9 5 †† (2 + 2 = 4)
T6 8 1 † (1 + 1 = 2)
T7 12 7 ††† (3 + 2 = 5)
T9 7 8 †† (1 + 2 = 3)
The ﬁgures (total scores) within parentheses show the scores calculated based on the table below.
Key [a] [b] Overall rating
Scored 3 when the
aggregated number was
11–12
Scored 3 when the
aggregated number was
10–13
Assigned ‘†††’ when the total score was 5–6: a greater
number of activities that reflect local innovation capacity
and pro-first culture
Scored 2 when the
aggregated number was
9–10
Scored 2 when the
aggregated number was
5–9
Assigned ‘††’ when the total score was 3–4: moderate
number of activities that reflect local innovation capacity
and pro-first culture
Scored 1 when the
aggregated number was
7–8
Scored 1 when the
aggregated number was
1–4
Assigned ‘†’ when the total score was 2: fewer activities
that reflect local innovation capacity and pro-first culture
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second column, [b], if the trust reported the adoption of innovations by using terms such as ‘the ﬁrst in
the UK’ or ‘cutting edge’, ‘ground breaking’ or similar. This has an implication of organisational willingness
to become a front runner when it comes to adopting relatively less-established innovations, seemingly
reﬂecting pro-ﬁrst organisational culture.
Based on the above quantitative results, T1, T3 and T7 reported a greater number of activities, seemingly
reﬂecting a greater level of local innovation capacity and pro-ﬁrst culture during the observed period, and
respondents who were aware of this organisational identity:
[. . .] the fact that it [Bioquell vapour hydrogen peroxide (VHP) Room Bio-Decontamination Service
(RBDS)] is innovative and we are one of the first trusts in the country to get on board with it, actually
quite appeals to the execs because they can then say take a look at us, we’re ahead of the game and
make them feel quite proud of themselves, in that respect.
T3M2 – nurse
We can say that these trusts were eager to be perceived as ‘the ﬁrst’ or ‘cutting-edge’ organisations,
willing to take a risk in becoming ‘the ﬁrst of its kind’; therefore, they have demonstrated an
open-minded, pro-change organisational culture. On the other hand, based on the above quantitative
results, T4 and T6 reported fewer relevant activities; this might reﬂect a less proactive attitude towards
something very new. T2, T5 and T9 showed a moderate attitude towards developing innovation locally as
well as introducing ‘cutting edge’ or relatively less-established innovation imported from outside the
organisation. Our primary data (interviews) captured what was evident through secondary sources for T9:
It’s one of degrees, as I say, if we were way behind the ball and someone came back from another
trust and say, ‘They’re doing this, why aren’t we doing it?’, then that, you then have perhaps a formal
expectation to develop that particular aspect but [. . .] the assumption is that we are at the leading
edge for most things or we’ve actively made a decision that we’re not going to be at the leading
edge because either it doesn’t suit us or whatever. [. . .] there are no doubt some things we’re at the
trailing edge but again the expectation is that that is an active decision that we’re deliberately holding
back because we’ve made an assessment and we see some risks associated with it or it doesn’t fit
with the overall strategy of the trust.
T9M2 – doctor
The above respondent at T9 reported a risk averse attitude towards introducing ‘cutting-edge’ innovation
and his or her decision-making was rather inclined to the ‘active’ rational paradigm. Based on the
secondary data analysis, T1 showed a strong organisational appetite to take a risk in the innovation ﬁeld,
whereas T6 seemed to be a risk averse organisation.
We will now look at the number and the type of IPC-related innovations reported by the trusts. We also
compare the number of innovations with the number of staff for each trust (Table 9). The innovations
identiﬁed here are a wide range of IPC interventions or interventions that might directly or indirectly
affect IPC. These were reported by the trusts themselves. They ranged from small to large and from
technological/technical/product to organisational/administrative/programmatic to process/protocol types
of innovations. Based on trust-speciﬁc secondary data, the innovation activities and innovation types were
analysed for each trust. The sources included the following: trusts’ annual reports and ﬁnancial accounts
(2007/08, 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11, 2011/12), trusts’ quality accounts reports (2009/10), DIPC reports
(when available), trust board meeting minutes (when available), staff magazines, newsletters, bulletins and
other publicly available materials (between 2007/08 and spring 2011).
The ﬁgures within Table 9 show the aggregated number of the data based on these trust-speciﬁc
secondary sources: for example, we counted ‘1’ for ‘process/protocol innovations’ if the trust reported the
introduction of a new IPC training scheme, as it falls into the category of process innovation. Similarly, we
counted ‘1’ for ‘organisational/administrative/programmatic innovations’ if the trust reported the
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TABLE 9 Innovations reported at each trust (reported 2007/08–spring 2011)
Trust
Organisational/
administrative/
programmatic
innovations
Technical/
technological/
product
innovations
Process/
protocol
innovations
Total number
of innovations
reported
No. of staff
(average between
2007/08 and
2010/11)
Innovations
relative to size
(no. of innovations/
100 staff)
Rating based on ‘Total
number of innovations
reported’ (total score)
T1 86 46 90 101 9793 1.03 † (1)
T2 125 51 128 160 5690 2.81 ††† (3)
T3 100 46 109 125 6175 2.02 †† (2)
T4 75 26 77 87 6407a 1.36 † (1)
T5 84 29 76 86 8831 0.97 † (1)
T6 126 45 133 156 4133 3.77 ††† (3)
T7 145 50 134 165 12,356 1.34 ††† (3)
T9 69 26 72 84 7308 1.15 † (1)
a Average for 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2010/11.
The ﬁgures within parentheses show the scores given based on the table below.
Key Total number of innovations reported Rating based on ‘total number of innovations reported’
Scored 3 when the number was 139–165 Assigned ‘†††’ when the score was 3: a greater number of innovations reported by the trust
Scored 2 when the number was 111–138 Assigned ‘††’ when the score was 2: moderate number of innovations reported by the trust
Scored 1 when the number was 84–110 Assigned ‘†’ when the score was 1: fewer innovations reported by the trust
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appointment of new IPC staff (i.e. a medical IPC lead, antibiotic prescribing pharmacists, infection
prevention link nurses, etc.), as it falls into the category of organisational/administrative innovation. Some
innovations were identiﬁed as cross-cutting or multifaceted innovations: for example, we considered a
Bioquell VHP RBDS (Bioquell UK Ltd, Andover, UK) at T5 as a multifaceted innovation within all three
categories. It is a product technology; its evaluation was initiated as part of the Department of Health’s
Showcase Hospitals programme; and the innovation process involved collaboration with the trust’s
domestic services partner.
The number of innovations reported implies the openness or transparency of the organisation in terms of
information sharing, and also a desire to demonstrate to others a pro-innovation culture. T2, T6 and T7
were stronger in this aspect, whereas T1, T4, T5 and T9 were weaker (Figure 5).
In relation to the type of innovation, all trusts tended to focus on ‘organisational/administrative/
programmatic’ and ‘process/protocol’ rather than ‘technological/technical/product’ innovations (Figure 6).
The data that include termination following adoption decisions or implementation of an innovation are not
often disseminated in the public domain. It is therefore difﬁcult to assess the degree of sustainable
implementation of innovations from secondary sources.
The results of the comparison concerning the number of innovations relative to size (no. of innovations
reported/no. of staff) implied the importance of organisation size (Figure 7). As demonstrated by a
U-shaped curve here, relatively extreme trusts, in terms of size (either smaller or larger), reported more
innovations. On the other hand, moderate-sized trusts reported much fewer innovations during the
observed period.
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FIGURE 5 Total number of innovations reported 2007/08–spring 2011.
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FIGURE 6 Types of innovations reported by each trust 2007/08–spring 2011.
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Communication: internal/external
We will now assess the communication domain at each trust, based on secondary sources that
were reported from 2007/08 to spring 2011. To examine this domain, we selected four aspects:
(1) communication channels, including newsletters, magazines, events, brieﬁngs and leadership walk
rounds; (2) patient and public involvement initiatives, and related infrastructure; (3) linkage with regional,
national and international IPC/patient safety initiatives; and (4) IPC/patient safety training or awareness-
raising events (Table 10). The ﬁgures in Table 10 show the aggregated number of data; for example, we
counted ‘1’ for ‘communication channels’ if there was a regular team brief within that organisation.
Table 10 reﬂects the extent to which internal and external communication was reported by each
trust during the observed period. Communication channels, [a], and IPC/patient safety training and
awareness-raising events, [d], can be considered as internal communication, and the rest as external.
However, data within the table do not take account of the quality of the communication channels or of
informal communication channels.
The overall ratings in Table 10 show that T1 and T5 seemed to score relatively low on communication,
whereas T3, T7 and T9 reported relatively high numbers of communication-related channels and initiatives
and high levels of communication-related infrastructure. Notably, T7 showed a signiﬁcantly higher number
of patient and public involvement initiatives and higher levels of related infrastructure than the remaining
trusts; this was also demonstrated by the extremely high number of patients (approximately 20,000) who
were recruited to participate in research during 2009/10. A similarly research-strong organisation, T1,
recruited approximately 13,000 patients during the same period. In fact, T7 was one of the UK’s ﬁrst trusts
to incorporate the public into research decision-making mechanisms.
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FIGURE 7 Relationship between ‘number of staff (average 2007/08–2010/11)’ and ‘number of innovations
reported (2007/08–spring 2011)’.
ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT: THE MACROCASES OF THE EIGHT NHS TRUSTS STUDIED
58
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
Summary
Table 11 shows overall ratings for each domain of contextual factors for the eight ‘macrocases’. To sum
up, T7 obtained a better overall rating in all of the domains observed. A greater number of research
activities were reported by T1, T5 and T7. Activities that reﬂect local innovation capacity and a ‘pro-ﬁrst’
culture were more likely to be seen among T1, T3 and T7. A higher number of internal/external
communication-related channels/initiatives/infrastructures was reported by T3, T7 and T9.
Being research-orientated, having a greater local innovation capacity and a ‘pro-ﬁrst’ culture, and/or a
greater number of internal/external communication-related initiatives/channels did not seem to have played
an important role in increasing the number of reported innovations. This was demonstrated in T6, where
such attributes were at a lower level than at other trusts. Relatively extreme trusts, in terms of size (either
smaller, such as T6 and T2, or larger, such as T7), reported more innovations. Hence, in our organisational
sample the trust size was a prominent factor in this regard. Limitations in the classiﬁcations and clustering
of cases presented in this chapter relate to our reliance upon self-reported data for a number of
organisational context dimensions, and the unavoidably reductionist approach we used in analysing and
reporting on the large data set at hand.
TABLE 10 Communication (internal and external) (reported 2007/08–spring 2011)
Trust [a] [b] [c] [d] Overall rating (total score)
T1 7 5 14 18 † (1 + 1 + 1 + 2 = 5)
T2 7 6 39 17 †† (1 + 1 + 3 + 2 = 7)
T3 12 15 35 24 ††† (2 + 2 + 3 + 3 = 10)
T4 6 12 25 13 †† (1 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 7)
T5 4 2 19 12 † (1 + 1+ 1+ 1 = 4)
T6 10 8 30 19 †† (2 + 1 + 2 + 2 = 7)
T7 13 28 32 8 ††† (2 + 3 + 3 + 1 = 9)
T9 19 18 30 14 ††† (3 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 9)
[a] No. of communication channels.
[b] No. of patient and public involvement initiatives, and related infrastructure.
[c] No. of linkages with regional, national and international IPC/patient safety initiatives.
[d] No. of IPC/patient safety training or awareness-raising events.
The ﬁgures (total scores) within parentheses show the scores calculated based on the table below.
Key [a] [b] [c] [d] Overall rating
Scored 3 when
the aggregated
number was
15–19
Scored 3 when
the aggregated
number was
20–28
Scored 3 when
the aggregated
number was
32–39
Scored 3 when
the aggregated
number was
20–24
Assigned ‘†††’ when
the total score was 9–10:
higher level of
communication
Scored 2 when
the aggregated
number was 9–14
Scored 2 when
the aggregated
number was
11–19
Scored 2 when
the aggregated
number was
22–31
Scored 2 when
the aggregated
number was
13–19
Assigned ‘††’ when the total
score was 6–8: moderate
level of communication
Scored 1 when
the aggregated
number was 4–8
Scored 1 when
the aggregated
number was 2–10
Scored 1 when
the aggregated
number was
14–21
Scored 1 when
the aggregated
number was 8–12
Assigned ‘†’ when the total
score was 4–5: lower level
of communication
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TABLE 11 Overall summary of contextual data reported by the trust (based on secondary source)
Trust
Trust
performance
and patient
experience
Magnitude
of shocks,
crises and
critical events
(inner, outer)
Research
activity
Communication
(internal,
external)
Innovation activity Trust size/
resources
(no. of
staff – average
between
2007/08 and
2010/11)
Local
innovation
capacity
and pro-ﬁrst
culture
Innovation
reported
by the trust
T1 † ††† ††† † ††† † 9793
T2 ††† †† †† †† †† ††† 5690
T3 †† ††† †† ††† ††† †† 6175
T4 †† ††† † †† † † 6407a
T5 †† †† ††† † †† † 8831
T6 †† † † †† † ††† 4133
T7 ††† † ††† ††† ††† ††† 12,356
T9 †† †† †† ††† †† † 7308
a Average for 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2010/11.
Key
Better overall rating in performance/activity/communication, or relatively low level of internal/external shocks.
Moderate level of overall rating in performance/activity/communication, or moderate level of internal/external shocks.
Worse overall rating in performance/activity/communication, or relatively high level of internal/external shocks.
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Chapter 7 Evidence in action: technology products
overview and typology
In this chapter we discuss the results of our formal investigation of 18 environmental hygiene technologyproducts. We do this by using interview data from phase 2 and complementary secondary data on
product-supporting evidence for efﬁcacy and cost.
We start by presenting an overview of the selected products. We purposefully sampled for three
technology product examples in each of the eight trusts fulﬁlling the following criteria: (1) one technology
product currently being considered for adoption, (2) one technology product successfully adopted and
implemented, and (3) one technology product rejected or discontinued after initial adoption. All products
empirically examined concerned the period 2007–2012. In this chapter we also provide a typology of
these 18 products, distinguishing among three important dimensions: (1) expected budgetary impact,
(2) perceived impact on practice, and (3) evidence strength on efﬁcacy.
Technology products overview
This section offers an overview and typology of the environmental hygiene technology products studied
in each of the trusts. Detailed accounts of their journeys in the eight trusts participating in phase 2
are included.
Overall, 18 environmental hygiene technology products based on 15 unique technologies have been
reviewed in a total of 27 individual technology product journeys in the eight trusts. These 18 products
constitute tracers for studying the use of evidence in support of the innovation adoption process in each
organisation. These products were recommended by participating trusts’ staff to the research team as
examples of innovative technologies considered for adoption since 2007, and can be categorised into:
l Liquid cleaning technology products (three): DIFFICIL-S® (Clinimax Ltd, Bury St Edmunds, UK);
Chlor-Clean soluble tablets (Guest Medical Ltd, Aylesford, UK); and Virusolve+® (Amity International,
Barnsley, UK).
l Wipe cleaning technology products (four): clinell® universal sanitising wipes (non-sporicidal, green
wipes) (GAMA Healthcare Ltd, London); clinell® sporicidal wipes (red wipes) (GAMA Healthcare);
clinell® alcoholic 2% chlorhexidine wipes (GAMA Healthcare); and PDI® Sani-Cloth® CHG 2% alcoholic
chlorhexidine gluconate wipes (PDI Inc., Orangeburg, NY, USA).
l Inspection technology products (four): 3M™ Clean-Trace™ NG luminometer (3M United Kingdom plc,
Bracknell, UK); Hygiena SystemSURE II adenosine triphosphate (ATP) hygiene monitoring system
(Hygiena, Camarillo, CA, USA); UV (ultraviolet) light inspection torch (UV Light Technology Ltd,
Birmingham, UK); and DaRo UV light inspection cabinet (DaRo UV Systems Ltd, Sudbury, UK).
l Decontamination technology products (ﬁve): Bioquell VHP RBDS; Steris BioGenie VHP decontamination
system (STERIS Corporation, Mentor, OH); Advanced Sterilisation Products (ASP®) GLOSAIR™
400 aerosolised hydrogen peroxide (aHP) system (ASP c/o Johnson & Johnson Medical Ltd,
Wokingham, UK); JLA OTEX® laundry system (JLA Ltd, Ripponden, West Yorkshire, UK); and Medixair™
and Medixair™ Meos UV air sterilisation units (Pathogen Solutions Ltd, Solihull, UK).
l Other infection prevention products with no anti-infective agent (two): Design Bugs Out (DBO)
commode (The Kirton Healthcare Group Ltd, Haverhill, UK); and disposable sterile surgical site gowns.
Table 12 shows the different technology products examined in each of the trusts. They have been listed in
columns representing the outcome for each at the time of data collection (April 2011–July 2012), with
the number in parentheses denoting each individual technology product microcase. Only one example, the
Bioquell VHP RBDS, features in all three columns.
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Typology of technologies
This section offers a typology of the environmental hygiene technology products in terms of (1) expected
budgetary impact for trusts, (2) perceived impact on practice for trust staff, and (3) evidence strength
on efﬁcacy.
The budget and practice impact classiﬁcations have been based on trust staff perceptions of product
attributes elicited during phase 2. This is in line with qualitative methods used in health technology
assessment deployed within the context of the health-care organisation to rigorously examine ‘the
objective material conditions; the actors’ prior knowledge, values and experience; and the actors’ working
deﬁnitions of what kind of event they were engaged in and the ways in which conditions, knowledge,
values and experience were relevant’ (p. 46).91 This approach connects seamlessly with sensemaking
theory, and incorporates the innovation studies concepts of compatibility, which is reﬂected in the
perceived budget and practice impact, relative advantage, which is linked to budget impact and evidence
strength on efﬁcacy, and complexity, reﬂected in practice impact.
TABLE 12 Technology products selected for review by trusts
Trust
Products under
consideration Successfully implemented products Rejected products
T1 (One) DBO commode (Two) clinell universal sanitising
wipes (2% chlorhexidine, C22H30Cl2N10,
70% ethanol-based alcohol)
(Three) Bioquell VHP RBDS
(30% w/w aqueous
hydrogen peroxide, H2O2)
T2 (Four) disposable sterile
surgical site gowns
(Five) ASP GLOSAIR 400 aHP system
(5–6% hydrogen peroxide solution,
released in aerosol form)
(Seven) UV Light Technology
Ltd inspection torch
(Six) 3M Clean-Trace NG luminometer
(based on ATP measurement)
T3 (Eight) Bioquell VHP RBDS
(30% w/w aqueous
hydrogen peroxide, H2O2)
(Nine) clinell sporicidal wipes
(peracetic acid, CH3CO3H)
(10) Medixair and Medixair
Meos UV air sterilisation units
T4 (11) Clinimax DIFFICIL-S
(chlorine dioxide, ClO2)
(12) Bioquell VHP RBDS Steris BioGenie
VHP system (30% w/w aqueous
hydrogen peroxide, H2O2)
(13) Virusolve+ liquid
(dodecylamine-based substances,
biodegradable detergent)
T5 (14) Bioquell VHP RBDS
(30% w/w aqueous
hydrogen peroxide, H2O2)
(15) Chlor-Clean tablets (sodium
dichloroisocyanurate, C3Cl2N3NaO3)
(16) 3M Clean-Trace NG
luminometer, Hygiena
SystemSURE II ATP hygiene
monitoring system
(based on ATP measurement)
T6 (17) Bioquell VHP RBDS
(30% w/w aqueous
hydrogen peroxide, H2O2)
(18) JLA OTEX laundry system
(ozone, O3)
(19) Medixair and Medixair
Meos UV air sterilisation units
T7 (20) Clinimax DIFFICIL-S
(chlorine dioxide, ClO2)
(21) ASP GLOSAIR 400 aHP system
(5–6% hydrogen peroxide solution,
released in aerosol)
(22) UV Light Technology
Ltd inspection torch
(23) UV Light Technology
Ltd hand inspection unit
T9 (24) clinell alcoholic wipes
and PDI Sani-Cloth wipes
(2% chlorhexidine,
C22H30Cl2N10, 70%
ethanol-based alcohol)
(25) clinell sporicidal wipes (red)
(peracetic acid CH3CO3H)
(27) Bioquell VHP RBDS
(30% w/w aqueous
hydrogen peroxide, H2O2)
(26) JLA OTEX laundry system
(ozone, O3)
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In this typology, a speciﬁc technology product budget impact is classiﬁed as ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’.
These classiﬁcations are based on trust staff perceptions of (1) the immediate budgetary impact of each
product examined in their trust [unit cost price, ﬁnancial support available for procurement, cost assumed
by private ﬁnance initiative (PFI) partner], and (2) sustainability costs.
Classiﬁcations for the 18 products across the eight trusts are listed in Table 13. In addition, Appendix 7:
Technology products unit cost price list shows the technology products according to their list unit cost
price in descending order, from the most to the least expensive. As part of the Department of Health and
the former NHS PASA’s ‘HCAI Technology Innovation Programme Award’ for outstanding contributions to
TABLE 13 Technology products’ expected budgetary impact in trusts
Technology product Trust Budget impact
ASP GLOSAIR 400 aHP system T2 Low
T7 High
Steris BioGenie VHP system T4 Low
JLA OTEX laundry system (JLA 40 High Spin machine with OTEX system ﬁtted) T6 Low
T9 Low
3M Clean-Trace NG luminometer (with board and swab rods) T2 Medium
T5 Medium
Bioquell VHP RBDS (one hospital room) T1 High
T3 Medium
T5 Medium
T6 Medium
T9 High
Medixair and Medixair Meos UV air sterilisation unit T3 Low
T6 Low
T7 Low
UV LIGHT Technologies inspection torch T2 Low
Hygiena SystemSURE II ATP hygiene monitoring system (with swab rods) T5 Medium
DBO commode T1 Medium
DaRo UV light inspection cabinet (with gel and accessories) T7 Low
DIFFICIL-S disinfectant solution (with mixing vessel and four bottles) T4 Low
T7 Low
Virusolve+ T4 Low
Disposable sterile surgical site gowns (box of 30) T2 Medium
Clinell universal sanitising wipes (non-sporicidal, six 200-wipe packs) T1 Medium
Clinell sporicidal (red) wipes (pack of 25) T3 Medium
T9 Medium
Clinell alcoholic wipes T9 Low
Chlor-Clean tablets T5 Low
PDI Sani-Cloth CHG 2% alcoholic chlorhexidine gluconate wipes (pack of 200) T9 Low
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ﬁghting infections 2009’, £150,000 was awarded to trusts T3, T4 and T7 and £50,000 to T2. The trusts
were given free reign to use the sum to procure technologies that could help reduce HCAIs (awarded in
February 2009 and technologies procured within the following year). The award funding was taken into
account in the classiﬁcation of technologies in terms of expected budgetary impact for these four trusts
and for the speciﬁc technology products procured using this method. When this funding was reported by
the respondents to have played a signiﬁcant role in the adoption and implementation processes, this is
discussed in the individual microcases in Chapter 8. For example, the technology product ASP GLOSAIR
was perceived to have a ‘low’-budget impact in T2 and a ‘high’ budget impact in T7, as T2 used the
award funding to procure the speciﬁc product.
Table 14 groups technology products in terms of their associated impact on practice perceived by the trust
staff interviewed. The classiﬁcation has been put together based on qualitative analysis of phase 2
interviews, and includes ﬁve classes:
l Very low – product or technology same or very similar to existing, established products in the NHS.
l Low – product has new features (e.g. active ingredient) and is used in the same manner as existing,
established products in the NHS: limited staff training required.
l Medium – product has new features and is used differently from existing, established products in the
NHS: staff training required.
l High – new product or technology with precursor method, product or technology.
l Very high – new product or technology without precursor.
Evidence strength data on the efﬁcacy of products have been collected through secondary research:
‘Efﬁcacy refers to the probability of beneﬁt to individuals in a deﬁned population from a medical
technology applied for a given medical problem under ideal conditions of use’ (p. 711).92 Table 15
illustrates the strength of the evidence base for the efﬁcacy of each product based on (1) a HPA RRP
recommendation, (2) an evaluation report published as part of the Department of Health’s HCAI
Technology Innovation Programme, Showcase Hospitals programme, or other government-sponsored
technology assessment or evaluation programmes, and (3) scientiﬁc articles published in peer-reviewed
journals. A product of RRP recommendation 1, published scientiﬁc articles, and technology assessment
evaluation reports where available is classiﬁed as an ‘established’ product having a ‘high’ evidence strength
on efﬁcacy. Products of RRP recommendation 2 which also feature in published scientiﬁc articles or
technology assessment evaluation reports are classiﬁed as ‘emergent’ products, having ‘medium’ evidence
TABLE 14 Practice impact of technology products
Very low Low Medium High Very high
Disposable sterile
surgical site gowns
DBO commode DIFFICIL-S ASP GLOSAIR 400
aHP system
Medixair UV air
sterilisation unit
Clinell universal
sanitising wipes
(non-sporicidal)
Clinell sporicidal
(red) wipes
Chlor-Clean
tablets
Steris BioGenie VHP
system
Medixair Meos UV
air sterilisation unit
Clinell alcoholic
wipes
Virusolve+ JLA OTEX
laundry system
3M Clean-Trace NG
luminometer
PDI Sani-Cloth wipes Bioquell VHP RBDS
UV LIGHT Technologies
inspection torch
Hygiena SystemSURE II
ATP hygiene monitoring
system
DaRo UV light inspection
cabinet
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TABLE 15 Evidence strength on the efﬁcacy of technology products
Technology product
HPA RRP
recommendation
Technology
assessment
evaluation report
(UK/international)
Peer-reviewed
journal scientiﬁc
articles
Evidence strength
on efﬁcacy
(established/emergent)
ASP GLOSAIR 400
aHP system
✓ RRP3 (2008) ✓ Medium, emergent
Steris BioGenie VHP
system
✓ RRP2 (2005) Low, emergent
JLA OTEX laundry
system
✓ RRP1 (2012)
✓ RRP2 (2008)
✓ ✓ High, established
3M Clean-Trace NG
luminometer
✓ RRP1 ✓ (multisite) ✓ High, established
Bioquell VHP RBDS ✓ RRP1 (2008)
✓ RRP2 (2004)
✓ ✓ High, established
Medixair UV air
sterilisation unit
✓ RRP2 ✓ ✓ Low, emergent
UV LIGHT
Technologies
inspection torch
✓ ✓ Medium, emergent
Hygiena SystemSURE II
ATP hygiene
monitoring system
✓ RRP1 (2010) ✓ High, established
Medixair Meos UV air
sterilisation unit
Low, emergent
DBO commode ✓ Low, emergent
DaRo UV light
inspection cabinet
✓ Low, emergent
DIFFICIL-S ✓ RRP2 (2009)
✓ RRP3 (2008)
Low, emergent
Virusolve+ ✓ RRP5 Low, emergent
Disposable sterile
surgical site gowns
✓ Low, emergent
Clinell universal
sanitising wipes
✓ RRP2 ✓ Medium, emergent
Clinell sporicidal (red)
wipes
Low, emergent
Chlor-Clean tablets ✓ Low, emergent
Clinell alcoholic wipes ✓ RRP2 ✓ Medium, emergent
PDI Sani-Cloth CHG
2% alcoholic
chlorhexidine
gluconate wipes
✓ Low, emergent
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strength on efﬁcacy. All other combinations of (1)–(3) result in an ‘emergent’/’low’ classiﬁcation for the
products concerned.
The HPA RRP may publish one of seven recommendation statements for each particular technology
product. Products that obtain RRP1 are understood as having a strong evidence base conﬁrming their
efﬁcacy, and are normally considered for fast tracking and inclusion in NHS Procurement and NICE work
plans. RRP1 is issued as ‘basic research and development, validation and recent in use evaluations [of the
product] have shown beneﬁts that should be available to NHS bodies to include as appropriate in their
cleaning, hygiene or infection control protocols’ (p. 5).73 All of the remaining six recommendations describe
different levels of a product’s emergent evidence base on efﬁcacy. [Please see the following page of the
HPA portal for a full explanation of the RRP recommendations: www.hpa.org.uk/ProductsServices/
MicrobiologyPathology/RapidReviewPanel/rapRecommendations/ (accessed 12 November 2012).]93
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Chapter 8 Evidence in action: product microcases
in eight NHS trusts
This chapter provides an in-depth presentation of the 27 technology product ‘microcases’ across theeight NHS trusts that participated in phase 2. The reader is alerted to the length of the chapter, which
details ﬁndings from a sizable study with multiple cases. All microcases follow a standardised format to
facilitate cross-comparison. Tables 16–41 list the speciﬁc evidence types used in each microcase alongside
the sources from where these were elicited. Figures 8–33 depict the stakeholders involved and evidence
types used in each of the innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation),
and the related organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for each of the technology
products. Text in light grey shows the evidence type(s) or stakeholder(s) who were not involved in
that substage.
We look at each technology product journey in detail along the three key stages of the innovation process:
initiation, adoption decision and implementation. We present the interplay among stakeholders involved in each
stage, the associated evidence types and sources debated, and how these were linked to organisational adoption
and implementation outcomes. What relevant evidence and knowledge bases have the diverse stakeholders in
our case sites accessed, debated, used or rejected? What can be learnt from exploring the relationships among
such diverse evidence forms? How does the espoused use of evidence by individual professionals reported in
phase 1 compare with collective processes of accessing and using evidence for the adoption and implementation
of speciﬁc products in the context of an organisation explored in phase 2 and outlined in this chapter?
Trust 1 technology microcases
Microcase 1: Design Bugs Out commode
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
The special design features of the DBO commode were perceived by informants as novel, suggesting that
a lot of ‘high-tech’ input went into its design and fabrication. It was perceived to be a ‘low-tech’ piece of
equipment and one that comes with a process of how to clean it after use. At the time of its introduction,
environmental hygiene had still been an area of concern for T1. However, informants suggest that it was
viewed as an opportunity to launch a ‘next-generation’ product. Its main advantages are identiﬁed to
be (1) its modern look and feel; (2) staff time savings owing to ease and speed of cleaning its surfaces;
(3) its capacity to save space by placing commodes onto one stack – easy to move and store; and
(4) patient and staff safety in terms of reduced infection risk.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The Showcase Hospitals programme is understood to have provided the initial idea and support for the
adoption of the DBO commode in T1. Evidence was also sourced through seminars and presentations
available through the Design Council DBO project. The T1 showcase lead played a ‘championship’ role by
providing support to the local trial at every stage.
Key stakeholders involved at the start of the DBO commode trial were the DIPC, senior and junior members of
the IPC team, ward and domestic contractor staff (domestic services are outsourced in T1), heads of nursing and
clinical leads. The local trial was approved at the trust’s infection prevention committee meeting. During the trial,
patient feedback on its use was elicited. The strong interest and commitment shown by the DIPC, along with
effective communication of the trial intent and beneﬁts by the IPC team to other stakeholders, are viewed as
pivotal in the successful conduct of the trial. Senior nurses engaged positively with the trial process, while the
clean, modern look and feel of the product served to complement the IPC team communication with shop-ﬂoor
stakeholder groups.
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Evidence sources accessed during the stages of initiation, adoption decision, and implementation included
material available through Showcase Hospitals and the DBO programme (Table 16, Figure 8). Senior IPC team
members also accessed evidence through their professional networks in all three stages. Local evidence, in
the form of ‘ongoing’ patient and ward staff feedback, was also directly collected during the trial. Key
decision-makers are aware of the importance of the perceived cleanliness of bedside products and care
environment in enhancing patient conﬁdence when selecting new products. One respondent highlighted:
I think you’ve got to remember when you’re in the patient environment how it looks is very important
to patients and visitors. So if you’ve got different commodes and all look tatty and unclean, or
difficult to clean, and even you could have the nicest ward but when you’ve got kit around the
bedside that doesn’t match . . . .
Senior nurse
TABLE 16 T1 DBO commode: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Showcase Hospitals programme Product documentation
DBO programme Product documentation incl. evaluation report
Professional networks Professionals’ recommendations
Trust care environment Local trial incl. patient and staff feedback
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Product documentation
Product documentation
DBO evaluation report
DBO evaluation report
Professionals’ recommendations
Professionals’ recommendations
Local trial, patient and staff
feedback
Product documentation
DBO evaluation report
Professionals’ recommendations
Local trial, patient and staff
feedback
Local trial, patient and staff feedback
DIPC DIPC
DIPC
Heads of nursing
Heads of nursing
Heads of nursing
Lead nurses
Lead nurses
Lead nurses
IPC team
IPC team
IPC team
Ward staff Ward staff
Ward staff
Domestic services partner staff Domestic services partner staff
Domestic services partner staff
Outcome
Adopted in two of three sites, phased implementation in progress
FIGURE 8 T1 DBO commode: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
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Training materials showing the cleaning process to follow after use of the commode were made available
to users.
Informants estimated the innovation adoption process to have lasted a maximum of 2.5 years, including
the early supplier involvement phase facilitated by the Department of Health involving discussions among
designers, manufacturers and NHS trusts.
Outcome
The outcome was that, following the trial, the DBO commode became available for general purchase in T1
in December 2011. One incompatibility identiﬁed prior to the trial was that the commode’s portable pan
requires macerator discharge in sluice rooms and only two of the three larger T1 hospital sites have sluice
room macerators installed. The product has otherwise generally been considered to be easy to use and in
line with the organisation’s culture and values.
Key factors in the commode’s adoption are perceived to be its ease of cleaning, patient comfort and cost
neutrality. Sustainability was considered during its design and trial. A requirement shared among external
stakeholders and T1 was that the changeover to the new commode had to be cost neutral. Financial
pressures have now led the IPC team to collaborate with external stakeholders in assessing product life-cycle
cost implications. Some minor damage has been reported to the commodes in the form of, for example,
discolouration of the commode arms caused by extensive cleaning and use in the trust care environment.
Microcase 2: clinell universal sanitising wipes
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
This product is perceived as a ‘low-tech’, well-established and validated product. It is also understood as
being compatible with the systems, structures and processes underpinning care delivery in the ward
environment, as well as with the infection-control-related values and culture of the organisation. The
product’s speciﬁc advantage is considered to be the time saved compared with using other products and
equipment. Its use is simple: staff take it out of the packet, wipe the surface and then dispose of it.
Before the introduction of wipes in T1, cleaning in wards was based on the use of a bucket, a mop and
cleaning solution. This solution was harmful to the ward environment and equipment: it was abrasive and
would wear down surfaces over time. This cleaning process was also fraught with errors associated with
dilution, use of mops, etc. Using a wipe was thought to be a simpler and more effective means of
cleaning. Several wipe products had been introduced in the trust. These were withdrawn when it was
decided to standardise to and procure one product for use across the trust hospital sites.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
Disinfectant wipes were ﬁrst introduced in T1 at the start of 2009. Many wipe-based disinfectant products had
appeared on the market as general sanitisers or speciﬁc to infectious diseases such as C. difficile. As several of
these were used in T1 hospitals and the merger of T1’s constituents was progressing, product standardisation
emerged as a priority. In this case, the initial focus was on the clinell Sporicidal Wipe. However, a senior IPC
team member of nursing background suggested standardising to one universal sanitising wipe across the
organisation, gathered the economic and other evidence, and produced a business case for this product.
Visits to other trusts and the knowledge of IPC team members provided a basis for ideation and evidence
gathering. Evidence was elicited from three main sources during the initiation, adoption decision and
implementation stages: professional networks of individual staff members; peers and colleagues in other
trusts; and industry/suppliers (Table 17 and Figure 9). Evidence acted as a facilitator towards adopting this new,
innovative cleaning product. Trust members interviewed suggested that their review of the evidence on use in
other trusts created a peer pressure effect, as it made them realise that ‘they were behind the times’.
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Sustainability was considered in the decision-making process. The procurement department required this
product standardisation to be cost neutral or lead to an overall cost reduction. Financial pressures during
that time are understood to have been less intense than more recently. The IPC team would later be
required to conﬁrm any such change as cost-saving. The selection process itself had a few weeks’ duration.
Pressures and other contextual factors, including high C. difficile infection rates at that time, and the
T1 hospitals merger circumstances, triggered a sense of urgency to solve these problems, and created
favourable ground for the adoption of a product with low complexity and low cost. One respondent suggested:
I think just at the time of the merger there was just lots going on and this was a quick win and a
quick decision really.
Senior nurse
TABLE 17 T1 clinell universal wipes: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Trust management Business case
Industry/suppliers Product documentation
Professional networks Conference presentations
Peers and colleagues Peer recommendations
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Business case
Business case
Product documentation
Product documentation
Conference presentations
Conference presentations
Peer recommendations
Business case
Product documentation
Conference presentations
Peer recommendations
Peer recommendations
Chief operating
officer
Chief operating officer
Medical director
Medical director
DIPC
DIPC
Heads of nursing
Heads of nursing
IC physician
IC physician
IPC team
IPC team
E&F team
E&F team
Procurement
Procurement
Ward staff
Ward staff
Chief operating
officer
Medical director
DIPC
Heads of nursing
IC physician
IPC team
E&F team
Procurement
Ward staff
Outcome
Trust-wide implementation
FIGURE 9 T1 clinell universal wipes: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making. E&F, estates
and facilities; IC, infection control.
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More importantly, external support, including the supplier providing wall mount ﬁttings for the product,
was another key facilitating factor in the trust-wide adoption decision across three main sites. One
respondent said:
[. . .] clinell come with wall-dispensers which was a factor so the only consultation with clinell was
whether they could support us to physically come round and fit them all. And so we needed to
involve them because they need their maintenance staff to come round and fit it all.
Senior nurse
[. . .] there were points to negotiate and that really came down to fixtures and fittings and did slight
changes in areas, slight changes in practice not resistance.
Senior nurse
There was no special project team set up. The product was approved through a committee whose
members included all senior stakeholders understood to have a key role by staff members: the DIPC,
infection control physician, medical director, chief operating ofﬁcer. Final approval was granted by the
DIPC. No patient views were elicited as part of the process.
The IPC team initially worked with the procurement department to identify a range of products for
consideration. Once the product choice was made, other stakeholder groups were invited to take part
including the heads of nursing and ward staff. The groups involved in implementation planning included
IPC nurses, the heads of nursing, procurement, and estates & facilities department (E&F). The product
champion role is identiﬁed with the senior IPC nurse who suggested the product initially. IPC nurses were
involved in the day-to-day, ward-to-ward implementation of the new cleaning product, working with
procurement to streamline supplies, and with E&F to mount new wall racks in wards where wipes are
stored and accessed.
Outcome
Some challenges were often heard during early implementation, especially around issues of compatibility
with certain equipment and poor engagement with predictable ‘hot spot’ users (i.e. theatres staff), or
status quo supporters, who often challenge new practices, processes and/or products as a result of a lack
of effective communication. Two respondents commented:
There always is a group of individuals who is saying they’ve done it in this way, this many years, why
are we changing?
Senior non-clinical manager
When you make an executive decision about changing products, you could have 99.9% of key
stakeholders that are happy and 1% will not be happy. I think most of the people were concerned
about it post-implementation. Because as I said what we did was we removed all of the other
products that were available through to order and it was kind of an anxiety from particular sets of
clinicians and places like theatres that they felt that ought to have alcohol based products to clean
their surfaces. They didn’t understand the technology behind it. I suppose on reflection we probably
should have communicated that a bit better.
Senior nurse
Nevertheless, a product champion (senior IPC nurse) utilised effective communication channels with
senior nurses, including a weekly ‘Back to the Floor Fridays’ meeting, to inform their adoption decision,
facilitating a smooth transition from one product to another. Other members of the IPC team followed this
paradigm and championed the new product across hospital areas of the trust:
I think to be fair, clinell [wipes] was something that we all felt very strongly about. We knew it
would make life easier on the wards, and we knew that we would make things happen. So I think
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that is one thing that we can say is that as a team we were probably all championing, and still do
when we are doing our audits.
Senior nurse
Standardisation to the new clinell sanitising wipe product was completed in T1 in late 2009. One measure
of success identiﬁed was ward staff productivity gains in terms of less time needed to clean surfaces. The
trust C. difficile rate reduction is perceived by some trust members to be associated with the use of this
wipe. However, there has been no formal evaluation to measure and substantiate these claims.
Stakeholder groups involved in the innovation adoption decision included IPC nurses, heads of nursing,
procurement and ward staff.
Microcase 3: Bioquell vapour hydrogen peroxide Room
Bio-Decontamination Service
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
Informants perceive the main attributes of the service to be its efﬁcacy in eliminating pathogens via
‘disinfection’ and ‘decontamination’ of the environment. The service is understood to involve a piece
of equipment, a device and a process – operating procedure – and be part of the Showcase
Hospitals programme.
The technology is considered to have been novel, ‘high-tech’, at the time of its introduction to the market
in 2008/2009. The clear relative advantage, understood as relevant to patients, staff, the trust and the
NHS, is the high level of decontamination and hygiene assurance it offers. However, it is thought that it
cannot be a substitute for a ‘deep-clean’ process; it is perceived as a complement offering additional
assurance, as it also prompts ward staff to conduct a deep clean and de-clutter the ward environment
prior to use. The service itself, its operation and its merits are understood as relatively easy to explain to
others. However, delivery of the service (portable machine operation, area sealing, etc.) is thought to be
quite complex.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The trust had sporadically used the service during infection outbreaks and viewed the Showcase Hospitals
programme as an opportunity to trial a promising environmental hygiene technology. There was also an
incentive for the trust to urgently improve C. difficile infection rates at that time. Initially, little resistance
was noted by respondents. The trial was supported by the Showcase Hospitals programme and was led by
the trust Showcase Hospitals programme team, comprising a project manager and assistant (Table 18
and Figure 10).
Stakeholder groups involved included the IPC team, E&F, domestic staff, heads of nursing, procurement
and clinical leads in areas where the service was trialled. The trial was also on the agenda of two trust C.
difficile task force group meetings, which include the medical director and chief operating ofﬁcer. The
showcase lead acted as a champion and promoted use of the technology with enthusiasm.
TABLE 18 T1 Bioquell VHP RBDS: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Trust management Business case
Industry/suppliers Product, service documentation
Showcase Hospitals programme Technology documentation
Professional networks Conference presentations
Trust care environment Local trial; staff feedback
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The service was initially considered as compatible with care structures and systems, as well with T1 values.
During the trial the service began to be understood as a complement to other means of infection control,
and as a last resort tool of ensuring effective decontamination. This change in perception, coupled with its
high cost, resulted in a difference of opinion between clinicians and managers; the former were in favour
of its adoption as an effective decontamination means, whereas the latter felt that its routine use came
with a high cost.
The service was also understood by some to introduce a time lag between care systems and processes that
had to be run concurrently. For example, bays and rooms were becoming available later than anticipated.
One respondent highlighted awareness of the complexity of this technology’s use in terms of space and
cost (i.e. patient ﬂows, related hidden cost), which seems to have triggered a negative perspective on
adoption among the IPC team:
The business case was written but the cost was quite substantial for the organisation. [. . .] when
organisations had funding that they could spend but as time went on we thought actually it’s not a
good use of funding. So even though the business case was written, almost approved, infection
control [team] strongly disagreed with funding a product that they strongly believed would have an
impact. [. . .] The C. diff[icile] task force accepted that and partly because actually the use of that
product was so complex in terms that you would have to move patients off. Then actually just the
cost of all that would have been more than using a piece of equipment. So they were happy with
that decision.
Senior non-clinical manager
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Business case
Business case
Conference presentations
Product, service documentation Technology documentation
Local trial; staff feedback
Local trial; staff feedback
Technology
documentation
Chief operating
officer
Chief operating officer
Medical director
Medical director
DIPC
DIPC
Heads of nursing
Heads of nursing
IC physician
IC physician
IPC team
IPC team
E&F team
E&F team
Procurement
Procurement
Ward staff
Ward staff
Chief operating
officer
Medical director
DIPC
Heads of nursing
IC physician
IPC team
E&F team
Procurement
Ward staff
Outcome
Rejected
Product, service
documentation
Technology
documentation
Conference presentations
Business case
Product service
documentation
Conference presentations
Local trial; staff feedback
FIGURE 10 T1 Bioquell VHP RBDS: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
IC, infection control.
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As the service trial progressed, the two main types of evidence featuring in the decision-making of
whether to adopt or reject were (1) the business case prepared by the IPC team, and (2) feedback elicited
by stakeholder groups while the trial was ongoing. The business case conﬁrmed the high cost arising from
regular use of the service. The E&F department anticipated additional workload to be generated as a result
of using this technology in terms of preparing clinical areas for its use. There were some reports of
intensive-care clinicians suggesting bed management to have been somewhat adversely affected during
the trial.
The stakeholder groups also considered the possibility of ad hoc use. During a lengthy adoption
decision-making stage, the decline of infection rates through ‘other initiatives’ was witnessed:
[. . .] there was a lot of discussion for about 6 months afterwards, as to whether we would bring
them in on an ad hoc basis and use them. We got as far as having a business case. And we then
decided infection rates were going down regardless and we felt it was something that wasn’t really
needed but we know it’s there if we do need it.
Senior nurse
Outcome
The ﬁnal decision not to mainstream use of this service at the present time was reached at trust board
level. The trial report suggested that, generally, the service was positively perceived. A business case was
put together by the IPC team, the showcase team, managers and procurement. It was presented to the
trust’s infection prevention committee group and was then recommended to the trust board. Overall, a
key factor facilitating the trial was that the technology became available as a managed service. However,
the cost of mainstreaming the use of this particular service across the trust is understood to have played
a key part in the decision taken, along with any disruptive effects anecdotally reported during the trial.
Trust 2 technology product microcases
Microcase 1: standardisation of disposable sterile gowns
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
Disposable sterile gowns were understood by T2 informants to be a product that is easy to use, and
one that has been available in the NHS for a long time. The objectives behind standardising gowns used
in T2 to one gown product, namely to ensure quality and generate savings for T2, were highlighted by
informants as important. Several different gowns used in T2 theatres have been found to allow
‘strike-through’, that is, ﬂuid seepage from their exterior into their interior surface, posing a risk to
theatre staff.
Gown standardisation was understood to be compatible with care delivery structures and systems, T2
values and the service quality culture. It has been approached through an integrated care perspective that
examines the use of gowns in care pathways involving different surgical procedures. It has aimed at
selecting one gown product that provides adequate protection against ‘strike-through’ for several hours,
ease of use in any procedure and cost savings. Beneﬁts to patients and staff include less risk of having to
stop a procedure for a gown change and a more comfortable working routine for staff.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The need for standardisation was highlighted by T2 senior theatre staff. The procurement specialist nurse
then sourced further information and evidence through NHS procurement, professional networks and
suppliers (Table 19 and Figure 11). Suppliers were then approached individually with requests for product
demonstrations. A special focus group was formed to look at the evidence, as part of the wider T2
cost-saving lean transformation programme. Focus group members were senior nurses, procurement
specialists, senior surgery staff and a T2 lean service improvement team member.
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Five products of different suppliers were shortlisted by the focus group within 2 weeks. An evaluation plan
was then put together to assess the relative merits of each product regarding highest quality offered for a
price acceptable to the trust. The procurement specialist nurse acted as a champion, supported shortlisting
and led the evaluation process. The evaluation of the ﬁve gown products was organised in early 2012.
It was based on a single data entry form agreed a priori with manufacturers. Each of the gowns was
evaluated on a particular day within 1 week. Results were collected and fed back to the focus group by
the procurement specialist nurse.
TABLE 19 T2 standardisation of disposable sterile gowns: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Professional networks Supplier and product information
Industry/suppliers Product documentation; product demonstration
Peers and colleagues Feedback on current products
Trust care environment Local trial; current usage data
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Supplier and product
information
Supplier and product information
Product documentation
Product documentation
Product demonstration
Product demonstration
Feedback on current
products
Feedback on current products
Local trial; usage data
Supplier and product
information
Product documentation
Product demonstration
Feedback on current
products
Local trial; usage data
Local trial; usage data
Space group
Space group
Senior nurses
Senior nurses
Service
improvement team
Service improvement team
Procurement
specialist nurse
specialist nurse
IPC team
IPC team
Theatre staff
Space group
Senior Nurses
Service
improvement team
Procurement
specialist nurse
IPC team
Theatre staffTheatre staff
Outcome
Ongoing decision-making
Procurement
FIGURE 11 T2 standardisation of disposable sterile gowns: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in
decision-making.
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Outcome
The results of the trial were fed back to the focus group and the T2 innovations or ‘space’ group.
However, the decision process was delayed in the second quarter of 2012, as one of the companies
participating in the trial raised a formal complaint against T2.
Microcase 2: 3M Clean-Trace NG luminometer
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
This system was understood by T2 informants to be a medium- to high-technology solution for assessing
whether clinical areas and surfaces are cleaned effectively. Prior to its introduction, there were no means
of testing whether a previously cleaned surface had been decontaminated of microorganisms and residues.
This system was viewed as having a key beneﬁt for patients, staff, the trust and the NHS. T2 staff
members suggested patients were reported as feeling more secure when observing use of the device,
while levels of staff responsibility vis-à-vis effective cleaning also were raised. It is generally perceived to be
compatible with care structures and systems and T2’s culture and values.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
Ideation about the system came through the Showcase Hospitals programme and the T2 DIPC – Executive
Nurse. The DIPC put the system forward at the T2 space group. It was then followed up by the IPC nurse
consultant, who liaised with ward staff for training and trialling purposes. Stakeholder groups involved
included the IPC team and ward staff. ‘Championship’ roles are identiﬁed with the nurse consultant and
individual matrons in wards where the device was ﬁrst trialled.
In addition to the Showcase Hospitals programme, further information and evidence became available
through the companies involved and other trusts in the region (Table 20 and Figure 12). Additional evidence
featuring in the decision-making process included peer-reviewed journal articles on environmental
assessment based on ATP, reviewed by T2’s microbiology department.
A local evaluation was funded by the Department of Health through collaboration with the Smart
Solutions programme. This supported an evaluation of the Clean-Trace system and the UV light torch
equipment at the same time, as it was thought that an alternative method of assessing surface cleanliness
was needed.
Outcome
Following the trial, the system has continued to be used in selected wards in the main T2 hospital site.
Funding and support to sustain its use has been provided by the DIPC. Although a reduction in C. difficile
cases was noted in wards where it was used, a formal evaluation was not carried out to establish a link.
The main outcomes identiﬁed have been raising staff (including matrons’) interest in and motivation for
effective cleaning, and improved communication among staff and patients.
TABLE 20 T2 3M Clean-Trace NG luminometer: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Showcase Hospitals programme Product documentation
Industry/suppliers Product demonstrations and training
Peer-reviewed academic literature Scientiﬁc articles
Other trusts Local trials feedback
Trust care environment Local trial data
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The innovation adoption process in this case lasted 6 months. The system’s main advantageous feature is
understood to be the direct, online feedback provided to middle and senior management on surface
cleanliness in wards. New domestic staff members were appointed for the implementation of this
technology, and their culture of collaborative teamwork was also witnessed as leading to successful
implementation. ‘Ownership’ of the swabbing process by domestic staff is thought to have been another
key facilitating factor, as it helped generate enthused and interested users among them. An alternative
scenario would see IPC team members visiting wards and obtaining samples. This has been viewed as
potentially intrusive to care delivery in wards. One respondent commented:
[. . .] a practicality. Something that can actually translate down to ward level. Because that was a bit
of a challenge because I think some ways of implementing that this would be given to infection
control and then they just pop out and do swabbing. But you then go into an area as a stranger and
with [domestic staff] using it there was a bit of ownership and you don’t actually get that if you do
something and you give somebody feedback that’s fine but you’re very much an inspector. If people
can take part in it and do something about getting the readings for themselves and you’ve
got somebody who knows the area really well and knows what they are doing, I think you get
more involvement.
Senior nurse
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Product documentation
Product documentation
Product demonstrations
and training
Product demonstrations and training
Scientific articles
Scientific articles
Local trials feedback
Local trials feedback
Local trial data
Local trial data
Product documentation
Product demonstrations
and training
Scientific articles
Local trials feedback
Local trial data
Space group
Space group
DIPC/executive
nurse
DIPC/executive nurse
IPC team
IPC team
Ward staff
Ward staff
Microbiology
Microbiology
Domestic staff
Domestic staff
Space group
DIPC/executive
nurse
IPC team
Ward staff
Microbiology
Domestic staff
Outcome
Adopted and used in selected wards
FIGURE 12 T2 3M Clean-Trace NG luminometer: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
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Microcase 3: ASP GLOSAIR 400 aHP system
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
The system’s perceived attributes include its decontamination and disinfection capability and its versatility
regarding room size. The system is used by the trust’s Deep Clean Team as part of their cleaning regime
once patients and staff have been removed from clinical areas before having them sealed. Its use is
complementary to and follows the ‘deep clean’, general or terminal cleaning methods practised before its
adoption. It is most often used during E. coli, C. difficile and norovirus outbreaks. Although there has been
no formal review of its effectiveness and use conducted after adoption, its introduction is considered
successful. As one T2 adopter suggested, ‘it seems to be working for us’. Adopters further suggested that
a positive communication dividend has been reaped in terms of higher assurance of patients and the
public that infection control is a top priority at T2. One respondent said:
[. . .] even patients ask as well now, ‘what’s this machine’ in a roundabout way.
Non-clinical manager
[. . .] we have had feedback from patients. And we have done that by a variety of surveys and actually
patients feel very assured when they see us doing that and actually taking cleaning very seriously. And
actually we have had a couple of complaints in winter that patients had been in our trust previously.
And they had seen the HPV vapour being used on the ward and during the following admission they
had not seen it, so they wrote in to say are you still not doing that? I think it does assure patients
around the standard of cleaning when they see things like that happening.
Senior nurse
The system is perceived as complex to utilise by senior trust members. Staff members working more closely
with the Deep Clean Team suggest that it is relatively easy to use. However, operators need to be trained
appropriately, and cleaning prior to its operation is viewed a prerequisite. Bed management issues arising
from its use were reported. However, respondents suggested that staff members work together to
minimise impact, and that this system is considered quicker to use than related services. The innovation is
considered to be in line with the values and culture of T2, as one organisation in which IPC and patient
safety are high priority areas.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
Senior trust members ﬁrst heard about the system at a company presentation in a neighbouring trust. A
decision was subsequently taken to trial the system in T2. Trial and purchase were supported through the
Department of Health’s Deep Clean programme. The system’s purchasing cost was viewed as prohibitive.
A workshop and demonstration were organised by the T2 Hotel Services Team. Stakeholders involved in
the process included the T2 IPC team, microbiology department, hotel services and domestic staff. Key
individuals with a leading role were the IPC Team Leader, the Consultant Medical Microbiologist (Infection
Prevention Doctor) and the DIPC. Microbiology assessed the evidence and highlighted the system’s relative
merits to other stakeholders. Some informal challenges towards the evidence gathered by microbiology
were witnessed, and the company’s promotion efforts were perceived as insistent by some stakeholders:
I think there was a little bit of [something] about the results of the information, I think there was a bit
of resistance, well not resistance, slightly challenged. [. . .] I think it was Microbiology.
Non-clinical manager
[. . .] I think not formally, there have been some reservations because as I said not a huge amount of
evidence that this works. Primarily it was the company that was pushing it forward and so there has
been some kind of disquiet around is this actually making a difference or is it generally raising the
awareness of you know, cleaning and things. It’s never been formally challenged as such.
Senior nurse
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Nevertheless, the decision to adopt the system was made at senior management level and was greatly
supported by the DIPC. A respondent commented:
It was agreed at a committee an infection control group committee but I think the decision to go
with it sat with the DIPC the Director of Infection Prevention, I think the ultimate decision was [theirs].
Senior nurse
Table 21 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 13 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
TABLE 21 T2 ASP GLOSAIR 400 aHP system: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Mass media Specialist periodical reports
Industry/suppliers Product documentation; product demonstration
Peer-reviewed academic literature Scientiﬁc articles
Trust care environment Product workshop; local trial
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Specialist periodical
reports
Specialist periodical reports
Product documentation
Product documentation
Product demonstration
Product demonstration
Scientific articles
Scientific articles
Product workshop; local
trial
Product workshop; local trial
Specialist periodical
reports
Product documentation
Product demonstration
Scientific articles
Product workshop; local
trial
Trust board
DIPC/executive
nurse
IPC team
Hotel services
Microbiology
Domestic staff
Trust board DIPC/executive nurse
IPC team Hotel services
Microbiology
Domestic staff
Trust board
DIPC/executive
nurse
IPC team
Hotel services
Microbiology
Domestic staff
Outcome
Trust-wide implementation
FIGURE 13 T2 ASP GLOSAIR 400 aHP system: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
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Outcome
The system became available for use across T2 in late 2007. The evidence featuring during the process and
multidisciplinary teamwork during implementation – part of T2’s organisational culture – are understood to
have facilitated adoption. The technology has been considered an opportunity during a challenging climate
of persistently high C. difficile and MRSA bacteraemia case incidence at T2. However, since adoption the
system has mostly been used to combat C. difficile and norovirus. Protocols were developed to support its
use. The innovation adoption process is understood to have concluded fairly quickly. The company
provided training and a new group was formed as part of the T2 Deep Clean Team, the Rapid Response
Clean Team; the respondents considered these to have been key enablers.
In T2, use of the system was reported to take 3 hours for a bay or room. A full deep-clean process,
including use of this system, was reported to take a maximum of 6–8 hours. Space to host patients
becomes available after the deep clean and/or rapid vapour-based clean take place. This is considered very
important in alleviating bed management pressures. The system’s adoption is understood to be a success
as part of the measures helping T2 report lower infection rates.
Based on T2 interviews from phase 1, this technology product is currently in the re-evaluation process to
build up its local evidence base. This was driven by an organisational need for justiﬁcation of its ongoing
use, and a need for evidence felt by stakeholders based on microbiologists’ critical appraisal of the existing
evidence available.
Microcase 4: UV LIGHT Technologies inspection torch
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
Staff members of T2 understand the torch to be bulky and heavy when carried within the care
environment. The risks of eye damage when directing or reﬂecting light towards others, and of skin burn
when touching the front glass once the torch has been in operation for some time, were also identiﬁed by
respondents. The torch is viewed as a high-tech item that was recently introduced in the NHS and that is
useful in revealing stains and other surface residues that are not readily discernible. However, further
training is required for observers to identify the type and content of stains or residues revealed. Its main
beneﬁt was thus understood to be that it enables staff to visually assess surface cleanliness rapidly. It was
perceived as rather impractical for use in wards, but useful in occasional inspections, and generally as
bringing limited beneﬁt to T2’s IPC practice.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The UV light torch was initially considered as an opportunity at T2 during a time of high C. difficile
incidence in 2007–8. Subsequently, the opportunity for a trial came in the form of an evaluation of the UV
light torch in tandem with the 3M Clean-Trace luminometer, funded by the Department of Health and
Smart Solutions.
One respondent expressed some concerns about the suitability of this evaluation method to assess
genuine outcomes:
I think if you have a go with something quite a lot of spin-offs, we didn’t know at the time what kind
of spin-offs there was going to be. But a big benefit to us was being able to try the ATP out at the
same time. So actually we ended up with two technologies and at the end of it I was actually thinking
to myself that maybe we shouldn’t, always be viewing the technologies in isolation because quite
often some of these things are complementary.
Senior nurse
Once the risks associated with its use became apparent, a detailed protocol was developed to guide the
use of torches, luminometers and rod swabs. All items were placed on a trolley for easier transfer, access,
use and reposition by T2 staff members during the trial.
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Table 22 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 14 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Product documentation
Product demonstration
Feedback on use
Local trial data
Product documentation Product demonstration
Feedback on use Local trial data
Product documentation
Product demonstration
Feedback on use
Local trial data
DIPC/executive
nurse
IPC team
Microbiology
DIPC/executive nurse IPC teamMicrobiology Domestic staff
DIPC/executive
nurse
IPC team
Microbiology
Domestic staff
Outcome
Adopted and ad hoc use trust wide
Domestic staff
FIGURE 14 T2 UV LIGHT inspection torch: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
TABLE 22 T2 UV LIGHT inspection torch: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Industry/suppliers Product documentation; product demonstration
Peers and colleagues Feedback on use
Trust care environment Local trial data
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Outcome
Following the trial, consensus among staff centred on not recommending the system for trust-wide
implementation, but keeping the unit for use in occasional inspections. A facilitating factor to this end is
considered to be the availability of the torch at a reduced price by the supplier. A respondent commented:
[. . .] it would have been better to look at the UV light and its usefulness in moving equipment, for
example, into a darker room and examining how clean it was. Rather than try to do it in broad day
light at the bed-side. It is useful in the operating theatre.
Senior nurse
Trust 3 technology product microcases
Microcase 1: Bioquell vapour hydrogen peroxide Room
Bio-Decontamination Service
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
The Bioquell VHP RBDS was perceived by T3 informants as an effective means of disinfection and
decontamination. It is understood that hydrogen peroxide vapour can access those areas that may not be
readily accessible by manual cleaning, and that it is more efﬁcacious than its aerosolised variant. It is
viewed as a new, high-tech system that is a complement to deep cleaning. Its efﬁcacy in eradicating
C. difficile spores has been a particularly attractive feature. The main beneﬁts arising from its use are
understood to be a safer care environment for patients, reduced risk of cross-infection and a reduced
workload for staff. Opinion seems to differ on whether there would be ﬁnancial savings to be had from its
use, and whether the time taken to use the service amounts to more or less the overall time required to
deep-clean care areas to the same effect. Respondents suggested that there is a substantial cost element
in using this service and VHP technology more generally. Nonetheless, they would generally recommend
the service and technology be taken up more widely in the NHS.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The technology was reviewed as part of T3’s efforts to mitigate C. difficile incidences. A senior member
of the trust IPC team acted as the evidence broker, forming a project team to collect and review evidence
in the ﬁrst instance, and bringing the evidence to other trust fora. These included working groups on
C. difficile reduction and meetings with the trust CEO. The technology was also discussed by the trust
Investment and Purchasing Group. After a review of the evidence, the trust CEO allowed site surveys to be
carried out in the trust. Patient groups also informally demonstrated their interest in this technology.
The trust’s medical microbiologist was involved in the adoption decision. The following respondent
suggested that he was exercising ‘expert’ power as a microbiologist over the other stakeholders when
reviewing the evidence:
The microbiologist, not challenged it but are you sure that it’s doing, that was almost the thing.
Because I would take the evidence to him and go through it with him so that is his nature. If you are
going to sit in a meeting with him I need you to be with me. Not then be against me and start
challenging. So I was very clear to pick out all the things that I thought were relevant and I think he
was reading himself. But actually he left it up to me to do a lot of the stuff and he would actually
challenge a lot.
Senior nurse
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Moreover, the key decision-makers became conﬁdent in making a more concrete decision through a site
visit to another trust, where they directly observed this technology in action. One respondent suggested:
Only after we had the practical demonstration in [the other trust] we were cautious before that. They
provided us with the evidence when they gave us the seminar here. But we were cautious until we
had actually seen exactly what was the process involved. How they sealed all the rooms up, how they
controlled it while they gas. It was only after we had actually seen it and had it demonstrated to us,
and we had spoken to the operatives, [that we] did we feel completely safe that it was all being
controlled in the proper manner.
Senior non-clinical manager
Sustainability has been a factor in the decision-making process, as regular use of the service has been
understood to represent a signiﬁcant outlay for the trust.
Table 23 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 15 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
Outcome
Informants from T3 suggest that the technology is positively viewed in the trust. A decision on it is
pending owing to perceived costs associated with its use, and also because it cannot be widely used across
all of the trust’s sites. The supplier’s engagement with the process, with particular regard to the
organisation of local site surveys and delivery of evidence on the service, is considered as a key facilitator
of the decision to trial the service and willingness to develop its use further as an active component in the
trust’s decontamination approach, particularly when a new planned hospital site is built. The evidence on
the technology’s efﬁcacy is also thought to have played a supporting role.
Microcase 2: clinell sporicidal wipes
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
The clinell Sporicidal Wipe is understood by T3 informants as a ‘low-tech’, novel product combining
sporicidal action with wipe use. They suggested that the product was introduced as another measure to
help reduce infection rates further. Trust members suggested that they were already familiar with using
wipes in the trust care environment and welcomed use of this product. The product’s perceived beneﬁts
included ease of use, efﬁcacy and a safer care environment for patients and staff. Before its adoption, a
spray-based sporicidal product was used. Its use by staff was fraught with problems despite regular
training, and its efﬁcacy was understood to be rather low.
TABLE 23 T3 Bioquell VHP RBDS: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Health agencies HPA RRP recommendation
Showcase Hospitals programme Showcase trial report
Peer-reviewed academic literature Scientiﬁc articles
Professional networks Conference presentations
Industry/suppliers Product documentation and research
Other trusts Site visits; feedback on use
Trust care environment Site surveys; feedback on use
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02060 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 6
83
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Kyratsis et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The clinell sporicidal wipes were introduced at a time when the incumbent sporicidal product was
understood to be failing. Ideation came from a presentation in a professional conference attended by IPC
team members. In a short space of time, small local trials were held in a few hospital areas, where ward
staff were given the product to try it out. The decision was channelled through the trust’s product
selection committee, whose membership includes care specialists, divisional representatives and matrons.
Minutes from formal meetings held were reviewed by trust directors, including ﬁnance directors. The
trust’s Health and Safety Team were also consulted. The product’s cost was considered favourably during
the decision-making process, as the product was proven to be less expensive than the incumbent product,
generating small savings for the team and the trust.
Table 24 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 16 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
Outcome
The decision to adopt the product was taken by the IPC team, and was approved by the product selection
committee. A key factor was the review of the evidence on the product’s cost neutrality. After the decision
was made, IPC team members communicated with ward managers via e-mail and visits to wards.
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
RRP recommendation
Showcase trial report
Scientific articles
Conference presentations
Product documentation
Site visits; use feedback
Site surveys; use feedback
RRP recommendation Showcase trial report Scientific articles
Conference presentations Product documentation Site visits; use feedback
Site surveys; use feedback
RRP recommendation
Showcase trial report
Scientific articles
Conference presentations
Product documentation
Site visits; use feedback
Site surveys; use feedback
Trust CEO
Trust CEO
IPC team
IPC team
E&F team
E&F team
Risk management
Risk management
Purchasing
Purchasing
Operations staff
Operations staff
H&S
H&S
Deputy DIPC
Deputy DIPC
IC physician
IC physician
Medical
microbiologist
Medical microbiologist
Head of
decontamination
Head of decontamination
Trust CEO
IPC team
E&F team
Risk management
Purchasing
Operations staff
H&S
Deputy DIPC
IC physician
Medical
microbiologist
Head of
decontamination
Outcome
Ongoing decision-making
FIGURE 15 T3 Bioquell VHP RBDS: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making. H&S, health
and safety; IC, infection control.
EVIDENCE IN ACTION: PRODUCT MICROCASES IN EIGHT NHS TRUSTS
84
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
The company’s active engagement during product deployment, in terms of product support and trust staff
training, is understood to have facilitated implementation. One respondent described this as follows:
[. . .] the company had been very supportive in rolling out to an organisation. But they went round
and saw all the staff you know we looked at all the posters and that, these are the sort of measures
that we need to give our staff. They did all of that and went round and helped us and the company
came round and put all the dispensers up and everything, so I think it’s important.
Senior nurse
TABLE 24 T3 clinell sporicidal wipes: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Industry/suppliers Product documentation
Peer-reviewed academic literature Scientiﬁc articles
Professional networks Infection Prevention Society conference presentations
Other trusts Feedback on use
Trust care environment Staff feedback
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Product documentation
Scientific articles
IPS conference presentations
Feedback on use
Staff feedback
Product documentation Scientific articles IPS conference presentations
Feedback on use Staff feedback
Product documentation
Scientific articles
IPS conference presentations
Feedback on use
Staff feedback
Product selection
committee
Product selection committee
IPC team
IPC team
Procurement
Procurement
Domestic staff
Domestic staff
Ward staff
Ward staff
H&S
H&S
Product selection
committee
IPC team
Procurement
Domestic staff
Ward staff
H&S
Outcome
Trust-wide implementation
FIGURE 16 T3 clinell sporicidal wipes: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
H&S, health and safety; IPS, Infection Prevention Society.
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No resistance was reported during the implementation stage; this was partly a result of the nursing staff’s
experiences with the previous similar products. One respondent commented:
[. . .] we’ve had negative stuff with previous products but I think because that is so negative, the fact
that something that would just so easy to use I think they just grasped it so I think they were very
happy with it. I think perhaps that helped it. The negative experience helped it to be a positive yeah.
Senior nurse
Clinell sporicidal wipes have been used in the sluice rooms of the trust’s hospital wards since their
introduction. The product is understood to be successful because of trust members’ satisfaction, wide
adoption by staff, a decrease in cost and the substitution of the earlier problematic product. There is a
perception among staff that use of the wipes is associated with a reduction of infection rates and
outbreak duration.
Microcase 3: Medixair UV Light Air Sterilisation Unit
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
Informants understand the Medixair systems to claim to eradicate air-borne pathogens by producing
pathogen-free air in clinical areas. A collateral effect of keeping environmental surfaces cleaner is
understood to be claimed also. They are also understood as a high-tech product and quite new to the
NHS, but not compatible with existing trust care systems and structures. Beneﬁts anticipated included a
reduction in cross-infection, a cleaner care environment, better patient outcomes, a perception of actively
improving care for patients and related beneﬁts for the trust.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The IPC team was presented with grant funds to procure and use new technology to combat HCAIs.
Use of the devices was trialled in two hospital wards (thought to be ‘hot spots’), in which air samples were
collected. Evidence was gathered, reviewed by the IPC team and presented at the trust’s product selection
committee. IPC team members noted that the evidence presented on the technology was conﬂicting.
Those IPC team members who had a microbiology background understood the trial results to be
inconclusive in proving the efﬁcacy of the technology and devices themselves. The devices were
understood by some staff members to be disruptive while in operation in clinical areas. IPC members
found it difﬁcult to source spare parts when required. Knowledge about such maintenance requirements
and ongoing cost was neither readily identiﬁed by the trust from the start nor provided by the supplier:
[. . .] we did pilot again and they were on rental because we started realising there were a lot of
issues with the maintenance of them and the ongoing maintenance, and that was going to be a
problem, and the ongoing cost really. It wasn’t as it appeared when we first started out with it. So
things started to change we weren’t confident in the results. We did air sampling and we weren’t
confident with those results either.
Senior nurse
This resulted in staff members losing conﬁdence in making this technology work in reality.
Table 25 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 17 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
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Outcome
The outcome of the evidence review and decision-making process was a rejection of the system’s
continued use in the trust. The decision was taken by the IPC team. Local trial results were not suggestive
of a high level of efﬁcacy of the product in terms of air puriﬁcation. Patient and staff feedback included
comments on the product being obtrusive as part of the ward environment and noisy at times. T3
informants felt that, overall, the evidence was not robust enough to warrant their further engagement
with this technology.
TABLE 25 T3 Medixair UV Light Air Sterilisation Units: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Professional networks Conference presentations
Industry/supplier Product documentation, case study reports
Showcase Hospitals programme Product documentation
Other trusts Feedback on use
Health agencies HPA RRP recommendation
Trust care environment Local trial; staff and patient feedback
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Conference presentations
Conference presentations
Product documentation
Product documentation
Case study reports
Case study reports
Feedback on use
Feedback on use
RRP recommendation
RRP recommendation
Local trial; staff and
patient feedback
Local trial; staff and patient feedback
Conference presentations
Product documentation
Case study reports
Feedback on use
RRP recommendation
Local trial; staff and
patient feedback
DIPC and medical
director
DIPC and medical director
IPC team
IPC team
E&F team
Procurement Procurement
E&F team Procurement
Ward staff
Ward staff
Decontamination
manager
Decontamination manager
IC physician
IC physician
Medical microbiologist
Medical microbiologist
DIPC and medical
director
IPC team
E&F team
Ward staff
Decontamination
manager
IC physician
Medical microbiologist
Outcome
Rejected
FIGURE 17 T3 Medixair UV Light Air Sterilisation Units: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in
decision-making. IC, infection control.
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Trust 4 technology product microcases
Microcase 1: DIFFICIL-S disinfectant liquid detergent
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
DIFFICIL-S is understood by T4 informants to be a next-generation cleaning and disinfection product based
on chlorine dioxide, which is produced upon mixing. It is considered a step forward from hypochlorite
products used, which are understood to cause surface corrosion. Currently, the hypochlorite disinfectant
used at T4 is ActiChlor™ Plus (ECOLAB, Swindon, UK) tablets. DIFFICIL-S is thought to be highly effective,
as it achieves a very high bacterial load reduction in a short time, and also because of its low risk Control
of Substances Hazardous to Health proﬁle. These aspects are considered as key advantages over chlorine
dioxide and hypochlorite products alike. Products with chlorine dioxide as their active ingredient have been
available on the market for some time, but their use in the NHS seems relatively new.
The fact that the product delivers the required chlorine dioxide concentration means that it is viewed by
senior staff members as high tech, whereas the product application generally is viewed as low tech. The
product is considered to be in line with existing cleaning practice, care delivery processes and the trust’s
culture. However, it is perceived as a product that is less easy to use than detergent wipes, and one for
which variable cleaning efﬁcacy due to errors in preparation might still be an issue. Infection rate reduction
is suggested as the main beneﬁt. Further beneﬁts for the trust include a longer life of surfaces and
equipment and public conﬁdence owing to lower infection rates.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
Members of the IPC team found out about the product at the Infection Prevention Society annual
conference. Subsequently, they contacted the HPA for further input, and consulted a scientiﬁc paper that
reported research results about the product in a specialist peer-reviewed journal.
The recent C. difficile rates and trust management support for efforts mitigating C. difficile incidences
were also thought of as favourable conditions for selecting the product as well as launching its local trial.
The following respondent noted the external pressure applied from the strategic health authority in
relation to trust’s C. difficile performance. The aforementioned scientiﬁc paper was published during the
period when trust members were actively searching for solutions:
[. . .] our rates haven’t come down as quick as the SHA (Strategic Health Authority) would have liked
them to do. [. . .] we still had less cases than last year but they wanted less [than that . . .] we were
actively looking for anything that would help us with C. difﬁcile, otherwise it, with new products it’s
whether you hear about them through professional networks, you see them at conferences, or a rep
letterboxes you and gives you some literature, or in our case it was a mix of we were looking at the
time that this was available, so we were thinking what can we do and this paper came out.
Senior nurse
Key stakeholders involved included the IPC team, the medical director and director of nursing, heads of
nursing from the oncology hospital areas where the product was trialled, T4’s domestic services partner
staff, the ﬁnance department and the multiprofessional infection prevention monitoring committee. As T4
is a PFI trust, the decision has involved negotiations between the IPC team and the trust domestic services
partner on costing, staff training and PFI contractual aspects.
The trial had an approximate duration of 2 months. It was organised in the oncology areas of the T4 main
hospital site, because of their stable patient ﬂow patterns that do not typically include transfers to and
stays in other hospital areas. Any effect on infection rates was, thus, thought to have been contained
within, and be relevant to, those areas only.
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Evidence featuring in the initiation, adoption decision and implementation stages included feedback from
peers and colleagues in T4 and other trusts, expert advice from the HPA, supplier product documentation,
peer-reviewed journal articles and local data collected during the trial.
Table 26 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 18 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
TABLE 26 T4 DIFFICIL-S disinfectant liquid detergent: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Peers and Colleagues Feedback on use
Health agencies HPA expert advice
Industry/suppliers Product, service documentation
Peer-reviewed academic literature Journal of Hospital Infection scientiﬁc article
Other trusts Local trials feedback
Trust care environment Local trial data
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Feedback on use
Feedback on use
HPA expert advice
HPA expert advice
Product, service
documentation
Product, service documentation
scientific article
J Hosp Infect scientific article
Local trials feedback
Local trials feedback
Local trial data
Local trial data
Feedback on use
HPA expert advice
Product, service
documentation
scientific article
Local trials feedback
Local trial data
IPM committee
IPM committee
Medical director/
DIPC
Medical director/DIPC
IPC team
IPC team
E&F team
E&F team
Ward staff
Ward staff
Domestic services
partner staff
Domestic services partner staff
Theatre staff
Theatre staff
Director of nursing
Director of nursing
Heads of nursing
Heads of nursing
IPM committee
Medical director/
DIPC
IPC team
E&F team
Ward staff
Domestic services
partner staff
Theatre staff
Director of nursing
Heads of nursing
Outcome
Ongoing decision-making
J Hosp Infect J Hosp Infect
FIGURE 18 T4 DIFFICIL-S disinfectant liquid detergent: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in
decision-making. IPM, infection prevention monitoring.
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Outcome
The technology was viewed positively by T4 informants. The IPC team took a leading role in organising the
trial. A ‘champion’ role is identiﬁed with the manner in which a senior IPC team member has led the
process. The trial took place in the ﬁrst quarter of 2012 and data were collected. This locally produced
evidence was reviewed in April 2012. A decision is pending regarding adoption of DIFFICIL-S in T4.
Microcase 2: Bioquell vapour hydrogen peroxide Room
Bio-Decontamination Service and Steris BioGenie
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
Informants understood this technology to be appropriate for use once manual surface cleaning has been
completed by staff. The vapour released is thought to permeate and decontaminate areas not easily
accessible by manual cleaning, with the same efﬁcacy each time it is used, unlike manual cleaning. The
technology is understood to have been utilised in other industries for many years, and has only recently
been made available in health care. It is thus viewed as a low-tech principle whose application in this
manner in T4 is understood to be high-tech. This may reﬂect the attributes of the newer VHP machines
bought in T4, which can perform both vapour generation and aeration based on programing that takes
into account the volume of the room where the device will operate.
The main beneﬁts perceived to be stemming from the use of this technology are (1) a high degree of
decontamination and low infection rates for patients, (2) reassurance and a reduced workload for staff to
manage, and (3) a good public perception of the trust.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
Initially, T4 had used Bioquell VHP RBDS to effectively eradicate multiple MRSA bacteraemia strains in its
neonatal intensive-care unit. It was also used to decontaminate areas after an incident with sanitation
pipelines. One respondent described this as follows:
We had a massive sewage leak in the eye department or an air con failure [. . .], so when the eye
department came in on a Monday morning there was water just literally running down the walls and
off the ceiling tiles, and in their three operating theatres, and it was like going into a tropical
rainforest. But we were then worried about pseudomonas and things like that, so we decided then
that we would just peroxide the whole lot, clean it up and peroxide it, so we’d used it a couple of
times, we liked it.
Senior nurse
Persisting issues with environmental hygiene at T4 led the IPC team to consider solutions. The team
attended a Showcase Hospitals programme conference where they were presented with evidence on VHP
technology. The technology was considered easy to use and manage by the IPC team themselves, and very
effective in raising environmental hygiene standards. Decision-making was conﬁned to senior members of
the IPC team. The stakeholders at the initiation stage did not go through a tender process. A quick
decision was taken to purchase this particular product, mainly based on ﬁnancial incentives and previous
positive experience with the technology. This resulted in several problems, dilemmas and internal frictions,
and was exacerbated by a lack of ongoing support from the company.
Table 27 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 19 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
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Outcome
Based on these positive experiences and on available external funding [£150,000 was given to T4 as part
of the ﬁrst HCAI Technology Innovation Programme Awards, which is a joint initiative by the Department
of Health and the former NHS PASA, which was expected to be used for new technology aimed at further
tackling HCAIs (source: trust’s annual report 2008/09)], a decision was made by the trust IPC team to buy
four VHP machines, now marketed by Steris BioGenie for use in T4 hospitals as and when required. This
decision was implemented through direct contact with the supplier. The product was chosen on the basis
of its perceived ease of use, its combined operating modes of vapour generation and aeration/
TABLE 27 T4 Bioquell VHP RBDS & Steris BioGenie: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Showcase Hospitals programme Product documentation
Health agencies HPA RRP recommendation
Peer-reviewed academic literature Scientiﬁc articles
Other trusts Local trials and feedback on use
Peers and colleagues Feedback on use
Trust care environment Bioquell VHP RBDS local trial
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Product documentation
Product documentation
RRP recommendation
RRP recommendation
Scientific articles
Scientific articles
Local trials and use
feedback
Local trials and use feedback
Feedback on use
Feedback on use
Bioquell VHP RBDS
local trial
Bioquell VHP RBDS local trial
Product documentation
RRP recommendation
Scientific articles
Local trials and use
feedback
Feedback on use
Bioquell VHP RBDS
local trial
Trust IPC lead
Trust IPC lead
Heads of nursing
Heads of nursing
IPC team
IPC team
Ward staff
Ward staff
Domestic services
partner staff
Domestic services partner staff
Theatre staff
Theatre staff
Flow managers
Flow managers
Trust IPC lead
Heads of nursing
IPC team
Ward staff
Domestic services
partner staff
Theatre staff
Flow managers
Outcome
Adopted and ad hoc use trust wide
FIGURE 19 T4 Bioquell VHP RBDS and Steris BioGenie: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in
decision-making.
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dehumidiﬁcation, its residual antibacterial efﬁcacy through inclusion of 6 parts per million (ppm) silver iron
in the vapour mix and the discount offered by the supplier on the purchase of four machines.
Subsequently, T4 procurement highlighted formal procurement channels and alternative providers offering
products with identical attributes. Issues with the after-sales service and support of the supplier, before Steris
BioGenie, led the IPC team to seek VHP machine maintenance through the T4 clinical engineering team.
Members of the IPC team are called on by other hospital groups to operate the machines. The IPC
members conduct all sealing required within a room, including doors, windows, air vents, etc., and
they then operate the machines themselves. Since its introduction, a further hospital unit, the neonatal
intensive-care unit, chose to use the machines. IPC team members have provided training to
neonatal intensive-care-unit staff. Two of the machines now reside in the neonatal intensive-care unit
for immediate use upon incidence of an infection.
Wider use has been met with difﬁculties. Despite interest from theatre staff in the machines, theatre
rooms have been conﬁrmed to require more time and specialist input in order to be prepared for VHP,
and, as the IPC team has had a higher than expected staff turnover, it has been unable to provide this
additional support. As some bed management and staff working time issues have been reported in
this trust of high bed occupancy, it is thought that a dedicated team would help expand service use,
but that comes with its own cost implications. It has also been suggested that domestic services partner
staff undertake this task; however, a training and cost dimension has been identiﬁed that has merited
discussion. The IPC team’s intention of establishing a rolling VHP programme across the trust has thus not
been realised to date.
Microcase 3: Virusolve+
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
The suggestion to adopt this product came from a theatre infection control lead staff member (IPC
theatre link nurse). The product was understood to be very effective against all types of bacteria, including
blood-borne pathogens. Its ease of use resulted from it needing to be prepared only once for frequent use
thereafter. This was perceived to be a relative advantage over the current disinfectant needing to be made
up before each use. The product’s cost was viewed as acceptable to the trust. Virusolve+ is understood by
IPC team members to have been used in other trusts, and adopted relatively quickly in T4, without full
recourse to and examination of the evidence available.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
Shortly after the product began to be used, the IPC team asked to see the product data sheets and related
information. This occurred as part of a wider discussion and evidence review exercise among IPC team
members on new disinfectant products, prompted by corrosion effects observed on surfaces, attributed to
the currently used, incumbent, product. It resulted in doubts being raised about the active ingredient of
the product, its chemical composition and its cleaning efﬁcacy. Theatre staff feedback suggested that the
product was deposing a thin layer of substance on equipment, which needed extra rinsing to remove and
whose odour was rather unpleasant.
Further IPC team members’ communication with the supplier did not produce satisfactory results.
The decision to withdraw the product was taken by the T4 infection control lead.
Table 28 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 20 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
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Outcome
During its short time of use, the product was deployed in theatres. T4 staff members are reported to have
had a positive view of the product. However, doubts about its efﬁcacy, resulting from a relative lack of
evidence and transparency on the product operating principles, have been the main reason for its
withdrawal. There were some concerns about a major change in cleaning products impacting on a high
number of domestic staff, coupled with an ambiguous evidence base around the advantages of
Virusolve+. One respondent commented:
[. . .] logistically there are 600 domestics in this trust, they have all been trained to use hypochlorite,
[. . .] that is quite a task, and my lot, especially XXX, she came in nights, she came in weekends [. . .].
And to change over to another product is a big undertaking, and while it’s not a clear picture to me
TABLE 28 T4 Virusolve+: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Professional networks Conference presentations; Infection Prevention Society article
Industry/suppliers Product documentation
Peer-reviewed practitioner journals TOPIX article
Health agencies HPA article; HPA staff members’ feedback
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Conference presentations
Conference presentations
IPS article
IPS article Product
Conference presentations
IPS article
Product documentation
TOPIX article
HPA article
HPA staff members’
feedback
Product documentation
TOPIX article
HPA article
HPA staff members’
feedback
Theatre managers,
staff
Theatre managers, staff
IPC team
IPC team
IPC theatre link
nurse
IPC theatre link nurse
Teathre managers,
staff
IPC team
IPC theatre link
nures
Outcome
Rejected
Documentation
FIGURE 20 T4 Virusolve+: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making. IPS, Infection
Prevention Society.
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as to whether we should change the Virusolve+, or we should even question about our hypochlorite,
I’m not going to change, I’m not in a position to change because my numbers for C. diff[icile] are just
hovering above or on the trajectory, and I cannot rock the boat in anyway. So until I have a good
body of evidence that there is superior product, whether it’s Virusolve+, or chlorine dioxide, or
something else, I’m not going to change.
Senior nurse
This risk averse attitude towards the introduction of HCAI technologies can be partly explained by the fact
that T4 is the only trust among the participating trusts that achieved a good performance on both MRSA
bacteraemia and C. difficile infection rates during the whole period observed (see Chapter 6).
Trust 5 technology product microcases
Microcase 1: Bioquell vapour hydrogen peroxide Room
Bio-Decontamination Service
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
The service was understood by T5 informants to involve a piece of equipment, a device and a process or
operating procedure. It became available to the trust through the Showcase Hospitals programme in 2008.
It is considered to be a high-tech solution. Informants perceive the main attributes of the service to be its
efﬁcacy in eliminating pathogens via ‘disinfection’ and ‘decontamination’ of the environment. The
equipment itself is considered easy to use; however, there was limited understanding of its principles and
review of any evidence, especially among ward staff. Perceived caveats include that it is time-consuming,
costly and cumbersome in the form it was offered, that is, a service delivered by an external party rather
than by trust operators.
The service’s clear relative advantage is perceived to be the high level of decontamination assurance it
offers. Several informants suggest its use seems to coincide with falls in infection rates in wards. However,
it is thought that it is not a substitute for cleaning, but rather a complement to standard clinical area
cleaning practice. The service and equipment operation are understood to be relatively easy to understand
and explain to others. However, delivery of the service (portable machine operation, area sealing, etc.) is
thought to be complex and requiring specialist help.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
Key stakeholders involved were the IPC team, including the DIPC, who is the chief nurse, nurse consultant
and medical microbiologist, heads of nursing and lead nurses from the surgery, medicine, clinical and
scientiﬁc hospital divisions, domestic services staff and the T5 domestic services partner.
The trial had an approximate duration of 3 months. Types of evidence featuring in the initiation, adoption
decision and implementation stages included product documentation from the Showcase Hospitals
programme, feedback on use via professional networks, peers and colleagues in other trusts, the Department
of Health’s HCAI Technology Innovation Programme evaluation reports, supplier product documentation,
peer-reviewed journal articles and local data collected during the trial (Table 29 and Figure 21).
Outcome
The technology was viewed positively by T5 informants. Users’ support during the pilot was evident, in
part facilitated through awareness of the Showcase Hospitals programme, and by showcase lead acting as
a boundary spanner. One respondent said:
[. . .] we had a showcase lead nurse so they were, she was the one, or he was the one at the time
who was involved in about six different projects around the showcase hospitals. And he was sort of
liaising with the different teams so [. . .] it was discussed as a division, if you needed it then come
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down from infection control because they’d get the results, and then it would come to use and say
‘right, where do you want Bioquelling?’ or whatever the need was.
Senior nurse
In addition, anecdotal feedback was suggestive of a positive reception by T5 staff and patients. The service
was understood to improve on the inconsistent efﬁcacy of manual cleaning, reduce the cleaning workload
for nursing staff and relieve training needs for domestic staff associated with a high turnover. A less
TABLE 29 T5 Bioquell VHP RBDS: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Showcase Hospitals programme Product documentation
Professional networks/peers and colleagues Feedback on use
Health agencies Department of Health’s HCAI Technology Programme evaluation reports
Industry/suppliers Product, service documentation
Peer-reviewed academic literature Scientiﬁc articles
Other trusts Local trials feedback
Trust care environment Local trial data
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Product documentation
Product documentation
Feedback on use
Feedback on use
Scientific articles
HCAI Tech Programme evaluation
HCAI Tech Programme evaluation
Product, service doc
Product, service doc
Scientific articles
Scientific articles
Local trials feedback
Local trials feedback
Local trial data
Local trials data
Product documentation
Feedback on use
Scientific articles
HCAI Tech Programme evaluation
Product, service doc
Scientific articles
Local trials feedback
Local trial data
DIPC/chief nurse
DIPC/chief nurse Heads of nursing Lead nurses
IPC team
Heads of nursing
Lead nurses
IPC team
Domestic services
partner staff
Domestic services partner staff
DIPC/chief nurse
Heads of nursing
Lead nurses
IPC team
Domestic services
partner staff
Outcome
Adopted and ad hoc use trust wide
Showcase lead
Showcase leadShowcase lead
FIGURE 21 T5 Bioquell VHP RBDS: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
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positive aspect is identiﬁed in the waiting times for rooms to become available for occupancy and bed
management issues associated with them. The sustainability dimension was also discussed during
decision-making.
The service was again used successfully during the 2011–12 winter months in wards reporting a higher
than usual pathogen incidence. The trust has been looking at different options for adopting HPV
technology in tandem with its cleaning regime and stafﬁng requirements, in close collaboration with its
domestic services partner. This has involved the preparation of a business case for a further HPV
evaluation, which has been led by the IPC team in collaboration with hospital divisions.
Overall, a key factor in facilitating the trial has been that the technology became available as a managed
service. However, the disruptive effects that emerged during the trial, related to patient ﬂow, staff
deployment and bed management, are understood to have played a key part in the decision taken.
Microcase 2: Chlor-Clean tablets
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
Chlor-Clean is perceived to be a low-tech, innovative product which falls within the national guidelines on
effective sporicidal cleaning. It is understood to be easy to use. However, attention is required to use it
correctly: that is, the tablet has to be diluted in water to achieve the concentration recommended by
guidelines. Prior to adopting Chlor-Clean, Haz-Tabs (Guest Medical Ltd, Aylesford, UK) were used
comprehensively at T5, along with detergent wipes where appropriate. Haz-Tabs are now used only in
cases in which a higher-chlorine-concentration agent is required, for example in cases of bodily
ﬂuid spillage. Detergent wipes are used when cleaning with a lesser chlorine concentration is
considered appropriate.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
Senior IPC team members collaborated with the manufacturer to develop a protocol detailing how to use
Chlor-Clean in clinical areas. The adoption decision was taken by the IPC team. Subsequently, the product
was introduced across the trust on the basis of active electronic, verbal communication and a teaching
schedule. Ward link nurses liaised with the IPC team members and ward staff with regards to the product
on a regular basis.
Evidence was shared with other hospital groups via the intranet IPC team website; however, the exact
types and sources of evidence distributed have not been determined. Ward staff seemed unaware of the
product’s speciﬁc relative advantage, as well as of its cost and sustainability aspects. They seemed to place
trust in the work of the IPC team preparing the product’s implementation.
Implementation centred on the use of posters in wards and cascade teaching as part of T5’s routine
teaching programme. This also included demonstrations about how to dilute tablets in water to achieve
the required concentration, and how to conduct cleaning using the product. Instructions have also been
included on the containers and tablet tubes themselves.
Table 30 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 22 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
Outcome
Since its introduction, the product has been adopted and widely used by ward staff and domestic staff.
The product has been successfully mainstreamed across T5 and used extensively in the last 5 years.
Informants suggest that staff are generally happy with using the product and seem inclined to associate it
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with a reduction in infection rates. Two problems with its use were reported as part of this research. One
concerns the undesirable effect on surfaces observed after repeated use: many surfaces start to show signs
of breaking down once repeatedly cleaned with Chlor-Clean. A similar concern was raised with regard to
using probes for oxygen saturation in areas recently cleaned with the product. Soap and water continue to
be used for soft, for example fabric, surfaces, such as mattresses.
TABLE 30 T5 Chlor-Clean tablets: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Professional networks Conference presentations
Health agencies Department of Health’s sporicidal cleaning guidelines
Industry/suppliers Product, service documentation
Peer-reviewed academic literature Scientiﬁc articles
Other trusts Local trials feedback
Peers and colleagues Product feedback
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Conference presentations
Conference presentations
Sporicidal guidelines
Sporicidal guidelines
Product, service
documentation
Product, service documentation
Scientific articles
Scientific articles
Local trials feedback
Local trials feedback
Product feedback
Product feedback
Conference presentations
Sporicidal guidelines
Product, service
documentation
Scientific articles
Local trials feedback
Product feedback
IPC team
IPC team
Ward staff
Ward staff
Domestic staff
Domestic staff
IPC team
Ward staff
Domestic staff
Outcome
Trust-wide implementation
FIGURE 22 T5 Chlor-Clean tablets: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
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Microcase 3: 3M CleanTrace and Hygiena SystemSURE II ATP hygiene
monitoring system
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
Informants from T5 understand both systems to be low-tech products, new to the NHS and relatively easy to
use; the 3M product is viewed as somewhat easier to handle. Storing results on a server for later viewing is
considered a high-tech feature; however, respondents suggested that the graphs and tables generated
through the software are not always easy to make sense of. Before their trial, there was no means of
determining the efﬁcacy of surface cleaning other than visual inspection. The systems are thought to be in
line with T5’s values and culture, emphasising infection prevention and environmental hygiene. However,
their introduction was met with some difﬁculty vis-à-vis systems and structures supporting care delivery at T5.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The Showcase Hospitals programme provided ideation about this technology. Three local trials supported
by the programme were conducted in speciﬁc hospital areas of high patient throughput, such as the
medical assessment unit, neonatal and paediatric intensive-care units, and renal and gastroenterology
wards. Speciﬁc surfaces were selected that represented areas of high frequency of use by ward staff.
In one ward, patient feedback was sought through questionnaires about their conﬁdence levels. These
patients were presented with ATP data collected from their bedside surfaces. In other wards, managers
and matrons presented data as they became available.
The trials were supported by academic staff based at Loughborough University, who visited wards to
collect data through swabbing. One respondent described this as follows:
[. . .] what we agreed was that every week that the ward managers would get feedback from
Loughborough University, from the professor. [. . .] Every week, every Monday morning, OK. And it
came to me, and it came to the ward managers because obviously that’s their immediate area, OK.
And he actually would highlight for them, this may need a little bit more attention or whatever, but
overall the results were very, very good, very good.
Senior nurse
Additional staff members were also hired to work with the system and sample certain surfaces, which
were agreed upon beforehand between ward staff and the IPC team. Results, in the form of tables and
graphs, were fed back to T5’s staff of those wards and clinical areas where trials took place.
Stakeholder groups involved included the IPC team, ward staff, domestic staff (housekeepers), heads of
nursing and the trust’s infection control committee. The T5 showcase lead has been identiﬁed as a
‘champion’, as a result of him or her enacting communications about the trials among staff groups,
advocating the added value of the systems and the trial to the trust and organising data collection. One
respondent commented:
I e-mailed the matrons, the ward managers and the heads of nursing for them areas and said, we’re
going to be given the opportunity to do this, I see it as a very positive step forward, I involved people
like [. . .] and all these people from Sodexo, and I said if we use it as a positive thing it’s going to be a
very good guideline for as to how well we’re doing our cleaning. And as we all know clean hospitals
are something that’s very high on the agenda for the Department of Health. So I kind of sold it to
them in a very positive way.
Senior nurse
The types of evidence featuring in the adoption process as suggested by informants (Table 31) included
product documentation available through Showcase Hospitals, presentations at professional network
conferences, RRP recommendation reports, feedback from other trusts, data generated through local trials.
Figure 23 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the innovation process
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substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related organisational adoption and
implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey shows the evidence types or
stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
Outcome
The results of the trial suggested to T5’s staff members that the trust’s cleaning regime and practices were
generally quite effective. Both systems were viewed positively by most professionals and hospital groups
involved in the trials. Domestic and nursing staff members in wards where trials took place were reportedly
TABLE 31 T5 3M CleanTrace and Hygiena SystemSURE II ATP hygiene monitoring system: evidence sources
and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Showcase Hospitals programme Product documentation
Professional networks Conference presentations
Health agencies Department of Health’s HCAI Technology Programme evaluation reports;
HPA RRP recommendations
Other trusts Local trials feedback
Trust care environment Local trial data
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Product documentation
Product documentation
Conference presentations
Conference presentations
HCAI Tech Programme evaluation
HCAI Tech Programme evaluation
RRP recommendations
RRP recommendations
Local trials feedback
Local trials feedback
Local trial data
Local trial data
Product documentation
Conference presentations
HCAI Tech Programme evaluation
RRP recommendations
Local trials feedback
Local trial data
IC committee
Ward staff
IPC team
IC committee Ward staffIPC team Domestic staff
Domestic staff
IC committee
Ward staff
IPC team
Domestic staff
Outcome
Rejected
FIGURE 23 T5 3M CleanTrace and Hygiena SystemSURE II ATP hygiene monitoring system: professionals’
engagement and evidence types in decision-making. IC, infection control.
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enthusiastic about the systems; however, information or training does not seem to have been
provided systematically.
Following the trials, use of the two systems was discontinued, as there was no interest shown by T5’s
senior staff. One incompatibility was identiﬁed between the use of Chlor-Clean tablets and ATP swabbing:
a particular ingredient of Chlor-Clean altered ATP measurements. Cost implications had become apparent
during the trials. In addition, no particular hospital group or team was identiﬁed that would utilise the
system without adding to the existing workload of staff and disrupting existing care delivery systems and
processes. Use of the two systems was thus discontinued.
Trust 6 technology product microcases
Microcase 1: Bioquell vapour hydrogen peroxide Room
Bio-Decontamination Service
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
This technology is understood by T6 informants to be an effective means of decontamination, and more
effective than manual cleaning, as hydrogen peroxide vapour can access those areas that may not be readily
accessible by manual cleaning. It is viewed as a new, ‘high-tech’ system, a departure from the traditional
means and methods of cleaning. Prior to its introduction, manual deep clean and steam cleaning were
practised. It is, otherwise, thought to be relatively straightforward to explain and train staff members in the
use of. However, the time taken to carry out the procedure is understood to be a disadvantage regarding its
use in the trust and the NHS more widely. Beneﬁts arising from its use may include a safer care environment
for patients and staff, a reduced workload for staff, a higher throughput and better ﬁnancial position for
the trust, and improved quality of care in the NHS.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The technology was introduced in the trust as an environmental cleaning measure to help alleviate the
impact of a prolonged outbreak that caused signiﬁcant disruption. Since then, it has been used one more
time for the same purpose. A respondent discussed how evidence is sourced:
We’ve, oh right OK, obviously from your training. If you’re a microbiologist you would have gone
through the contamination training and things like that. You would have gone through conferences,
you would have seen it with hydrogen peroxide. The pressure to use it would have come from the
outbreak control meetings. . . . So there’s a lot of things that converges through, focus you. And
sometimes the drug reps or the manufacturers, if they’re present they might come and talk to you.
Senior doctor
Trust staff members were approached by companies offering VHP-based products. The RRP
recommendation of ‘1’ awarded to the service was a key reason for deciding to introduce the technology
to the trust. The IPC and E&F teams took part in the evidence review and decision-making, whereas
the DIPC led the process. The decision to bring in the Bioquell service was taken by the DIPC and
director of E&F.
The incidence of outbreaks, the introduction of this technology in other trusts and trust members’
awareness of that were the other factors leading to this decision. As one respondent commented:
So I think your need, and what’s going on in your organisation at the time also directly influences
your willingness to go out there and seek the new innovation and technologies.
Senior nurse
EVIDENCE IN ACTION: PRODUCT MICROCASES IN EIGHT NHS TRUSTS
100
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
Another respondent said:
There was good consensus, we bought it in after a couple of outbreaks. We were not meeting the
objectives and the targets that we were getting from [the Strategic Health Authority], so it was felt
that although this was over and above what is recommended nationally, it would be a good decision
for the trust to undertake.
Senior nurse
Table 32 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 24 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
TABLE 32 T6 Bioquell VHP RBDS: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Health agencies HPA RRP recommendation
Practitioner journals Scientiﬁc articles – via MEDLINE
Professional networks Conference presentations
Industry/suppliers Product documentation
Other trusts Feedback on use
Trust care environment Use experience; staff feedback
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
RRP recommendation
RRP recommendation
Scientific articles
Scientific articles
Conference presentations
Conference presentations
Product documentation
Product documentation
Feedback on use
Feedback on use
Use experience; staff
feedback
Use experience; staff feedback
RRP recommendation
Scientific articles
Conference presentations
Product documentation
Feedback on use
Use experience; staff
feedback
IC physician
Deputy DIPC
DIPC/director of
nursing
IPC team
IC physicianDeputy DIPCDIPC/director of nursing IPC team
E&F team
Procurement
Ward staff
Domestic staff
E&F team Procurement Ward staff Domestic staff
IC physician
Deputy DIPC
DIPC/director of
nursing
IPC team
E&F team
Procurement
Ward staff
Domestic staff
Outcome
Ongoing decision-making
FIGURE 24 T6 Bioquell VHP RBDS: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
IC, infection control.
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innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
Outcome
Decision-making was channelled through the trust’s outbreak management committee. The ﬁnal decision
to introduce the technology was taken by the DIPC. The DIPC is understood by some respondents to have
championed the introduction of VHP technology in the trust. One respondent commented:
So [the DIPC], I would think [the DIPC] was obviously a champion. [the DIPC], not because of the
evidence and things, there’s a lot of pressure that comes to the DIPC and the DIPC thinks differently
in terms of management.
Senior doctor
The experience of having used the service is thought to be a positive one by the trust’s staff members,
with particular regard to the support offered by the supplier. Some reservations have been expressed
regarding its use, as it introduces a time lag before bays become available after decontamination.
A respondent suggested:
I think the main thing I said they were a barrier is the patient flow and the activities, yeah, disruption
to that. That’s the one nobody can swallow.
Senior doctor
Senior trust members wish to establish whether the evidence is strong enough to conﬁrm its efﬁcacy
against other methods of cleaning. If it is to be mainstreamed, it should be better only than current
cleaning methods such that it can deliver better patient outcomes in tandem with other measures.
Microcase 2: JLA OTEX system
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
OTEX is understood by T6 informants to be a novel way of machine washing fabric-based care and
hospital equipment, not by traditional means of water and detergent, but through the release of ozone.
Respondents suggest that there is substantial evidence to support the efﬁcacy of this technology, in
particular its ability to release dirt from fabric. It is understood as a fairly well-established and validated
technology, viewed as simple to explain and quite compatible with T6’s values and culture. Informants’
opinions seemed to differ on whether there is added value from this technology and beneﬁts to patients,
staff, the trust and the NHS more widely.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The deployment of OTEX coincided with the introduction of microﬁbre mops and cloths in the trust.
Following a suggestion to use the product by the trust domestic services partner, a business case was
prepared. This was reviewed ﬁrst by the IPC team and then by the trust’s IPC Committee, whose
membership includes the trust’s directors of operations, other senior trust board members and senior
domestic services partner staff. The business case was reviewed in tandem with other evidence types,
which are shown in Figure 25, with a view to the new system featuring in the trust PFI contract. As one
respondent commented:
I don’t think cost has been an issue, I think the only problem there might have been is [the hospital]
being a PFI and getting the agreement of the PFI Group to agree the installation of the machines.
Senior nurse
Table 33 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited.
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Outcome
The technology has been mainstreamed in the trust and has become part of the trust’s PFI contract. This is
monitored through meetings between T6’s board members and senior staff of the domestic services partner.
T6’s domestic services partner has assigned ‘championship’ responsibilities to their staff members deployed in
the trust, who perform all tasks related to the system’s operation in collaboration with the trust’s ward staff.
This aspect is viewed as important vis-à-vis adoption and continuous use. One respondent commented:
[Domestic service partner staff] works, once they’re on the ward we have what we call devolution,
where they become part, they are part of the ward team . . . they’re [domestic service partner]
employees, but once they work on the ward they will take a lead from the sister [on that ward].
Senior non-clinical manager
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
RRP recommendation
Product documentation
Business case
Staff feedback
SH report of T9 Trial
RRP recommendation Product documentation
Business case Staff feedbackSH report of T9 Trial
RRP recommendation
Product documentation
Business case
Staff feedback
SH report of T9 Trial
DIPC/director of
nursing
IPCC
Deputy DIPC
DIPC/director of nursingIPCC Deputy DIPC
IPC team
Domestic services
partner staff
IPC team Domestic services partner staff
DIPC/director of
nursing
IPCC
Deputy DIPC
IPC team
Domestic services
partner staff
Outcome
Mainstreamed use in the trust
FIGURE 25 T6 JLA OTEX system: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making. IPCC, infection
prevention and control committee; SH, Showcase Hospitals.
TABLE 33 T6 JLA OTEX system: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Health agencies HPA RRP recommendation
Industry/suppliers Product documentation
Showcase Hospitals programme Showcase Hospitals report of T9 trial
Trust care environment Business case; staff feedback
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The trust’s domestic services partner also offers courses and product-based training, demonstrations and
training sessions with trust members.
Microcase 3: Medixair UV air sterilisation units
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
Informants from T6 understand Medixair to eradicate air-borne bacteria and be appropriate for use in
clinical areas. They are viewed as ‘high-tech’, radically new pieces of equipment whose efﬁcacy has yet to
be supported by robust evidence. They are also understood to be compatible with existing trust care
systems and structures. Beneﬁts anticipated included a reduction in cross-infection, a cleaner care
environment and a perception of actively improving care on behalf of patients.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The technology was considered for introduction in the trust care environment both as an opportunity in
itself and as part of a suite of measures to help reduce MRSA bacteraemia colonisation through air-borne
bacteria in bays.
Ideation began through a communication by the supplier to the CEO at T6. The supplier forwarded
product documentation, a report on the equipment’s scientiﬁc principles of operation and case studies of
the equipment’s use in other trusts. These were then forwarded to the IPC team for consideration. The
HPA RRP recommendation on the product was sourced during the adoption decision stage. The entire
evidence review and decision-making process lasted for approximately 1 month. The Deputy DIPC
collected all evidence types and information, and distributed it to the other stakeholders.
Table 34 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 26 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
Outcome
The outcome of the evidence review and decision-making process was a rejection of the systems. The
trust’s infection control physician and decontamination manager scrutinised the evidence and suggested
that the alleged efﬁcacy could not be sustained on the basis of the product’s principles of operation.
Informants suggested that this scrutiny and derived conclusion was accepted on the basis of the specialist
training of their two senior colleagues. Informants also felt that, overall, the evidence wasn’t robust
enough to warrant their further engagement with this technology. A respondent commented:
So we all basically sat round the table, having looked at the information that we’d been given, and
came up, had a discussion around whether we felt this was worth pursuing. The outcome was
that the evidence really wasn’t very strong, and we probably wouldn’t pursue it.
Senior nurse
TABLE 34 T6 Medixair UV air sterilisation units: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Professional networks Conference presentations
Industry/supplier Product documentation; case studies; scientiﬁc basis report
Health agencies HPA RRP recommendation
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Trust 7 technology product microcases
Microcase 1: DIFFICIL-S disinfectant liquid detergent
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
DIFFICIL-S is understood by T7 informants to be a new cleaning and disinfection product based on chlorine
dioxide, which is produced upon mixing. It is considered to be particularly effective against C. difficile
vis-à-vis other disinfectant products, resulting in a higher level of decontamination and cross-infection
mitigation. It is understood to have been evaluated by other trusts and still not widely adopted.
It is viewed as a product that is only somewhat complicated to prepare owing to its mixing requirement.
Chlor-Clean, the earlier disinfectant used in T7, also requires mixing with water in a container. Hence,
DIFFICIL-S has been viewed to be compatible with cleaning practice and easily adoptable by T7 staff based
on their experience with Chlor-Clean. It is also thought to be in line with T7’s values and culture, including
a focus on implementing innovative technologies that add value to care delivery. Anticipated beneﬁts are
a lower C. difficile incidence, a safer care environment for patients and staff and a shorter patient
length of stay. Further positive effects are expected vis-à-vis the trust’s reputation with the public and
health-care regulators.
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Conference presentations
Conference presentations
RRP recommendation
RRP recommendation
Product documentation
Product documentation
Scientific basis report
Scientific basis report
Case studies
Case studies
Conference presentations
RRP recommendation
Product documentation
Scientific basis report
Case studies
Decontamination
manager
CEO
IPC team
E&F team
Procurement
Decontamination managerCEO IPC team E&F team Procurement
Decontamination
manager
CEO
IPC team
E&F team
Procurement
Outcome
Rejected
FIGURE 26 T6 Medixair UV air sterilisation units: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02060 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 6
105
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Kyratsis et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The trial and use of DIFFICIL-S featured in an action plan towards mitigating C. difficile incidence, which
was regularly reviewed by the IPC team and senior managers. This action plan was put together as part of
a business continuity risks management suite of measures designed by T7’s senior staff:
. . . the decision to trial it was in response to the increase in C. difﬁcile and there were regular
meetings with the Chief Executive.
Senior nurse
A trial was organised on the basis of the product viewed as an opportunity to improve care delivery. The
decision to trial the product was taken among the DIPC, lead infection control nurse and the head of
domestic services. The trial was organised in four areas of one T7 hospital site and two wards in the T7
main site, and lasted for 10 weeks. The lead infection control nurse organised the trial and led the process,
which involved ward visits and meetings with domestic and ward staff and monitoring of progress at the
IPC team meeting.
Senior nursing staff were informed of the trial at a special meeting. Ward staff, including link IPC nurses,
were briefed on the product by a company representative. Domestic services staff applied the product
during the trial, including using swab equipment to check cleaning efﬁcacy. There was no patient
involvement. Junior IPC team members attended a demonstration in one ward where the trial was taking
place. Company representatives explained the process of producing and then using the product, and
responded to questions.
During the trial, complaints were made of a rather unpleasant scent in bays and throat irritation after
product use. Other concerns put forward included the somewhat longer time for disinfection to take effect
and increased usage of cleaning cloths. In addition, the product came at a signiﬁcantly higher cost than
the incumbent product. Cost, staff and training implications, arising from frequency of use, mainstreaming
the product across the trust or introducing the product in areas where the C. difficile incidence was higher
than others, were reviewed in the meetings of T7’s infection control committee, which included
stakeholders such as patient groups, the local primary care trust and the HPA.
Evidence types featuring at the initiation stage included presentations at professional network conferences,
product test data obtained from the Birmingham-based Hospital Infection Research Laboratory, product
documentation and demonstrations organised by suppliers (Table 35 and Figure 27). Product principles
were examined by recourse to the following types: a peer-reviewed journal article, feedback on use
sourced from other trusts, and data and staff feedback from T7’s local trial.
TABLE 35 T7 DIFFICIL-S disinfectant liquid detergent: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Professional networks Conference presentations
Health agencies HCAI research laboratory data
Industry/suppliers Product documentation and demonstrations
Peer-reviewed academic literature Journal of Hospital Infection scientiﬁc article
Other trusts Local trials and feedback on use
Peers and colleagues Local trial feedback
Trust care environment Local trial; patient and staff feedback
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Outcome
The outcome of the trial was positive. A somewhat lower cleaning aesthetic was identiﬁed on ceramic and
stainless steel surfaces. The use of additional cleaning agents was thought to be required in those cases.
The trial and related evidence were reviewed by the T7 Trust Executive Group:
[. . .] the purpose of that group is to do that challenging, it’s to make sure that there is robustness to
the decisions that you make. Usually with the things that we’ve done there has been enough
evidence to suggest that this is well worth doing and therefore the dissent is lessened.
Senior nurse
Following the trial, DIFFICIL-S was adopted by the trust in December 2011. As part of T7’s C. difficile
Action Plan for 2012/13, it is now used in the T7 main hospital’s medical assessment units, surgical
assessment centre and haematology unit as well as in another trust hospital. It is also used following any
individual cases of C. difficile and in any risk areas identiﬁed.
Microcase 2: ASP GLOSAIR 400 aHP system
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
The promise of this particular technology, the C. difficile incidence at the trust and funding availability
provided the impetus for the decision to review and trial this product. The choice of technology for the
Implementation
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HCAI research lab data
scientific article
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Local trials and use
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Local trials and use feedback
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feedback
Feedback on trial
Local trial
Product documentation
and demos
IC committee
IC committee
CEO
CEO
DIPC/consultant
microbiologist
DIPC/consultant microbiologist
Senior nurses
Senior nurses
IPC team
IPC team
Ward staff
Ward staff
Wider stakeholders
Wider stakeholders
Head of domestic
services
Head of domestic services
Domestic services
team
Domestic services team
IC committee
CEO
DIPC/consultant
microbiologist
Senior nurses
IPC team
Ward staff
Wider stakeholders
Head of domestic
services
Domestic services
team
Outcome
Trust-wide implementation
J Hosp Infect J Hosp Infect 
J Hosp Infect
FIGURE 27 T7 DIFFICIL-S disinfectant liquid detergent: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in
decision-making. IC, infection control.
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trial was the Bioquell VHP system. Locally generated evidence appeared to be important to trust members
of different seniority and professional background. A respondent noted:
Anything that we do, I think we try, we usually do an audit on and give feedback. Sometimes it may
just be the infection link nurses that will do it with them. But normally we trial quite a few things
on our ward.
Senior nurse
Several issues regarding room closure, hospital air conditioning systems, ﬁre alarm systems, bed
management and Control of Substances Hazardous to Health were identiﬁed and reviewed by T7’s senior
managers. A signiﬁcant ﬁnancial impact is reportedly associated with the purchase of the machines and
staff training costs. A respondent commented:
Certainly in terms of this technology there is an ongoing cost but within the terms of disposables, in
terms of the hydrogen peroxide canisters. But equally . . . maintenance costs for the machines
themselves . . . are not inconsiderable. So this will have been considered at a high level within the
trust. Agreement has been made about how that’s funded and it is being funded. We will need to
review because these things won’t last forever and, but it would not be conceivable [that] the trust
would go forward without this technology.
Senior nurse
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The chief nurse, deputy chief nurse and lead IPC nurse are viewed as trust members who championed the
technology. Use of aHP was understood to involve a trade-off between bed availability and staff workload,
and enhancing patient care. The senior team supporting the adoption of this technology worked through
issues identiﬁed with colleagues from other hospital groups. A respondent commented on the approach
towards evidence:
We became aware [of trials] across the country and we then began to look at those products from
our own perspective and to see and test whether the evidence was there. There was some
manufacturer evidence, research studies and . . . a rapid review assessment suggested, same as before
that these things seemed to have got the science base to use them. By which stage we’d already
got nine of them because locally we perceived that there was enough evidence to suggest that
they were going to be effective in the way that we wanted to use them.
Senior nurse
Ten machines were then purchased, followed by another 10 after a few months. The two purchases
represented a large capital outlay earmarked for adopting this technology. Overall, senior team members’
commitment is understood to have facilitated adoption. A respondent noted:
[. . .] some organisations will have different priorities, the speed of adoption is often about local
factors as much as it is about evidence. We were taking a very, I’d call, forthright view at that time,
we needed to do something different to get on top of things.
Senior nurse
Table 36 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 28 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
Members of the IPC team were trained to use the machines and initially operated these across the trust,
with no implications arising for other hospital groups. Subsequently, the trust appointed infection control
EVIDENCE IN ACTION: PRODUCT MICROCASES IN EIGHT NHS TRUSTS
108
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
assistants as new members of the T7 IPC team, who were trained in how to use the aHP machines for a
period of 4 weeks until they became competent. As an additional measure towards mitigating C. difficile
incidence in the trust, domestic services and other hospital group staff members were trained and took on
use of the machines. Bed management issues have been worked around successfully through liaison
among IPC team members, bed managers and ward staff. Effective collaboration was also reported
between domestic services and the IPC team. Despite some reluctance to taking on additional workload,
the number of users and trained staff has expanded across the trust.
TABLE 36 T7 ASP GLOSAIR 400 aHP system: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Health agencies HPA RRP recommendation
Industry/suppliers Product documentation
Peer-reviewed academic literature Scientiﬁc articles
Other trusts Local trials and feedback on use
Peers and colleagues Local trial feedback
Trust care environment Bioquell VHP RBDS local trial
Implementation
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RRP recommendation
RRP recommendation
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feedback
Local trials and use feedback
Local trial feedback
Local trial feedback
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Outcome
Adopted and ad hoc use trust wide
FIGURE 28 T7 ASP GLOSAIR 400 aHP system: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
IC, infection control.
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Outcome
Following the introduction of aHP and other measures to mitigate C. difficile at the trust, infection rates
were falling throughout the post-implementation period. On this basis, and because of its wider utilisation,
including norovirus cases and other pathogens, aHP is understood to be a successful technology, and
remains central to the trust IPC strategy. One respondent commented:
I think what was really helpful was, shortly after they got introduced, there was a dramatic fall in the
number of cases of C. difﬁcile and so whether it was or not associated with this it would almost be
impossible to say directly. But, having achieved such a high level of improvement, I think there would
then be a reluctance to take away something which would be seen as an effective tool in the armour.
Senior nurse
Microcase 3: Medixair UV air sterilisation units
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
The Medixair UV air sterilisation units are understood by T7 informants to be new, high-tech products
available on the market and to the NHS. Beneﬁts associated with their use include a reduction in
cross-infections from air-borne viruses such as norovirus. Air-borne viruses may spread quickly and cause a
major operational impact on emergency, planned or elective care, including closure of bays and wards for
decontamination purposes, as well as adversely affect trust reputation.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
In their efforts to reduce infection rates further and limit the impact of outbreaks, senior T7 staff members
looked at technologies capable of sterilising the air in rooms and stopping cross-contamination of
air-borne bacteria and viruses. One respondent noted:
A couple of years ago the hospital was hit by a prolonged, disruptive [outbreak] . . . . It affected
multiple wards, lots of bed closures, operational difficulties, a lot of disharmony in the hospital about
how we were dealing with it and a frustration that it appeared that there was very little we could do
to prevent the spread of this, perhaps. So a number of issues were looked at, one of them was for
the potential for these units to, if you like, clean the air.
Senior nurse
The medical assessment units of T7 were identiﬁed as areas to deploy the Medixair units, because of the
possible onward transmission of viral infections from these units to other hospital areas. During the
initiation stage, there were also some tests in the ward environment of using portable UV light inspection
devices in tandem with ATP swabbing. This has been viewed as a complement to cleaning conducted by
domestic services, and an aid for them to check the efﬁcacy of their cleaning process.
Consultant microbiologists led on evidence gathering and review in collaboration with T7’s deputy chief
nurse, IPC team members and T7’s E&F at a subsequent stage. The supplier suggested a clinical trial
should be organised; however, a consensus was reached among staff members that the evidence did not
seem to support this. A smaller pilot, in the form of a case study on the product devices, was completed:
It was quite a small group really and it largely centred around infection control doctors, DIPC, lead
infection control nurse, deputy chief nurse, the chief operating officer.
Senior nurse
The evidence suggested that the air intake and release rates of these particular products were a lot lower
than those of similar systems used in theatres. On this basis, their use in busy medical wards proved to be
ineffective. The initial and ongoing maintenance costs of these products were also understood to be high.
The evidence base put together is understood to have acted as a barrier to adoption. The evidence base
was reviewed and a decision to reject adoption was taken by the staff members mentioned above.
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Table 37 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 29 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
Outcome
Following review and deliberation of the evidence, it was felt that the efﬁcacy of the Medixair units did not
match the procurement and maintenance costs involved. The evidence, its examination and the decision to
reject the product, which was taken by the group of staff members who looked at the evidence, were
TABLE 37 T7 Medixair UV air sterilisation units: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Professional networks Conference presentations
Industry/suppliers Product documentation
Trust care environment Local case study including patient and staff feedback
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Conference presentations
Conference presentations
Product documentation
Product documentation
Case study data
Case study data
Conference presentations
Product documentation
Case study data
Deputy chief nurse Microbiology IPC team E&F team
Deputy chief nurse
Microbiology
IPC team
E&F team
Deputy chief nurse
Microbiology
IPC team
E&F team
Outcome
Rejected
FIGURE 29 T7 Medixair UV air sterilisation units: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
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documented in a paper presented to the Trust Executive Group. The decision to reject its adoption in the
trust was approved by the Trust Executive Group. One respondent noted:
Essentially, the infection control doctors looked very closely at this equipment and they did not concur
with the manufacturer’s findings in terms of efficacy. And they did not feel that they could
substantiate their claims.
Senior nurse
Microcase 4: DaRo UV light inspection cabinet
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
The UV light inspection cabinet marketed by DaRo UV Systems Ltd has also been trialled at T7. Informants
understand this technology product to be based on organic material luminescence becoming visible with
UV radiation. The technology is understood to originate from the food industry, and to have only recently
been applied in health care.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
DaRo UV light inspection cabinets were also introduced by the IPC team in wards, in collaboration with
senior nurses and ward staff, as a complement to the trust’s hand-washing campaign. The product was
ﬁrst viewed at a conference by IPC team members, and was then discussed at a meeting with senior
nurses. The decision to buy the product was reached swiftly, and the product was then actively promoted
by hand hygiene leads in wards.
Outcome
The UV light inspection cabinet has been viewed as a tool to train staff in hand-washing techniques, to
examine the efﬁcacy of these techniques and to prevent cross-infection from inadequately sanitised hands.
IPC nurses ran demonstrations of the cabinet for ward staff. The cabinets remain in regular use, including
as part of the induction for all new trust staff.
Trust 9 technology product microcases
Microcase 1: clinell and PDI Sani-Cloth CHG 2% alcoholic chlorhexidine
gluconate wipes for skin preparation
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
Informants at T9 understand these two wipe products to have been designated to be suitable for use on
medical devices, for decontamination and device preparation. The wipes, viewed as low-tech products, are
required to be used with the technique termed ‘scrub the hub’, requiring friction to be applied while the
hand is used to handle the wipe. They have not been licensed for skin preparation.
The product currently used for skin preparation in the trust and elsewhere in the NHS is an ampoule-based
product that contains a solution with a chemical composition and speciﬁcation and chemical properties
very similar to those of the two wipe products. This is the ChloraPrep® (CareFusion Corp., San Diego, CA,
USA) preoperative skin preparation antiseptic of 2% chlorhexidine gluconate and 70% isopropyl alcohol.
Use of the ampoule also requires an appropriate topical massage routine that generates friction and helps
with skin substance absorption. This technique, akin to the aseptic non-touch technique, allows the
health-care worker to appropriately use the ampoule to decontaminate the skin before any procedure,
while not coming into contact with the patient.
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Use of the wipes in this innovative manner is understood to relate to earlier practice, before the introduction
of chlorhexidine and ChloraPrep, when alcohol- or iodine-based wipes and solutions were used. The
innovation is understood to be in line with the cost-saving culture at the trust. One respondent said:
No one to my knowledge has challenged it because it seems to make sense. We’re in difficult
financial times and this is a classic example of what we call a QIPP [QIPP refers to ‘Quality, Innovation,
Productivity and Prevention’, which is a Department-of-Health-led programme to transform NHS
services to make efficiency savings of £20 billion’.94] – quality improvement, innovation, innovation
productivity, and prevention – where we see something that achieves the same outcomes but for
much less financial outlay, so.
Senior pharmacist
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The ideation for using wipe products in this manner originated from the trust’s Child Health Division. It
searched for evidence to conﬁrm that the use of ChloraPrep reduces infection rates. Such evidence was
not identiﬁed; hence, the recommendation to use wipe products was made.
Senior managers reportedly understand ChloraPrep to be more expensive than the wipes, which are
viewed as the same product but in a different format. The wipes have been highly efﬁcacious in the trust
in disinfecting intravenous devices, resulting in rates of MRSA bacteraemia, and other bloodstream
infections related to central or peripheral devices, being close to zero. However, IPC team members also
saw a risk in using the wipes in a patient context, as skin may be contaminated or recontaminated
through wipe contact. Moreover, the friction required when using a wipe is understood to be considerably
larger and applied during a longer time interval, entailing some risk of physical damage, particularly for
frail patients. Therefore, an audit in the form of a local trial was decided as a means to collect evidence on
this alternative use of the wipes and related staff training requirements. A small working group was
formed to organise two trials in paediatrics and general surgery. One respondent commented on clinical
engagement during the local trials, and identiﬁed surgical areas as ‘hot spots’:
They must have got quite a lot of consensus because as I said, some of the doctors have been a little
bit difficult to change, that’s why it’s not fully rolled out in some, in all of the surgical areas.
Senior nurse
The trust’s infection control physician is understood to have led on evidence gathering and evaluation. A
paediatrics lead nurse has acted as a local champion, leading the audit in that division and reporting on it.
One respondent commented:
It’s very difficult when you’re implementing a change that everybody has to comply with and they
don’t have achoice. So ultimately it is the ward nurses who are implementing this, they have to do it,
they don’t have a choice, but you have to get them on side. I would imagine that the benefits of it
were explained in that we’re reducing the MRSA, we’re saving the trust money, we’re promoting
patient safety, patient care, which is ultimately, like I say, we all signed up to be nurses because we
want to care for people.
Senior nurse
The way in which the evidence was communicated by senior nurses to the ward nurses, who were the
implementers of the innovation, was believed to be rational sensegiving aligned with the ward nurses
values and sensitivity to certain forms of evidence.
Table 38 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where
these were elicited. Figure 30 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
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organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
Outcome
The outcome is anticipated following conclusion and evaluation of the trust’s local trials.
Microcase 2: clinell sporicidal wipes (red)
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
Informants from T9 understand this product to be effective against C. difficile spores, which prove hard to
remove with cleaning based on soap and water, and cause cross-infection among patients. The wipe’s
active ingredient is activated by using tap water to wet the wipe, which then becomes ready for
application. The product is understood to have been radically new when it was introduced, because of its
TABLE 38 T9 clinell and PDI Sani-Cloth CHG 2% alcoholic chlorhexidine gluconate wipes for skin preparation:
evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Industry/suppliers Product documentation and demonstrations
Peers and colleagues Views and opinions
Trust care environment Local economic and trial data
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Product documentation
and demonstrations
Product documentation and demonstrations
Views and opinions
Views and opinions
Local economic and trial
data
Local economic and trial data – ongoing divisional local trials
Product documentation
and demonstrations
Views and opinions
Local economic and trial
data
Trust IPC
committee
Trust IPC committee
Trust governors’
committee
Trust governors’ committee
Medical director
Medical director
DIPC/DoN
DIPC/DoN
Deputy DIPC
Deputy DIPC
IPC team
IPC team
Stores department
Stores department
Ward staff
Ward staff
Divisional directors/
heads of nursing
Divisional directors/heads of nursing
Trust IPC
committee
Trust governors’
committee
Medical director
DIPC/DoN
Deputy DIPC
IPC team
Stores department
Ward staff
Divisional directors/
heads of nursing
Outcome
Ongoing decision-making
FIGURE 30 T9 clinell and PDI Sani-Cloth CHG 2% alcoholic chlorhexidine gluconate wipes for skin
preparation: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making. DoN, director of nursing.
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special C. difficile sporicidal focus. Before its adoption in the trust, ActiChlor Plus tablets and water were
used to produce a chlorine-based solution and clean commodes and other surfaces, causing surface
deterioration and damage. The product is understood to be ‘high tech’ because of the perceived high level
of research that was required to develop it; its uses are thought of as ‘low tech’. Informants associate it
with quicker cleaning practice; a reduction in C. difficile rates; and raising the importance of efﬁcacious
commode cleaning in the trust. It is viewed as beﬁtting the trust’s values and culture.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
Clinell sporicidal wipes were introduced at a time of relatively high C. difficile incidence for the trust.
Before its introduction, processes were in place to ensure a high level of hygiene, such as cleaning practice
audits and spot checks by senior staff. The product was introduced to the trust by the IPC team. Ward
staff were informed about it through the infection control link nurses’ meetings. The availability of
evidence on its sporicidal efﬁcacy is understood to have facilitated its adoption. The product comes with
a relatively high cost of approximately £7.65 per pack of 25 (see Appendix 7: Technology Products Unit
Cost Price List); however, this was weighted against the high costs of persistent C. difficile incidence. It
was then decided that it would be used to clean only the trust’s commodes and bed pans.
While the product was being rolled out, it was championed by an IPC team member. Appropriate
communication during training provided by the supplier, by internal e-mail and posters, is understood to
have played a key role in the product’s adoption by ward staff. Carefully worded posters were prepared
with speciﬁc instructions on how to handle and use the wipe.
Table 39 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 31 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
Outcome
Clinell sporicidal wipes have been used in all hospital areas of the trust in the last 2–3 years. The product is
understood to be one successful part of a suite of measures introduced to substantially reduce infection
rates across T9.
Microcase 3: JLA OTEX system
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
OTEX is understood by T9 informants to be a very effective product for washing and disinfecting
fabric-based domestic services equipment (mops, cloths), as well as hotel services equipment (curtains, linen,
etc.). Its environmental beneﬁts, using ozone rather than chemical disinfectants and energy and carbon
emissions savings, are also recognised. It is viewed as a new concept for the NHS and its environmental
beneﬁts, in particular, are thought to be of relevance. It is also viewed as complicated to explain, in part
because of the long-standing use of disinfectant-based washing in the NHS. The system is thought of as
fully compatible with care delivery systems and processes, as well as with T9’s culture and values.
TABLE 39 T9 clinell sporicidal wipes (red): evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Industry/suppliers Training on product use; lab tests documentation
Peer-reviewed academic literature Scientiﬁc articles
Professional networks Conference presentations
Trust care environment Staff feedback
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Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The trust was asked to trial OTEX as part of the Showcase Hospitals programme. The trust’s domestic
services partner team had been interested in the system for a few years before support for its evaluation
became available through the programme. It was involved in all stages (initiation, adoption decision and
implementation), as illustrated in Figure 32. Such user involvement from the initiation stage, together with
the partner team’s pre-existing positive perception of the system, played a catalyst role for consensus
decision-making among stakeholders. One respondent commented:
I think, because the contract, domestic contractor wanted it anyway, we didn’t, it was a really easy
task because we agreed, I think we were asked to evaluate it, we knew that our domestic service
were interested in it, so I think that’s partly why we agreed, because actually they, it was something
they wanted to do and we’d been asked to do, so that was a, I think that, we came to our consensus
of opinion very quickly that we’d go and evaluate it, because we wouldn’t have too many hurdles to
cross by trying to persuade someone it was a good idea.
Senior nurse
The trust was looking at further environmental hygiene measures at the time, so the trial of OTEX was
viewed as a timely opportunity.
The trial was managed by the trust IPC team. Choices were carefully made on both the hospital groups to
engage with, and of how to engage with them. These included the trust’s domestic services partner, the
trust’s cleaning operational group, including the patient services manager, and the clinical environmental
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
Product use training
Product use training
Lab tests documentation
Lab tests documentation
Scientific articles
Scientific articles
Conference presentations
Conference presentations Staff feedback
Staff feedback
Product use training
Lab tests documentation
Scientific articles
Conference presentations
Staff feedbackHeads of nursing
Heads of nursing
DIPC/DoN
DIPC/DoN
IPC team
IPC team
Ward staff
Ward staff
Heads of nursing
DIPC/DoN
IPC team
Ward staff
Outcome
Trust-wide implementation
FIGURE 31 T9 clinell sporicidal wipes (red): professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making.
DoN, director of nursing.
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monitoring lead. A close collaboration is reported between the IPC team and the domestic services
contractor. The trial lasted for a period of 3 months. The evidence generated from the trial was discussed
in the IPC team’s weekly operational meetings. No separate project structures, for example meetings, etc.,
were put together. Progress was reported at the trust’s infection prevention committee meetings, which
occurred every 2 months.
Table 40 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited.
Outcome
The trial evidence is understood to have demonstrated that the technology had no adverse effects and
proved efﬁcacious in eradicating germs and pathogens. Cost savings resulting from using less water, less
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
RRP recommendation
RRP recommendation
Product documentation
Product documentation
Feedback on use
Feedback on use
Local trial data; staff
feedback
Local trial data; staff feedback
RRP recommendation
Product documentation
Feedback on use
Local trial data; staff
feedback
Deputy DIPC
Deputy DIPC
DIPC/DoN
DIPC/DoN
Showcase lead
Showcase lead
IPC team
IPC team
Heads of nursing
Heads of nursing
E&F team
E&F team
Site management
team
Site management team
Ward staff
Ward staff
Domestic services
partner staff
Deputy DIPC
DIPC/DoN
Showcase lead
IPC team
Heads of nursing
E&F team
Site management
team
Ward staff
Domestic services
partner staff
Domestic services partner staff
Outcome
Trust-wide implementation
FIGURE 32 T9 JLA OTEX system: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making. DoN, director
of nursing.
TABLE 40 T9 JLA OTEX system: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Health agencies HPA RRP recommendation
Industry/suppliers Product documentation
Other trusts Feedback on use
Trust care environment Local trial data; staff feedback
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energy and less detergent were also documented. The change in practice and transition to a new
technology also had no adverse effects. Such positive local results changed the views of this technology
among IPC team members. One respondent said:
The only resistant was from Infection Control, because they didn’t really, actually I don’t know, they
just were very negative against it. But once they saw the results [i.e. onsite infection cases drop], and
saw what it offered, they were all for it.
Non-clinical manager
Following the trial, the trust’s IPC team approved further use of the system in the trust. The domestic
service partner conﬁrmed that it would be able and willing to continue using the technology. Its use has,
thus, now been mainstreamed as part of the trust’s cleaning regime. Use of OTEX was included in the
domestic services contract, with no further ﬁnancial implications for the trust. Adoption was facilitated
through collaboration among the showcase lead, domestic services and the supplier’s after-sales staff.
The domestic services partner’s motivation, support from the Showcase Hospitals programme and cost
neutrality are understood to be the main factors supporting adoption. Moreover, the supplier is viewed as
having a very supportive after-sales service.
Microcase 4: Bioquell vapour hydrogen peroxide Room
Bio-Decontamination Service
Attributes perceived by stakeholders
During the trial of the service, patients and staff perceived the service to be highly efﬁcacious, resulting in
high levels of disinfection and creating a safe care environment at the trust. Patient and staff opinions
were formally documented as part of the service evaluation.
Stakeholders, evidence and decision-making
The Showcase Hospitals programme provided the opportunity to the IPC team to trial the service
without cost implications for the trust. The programme supported the availability of Bioquell staff and
equipment on-site. These would be requested by trust members who wished to use the equipment for
decontamination in speciﬁc hospital areas. Trust members were reportedly encouraged to use the
service. The Showcase Hospitals programme lead introduced the service throughout T9.
The trust had multiple measures in place to combat HCAIs, and infection rates started to come down.
At the same time, use of the service was more often than not exacerbating delays associated with bed
availability and waiting times. There was time pressure, arising from competing priorities, and this was
exacerbated by the trust’s poor isolation capacity. One respondent commented as follows:
[. . .] you’ve got your competing demands of patients not being able to wait in A&E (accident &
emergency) for more than four hours and that, the constant pressure. We have internal targets
around how quickly patients need to be isolated, so the turnover of those, so that was I think the
biggest hurdle was the whole timeframe.
Senior nurse
After the end of the trial, C. difficile infection rates remained low and continued to fall. This led the trust
to take a more cautious approach to adoption. The same respondent described this as follows:
[. . .] We did then get it back in again for a short period when our C. difﬁcile rates went up, [. . .] and
we’d managed to secure some funding to do that. C. difﬁcile rates went down but again we’d
refocused all our energies within the organisation on the C. difﬁcile so all the practice improved as
well. So again it was difficult to see the impact and the rates still have gone down since we stopped
using it again. [. . .] we evaluated it in 2008/9 I think it was, and the last two, three years we’ve often
had conversations about Bioquell because it’s quoted so much, the evidence is there. However, I think
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now where our C. difﬁcile numbers have radically reduced quite significantly, [. . .] from a cost
justification perspective.
Senior nurse
On this basis of evidence related to infection rates and operational issues, it was considered that the
service may not actually make a difference as part of the trust’s suite of measures mitigating HCAI
incidence. Nonetheless, the technology was viewed in a positive light by senior trust members, including
the DIPC/director of nursing.
Table 41 lists the speciﬁc evidence types used in this microcase alongside the sources from where these
were elicited. Figure 33 depicts the stakeholders involved and evidence types used in each of the
TABLE 41 T9 Bioquell VHP RBDS: evidence sources and types
Evidence sources Evidence types
Health agencies HPA RRP recommendation
Showcase Hospitals programme Product information
Professional networks Conference presentations
Industry/suppliers Product documentation
Trust care environment Local trial data; staff feedback
Implementation
Initiation Adoption decision
RRP recommendation
RRP recommendation
Product information
Product documentation
Product documentation
Local trial data; staff
feedback
Local trial data; staff feedback
Product documentation
Conference
presentations
Conference presentations
RRP recommendation
Product information
Product documentation
Local trial data; staff
feedback
Conference
presentations
Deputy DIPC
Deputy DIPC
DIPC/DoN
DIPC/DoN
Showcase lead
Showcase lead
IPC team
IPC team
Heads of nursing
Heads of nursing
E&F team
Health and safety
Health and safety
E&F team
Site management
team
Site management team
Ward staff
Ward staff
Domestic services
partner staff
Deputy DIPC
DIPC/DoN
Showcase lead
IPC team
Heads of nursing
E&F team
Health and safety
Site management
team
Ward staff
Domestic services
partner staff
Domestic services partner staff
Outcome
Rejected
FIGURE 33 T9 Bioquell VHP RBDS: professionals’ engagement and evidence types in decision-making. DoN, director
of nursing.
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innovation process substages (initiation, adoption decision and implementation), and the related
organisational adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology product. Text in light grey
shows the evidence types or stakeholders who were not involved in that substage.
Outcome
The IPC team documented the trial and its outcomes and the evidence was presented to the trust
board. The CEO made further enquiries and a consensus developed with regard to the costs related to
its permanent adoption and operational use, which outweighed the beneﬁts obtained. One
respondent commented:
We then had some quite big discussions around whether we would continue using it and obviously
Bioquell as a company were very keen. We could see the advantages in terms of the concept and the
technology. The biggest stumbling block for us was cost and the operational issues. So I think we sort
of put a provisional case together and it was sat on the shelf in terms of, the chief executive and the
trust board were very much, OK, that’s great but what are the benefits? And obviously we then see,
or they wanted to know the benefits because it was such a huge cost to the existing service, the
existing process.
Senior nurse
A decision was, thus, taken at that level to reject adoption of this technology at the trust.
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Chapter 9 Cross-case analysis
This chapter outlines key themes from the cross-case analysis [looking at relevant patterns across themacro- (eight trusts) and microcases (27 technology product journeys)].
Overview of technology microcase outcomes across trusts
In Table 42 the adoption and implementation outcomes for the technology microcases are compared
along the dimensions of expected budgetary impact, perceived impact on practice and strength of
evidence base on efﬁcacy (discussed in Chapter 7). Themes from this comparative analysis are summarised
by decision outcome and adoption/implementation processes. The patterns observed are reﬂective of the
eight trusts sampled for this study; they provide important insights into the relevance of perceived
technology attributes to this process.
Decontamination and inspection products were mostly put forward by trusts to be studied as microcases
and most of these also resulted in adoption and trust-wide implementation. Decontamination products,
such as liquid cleaning and wipe cleaning, were generally associated with a lower expected budgetary
impact and a low to medium perceived impact on practice. The evidence associated with these products
was generally of ‘low’ strength. The adoption and implementation outcomes for these products varied
considerably across the trusts, from trust-wide implementation, adoption by the trusts and availability for
ad hoc use to rejection. By ‘ongoing decision-making’ we refer to those technology products under
consideration at the time of the study. The next section examines the decision-making processes and
outcomes across these technologies by considering the three dimensions of our typology, namely
perceived budgetary impact, practice impact and strength of the evidence base on efﬁcacy.
Decision outcome themes
Evidence strength on efficacy themes
There is no clear observable pattern when we look at outcomes and ‘evidence
strength on efficacy’
Table 42 includes products whose evidence base on efﬁcacy ranges from ‘low’ to ‘high’ and is emergent or
established. Within these classiﬁcations, decision outcomes vary between rejection and trust-wide
implementation. For those technologies implemented trust-wide, the evidence base on efﬁcacy spans the
range of low, emergent, to medium. Only two microcases, both of the JLA OTEX laundry system, with a
‘high, established,’ evidence base on efﬁcacy resulted in trust-wide implementation, which occurred in
both T6 and T9.
High evidence strength on the efficacy of a technology product did not always
lead to its adoption and full-scale implementation (as initially planned)
There were four technologies in our sample with a ‘high, established,’ evidence base on efﬁcacy, and
these featured in 10 of the microcases. Decision outcomes across these 10 microcases included rejection,
adoption and use in selected wards, adoption and ad-hoc use trust-wide, and trust-wide implementation.
Two examples of these are Bioquell VHP RBDS, which was adopted for ad-hoc use trust-wide in T5, but
rejected in T1 and T9, and the 3M CleanTrace and Hygiena SystemSURE II ATP hygiene monitoring system,
which were both rejected in T5.
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TABLE 42 Product attributes and outcomes
Technology product
Budget
impact
Practice
impact
Evidence strength
on efﬁcacy Trusts
Adoption and
implementation outcome
ASP GLOSAIR 400
aHP system
Low High Medium, emergent T2 Trust-wide implementation
DIFFICIL-S disinfectant
solution
Low Medium Low, emergent T7 Trust-wide implementation
Chlor-Clean Low Medium Low, emergent T5 Trust-wide implementation
Clinell universal
sanitising wipes
Medium Very
low
Medium, emergent T1 Trust-wide implementation
JLA OTEX laundry
system
Low Medium High, established T6, T9 Trust-wide implementation
Clinell sporicidal (red)
wipes
Medium Low Low, emergent T3, T9 Trust-wide implementation
ASP GLOSAIR 400
aHP system
High High Medium, emergent T7 Adopted and ad-hoc use
trust-wide
Steris BioGenie VHP
system
Low High Low, emergent T4 Adopted and ad-hoc use
trust-wide
DBO commode Medium Low Low, emergent T1 Adopted in two of three sites;
phased implementation in progress
DaRo UV light
inspection cabinet
Low High Low, emergent T7 Adopted and ad-hoc use
trust-wide
Bioquell VHP RBDS Medium High High, established T5 Adopted and ad-hoc use
trust-wide
3M Clean-Trace NG
luminometer
Medium High High, established T2 Adopted and used in selected
wards
UV light inspection
torch
Low High Medium, emergent T2 Adopted and ad-hoc use
trust-wide
DIFFICIL-S disinfectant
solution
Low Medium Low, emergent T4 Ongoing decision-making
Disposable sterile
surgical site gowns
Medium Very
low
Low, emergent T2 Ongoing decision-making
Clinell alcoholic wipes Low Low Medium, emergent T9 Ongoing decision-making
PDI Sani-Cloth CHG
2% alcoholic
chlorhexidine
gluconate wipes
Low Low Low, emergent T9 Ongoing decision-making
Bioquell VHP RBDS Medium High High, established T3, T6 Ongoing decision-making
Bioquell VHP RBDS High High High, established T1, T9 Rejected
Medixair UV air
sterilisation unit
Low Very
high
Low, emergent T3,
T6, T7
Rejected
Medixair Meos UV air
sterilisation unit
Low Very
high
Low, emergent T3,
T6, T7
Rejected
Virusolve+ Low Low Low, emergent T4 Rejected
3M Clean-Trace NG
luminometer
Medium High High, established T5 Rejected
Hygiena SystemSURE
II ATP hygiene
monitoring system
Medium High High, established T5 Rejected
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Low evidence strength on the efficacy of a technology product did
not preclude adoption and trust-wide implementation or adoption and ad-hoc
use trust-wide
There were 10 technology products classiﬁed as having a ‘low, emergent,’ evidence base on efﬁcacy.
These were perceived as having variable budget and practice impacts. Three of these products were
adopted and implemented trust-wide in four trusts, whereas three more have been adopted for ad-hoc
use across three trusts. Speciﬁcally, the technologies implemented trust-wide were as follows: DIFFICIL-S in
T7; Chlor-Clean in T5; and clinell sporicidal wipes in T3 and T9. Those adopted and used ad hoc include
Steris BioGenie VHP system in T4; the DBO commode in T1; and the DaRo UV inspection cabinet in T7.
Perceived impact on practice themes
Technology products associated with a ‘low’ or ‘medium’ perceived impact on
practice were less likely to be rejected
In our sample, 10 technology products considered for adoption were perceived as having a very low, low
or medium impact on practice. The majority of decisions concerning these products across the trusts (8 out
of 13 decisions) led to trust-wide or phased implementation: for example, DIFFICIL-S in T7; Chlor-Clean in
T5; clinell universal wipes in T1; JLA OTEX laundry system in T6 and T9; clinell sporicidal wipes in T3 and
T9; and the DBO commode in T1.
Technology products associated with a ‘high’ perceived impact on practice
were more likely to be rejected
Eight technology products with a high or very high practice impact were considered for adoption in eight
trusts. Out of these 16 decisions, there were 7 rejections reported. These included Bioquell VHP RBDS in T1
and T9; Medixair in T3, T6 and T7; and the 3M CleanTrace and Hygiena SystemSURE II ATP hygiene
monitoring system in T5. Seven decisions led to products being adopted and implemented trust-wide or used
ad hoc, namely the ASP GLOSAIR aHP system in T2 and T7; the Steris BioGenie VHP system in T4; the DaRo
UV Inspection Cabinet in T7; Bioquell VHP RBDS in T5; and the 3M CleanTrace luminometer and the UV
inspection torch in T2.
Technology products associated with a ‘low’ or ‘medium’ practice impact were
more likely to be adopted and implemented trust-wide
In our sample, 10 technology products perceived to involve a very low, low or medium impact on practice
were reviewed in 13 technology decisions across the eight trusts. In seven cases, these products were fully
implemented. These cases were as follows: DIFFICIL-S in T7; Chlor-Clean in T5; clinell universal wipes in T1;
JLA OTEX laundry system in T6 and T9; and clinell sporicidal wipes in T3 and T9. In four cases, the decision
to adopt was still pending at the close of the study: these were DIFFICIL-S in T4; disposable gowns in T2;
and PDI Sani-Cloth and clinell alcoholic wipes in T9. In T4, Virusolve+ was rejected.
Rejection decisions on technology products with a perceived ‘high’ impact on
practice consistently used local sources of evidence (data generated
within trusts)
Our technology sample featured four technology products with a ‘very high’ or ‘high’ practice impact that
were rejected in seven of the microcases. These were as follows: Bioquell VHP RBDS in T1 and T9; the
Medixair units in T3, T6 and T7; and the 3M CleanTrace and Hygiena SystemSURE II ATP hygiene
monitoring system in T5. In all seven cases, these rejections were based on staff feedback and local trial or
product case study data generated from within the trust care environment.
In the Bioquell RBDS case, in T1, the IPC team conducted a local trial and collected and analysed data on
staff experiences during and after the trial, which was reviewed by senior executives and other
stakeholders from within the trust including E&F and procurement. In T5, the IPC team conducted a local
trial and compared the results with feedback from local trials undertaken in other trusts. In T7, the
microbiology team and IPC team conducted a small case study of Medixair units in the ward environment.
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Similarly, T3’s IPC team conducted a local trial and elicited staff and patient feedback on the use of
Medixair devices in wards.
Budget impact theme
There is no clear observable pattern when we look at outcomes and
‘budget impact’
In total, 11 technology products with a ‘low’ perceived budgetary impact were considered for adoption in
seven trusts. Out of these 15 decisions, there were 4 rejections reported: Virusolve+ in T4 and the
Medixair units in T3, T6 and T7. Five decisions led to trust-wide implementation: the ASP GLOSAIR aHP
system in T2, the DIFFICIL-S in T7, the Chlor-Clean in T5 and the JLA OTEX in T6 and T9. Another three
technology products were adopted and used ad hoc trust-wide, while for three more the adoption
decision was ongoing. Two technology products with a ‘high’ perceived budgetary impact were
considered by three trusts: the ASP GLOSAIR aHP system was adopted and used ad hoc trust-wide in T7,
while the Bioquell VHP was rejected in T1 and T9. The former technology product, ASP GLOSAIR, was
perceived as having a ‘low’ budget impact in T2 (T2 had used externally awarded funding to procure the
product) and was adopted for trust-wide implementation, while in T7 it was perceived as having a ‘high’
budget impact, leading also to adoption but with ad hoc use trust-wide.
Technology product microcase themes
A comparative review of the 27 technology product microcases enables the following observations to be
made regarding stakeholder involvement and evidence use in the decision-making process.
Nurses were involved in all stages across the trusts for all technology products.
Out of the 27 product cases, 10 featured the involvement of nursing staff and at least one interdisciplinary
hospital group including senior trust members beyond the IPC team (trust innovations groups, IPC
committees, product selection groups, risk management groups and the trust board). The IPC team was
exclusively involved in three microcases. These were Virusolve+ in T4, Chlor-Clean in T5 and clinell
sporicidal in T9, and these cases were characterised by a ‘low’ or ‘medium’ budget impact, a ‘low’ practice
impact and a ‘low’ evidence strength on efﬁcacy. Nursing staff, doctors and non-clinical specialists were
involved in tandem in all three stages in four microcases, namely, DIFFICIL-S in T4 and T7; Bioquell in T3;
and the DBO commode in T1. Non-clinical staff were involved in all three stages of 11 microcases, and in
at least one stage in 25 microcases.
In the initiation stage, non-clinical staff, for example from domestic services or procurement, were involved
in 12 cases of mostly ‘medium’ budget impact; these involved ‘high’ practice impact products whose
evidence strength on efﬁcacy varied. Doctors were involved in the initiation stage in 10 cases of ‘medium’
or ‘high’ budget impact and ‘high’ practice impact products of variable evidence strength on efﬁcacy. All
three professional groups were involved in the initiation stage for eight products associated with ‘medium’
or ‘high’ budget impact, ‘medium’ to ‘very high’ practice impact and ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’ evidence
strength on efﬁcacy.
Doctors participated in adoption decisions in 14 cases (almost half of the total cases). These were primarily
the DIPCs and in some cases the medical director and infection control doctor. They fulﬁlled a strategic
role of endorsement and support to the newly adopted product with regard to its cost and practice
implications. This was reﬂected in the small sample of doctor respondents in phase 2 (i.e. those actively
involved in the decision-making process).There were 10 microcases for which senior members of all three
professional groups were represented in the adoption decision stage. Non-clinical staff participated in the
adoption decision stage in 21 journeys, making them the professional group with the second strongest
presence after nurses.
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Doctors were also involved in early or full implementation in nine microcases. Non-clinical staff were involved
in the implementation stage in 22 cases, again being the second most prevalent group after nurses.
The types and sources of evidence used seemed to vary only slightly depending on whether only one or
multiple professional groups were involved. Technology product journeys can be grouped into 14 cases in
which all three professional groups were involved in at least one stage and 13 in which this did not happen.
The types of evidence used most frequently within the former microcases were product information and
demonstrations, sourced from industry and product suppliers, followed by local trial data, scientiﬁc articles
and conference presentations. In the latter case, the evidence types most often used by those professionals
involved – typically nurses, and ward, domestic or procurement staff – were product information and
demonstrations provided by industry and suppliers, recommendations by health agencies, local trial data and
staff feedback from the trust care environment, scientiﬁc articles and conference presentations.
The involvement of medical microbiologists in 13 product journeys led to the production of locally
generated evidence through early implementation in the form of a local evaluation trial or case study.
The data generated from these studies complemented peer-reviewed academic literature regarding the
proposed technologies. This approach supported decisions concerning products with a ‘medium, ‘high’
or ‘very high’ practice impact in 11 cases. Research-active trusts with a substantial research capacity, as
deﬁned by our categorisation in Chapter 6, generated evidence in their local care environment: examples
include T1, T5 and T7.
In all cases of ‘high’ practice impact and ‘high’ evidence strength on the efficacy of products, senior
organisational executives were involved in adoption decisions.
Senior organisational executives were involved in 14 microcases of products of considerable practice impact
and otherwise variable expected budget impact and evidence strength on efﬁcacy. This senior involvement
was in the form of a number of organisational roles, including medical director, chief operating ofﬁcer,
director of nursing, deputy chief nurse, DIPC and deputy DIPC, head of nursing, decontamination manager,
and senior consultant microbiologist. Senior executives also contributed directly to decisions regarding
products of ‘low’ budget impact and ‘medium’ practice impact, such as DIFFICIL-S (low evidence strength
on efﬁcacy) in T4 and T7 or OTEX (high evidence strength on efﬁcacy) in T6 and T9.
The role of the director of infection prevention and control
Trust DIPCs were involved in at least one stage of the adoption process of 17 technology products, whose
expected budget impacts varied from ‘low’ to ‘very high’. Of these product microcases, 11 featured
products of ‘medium’, or ‘high’ practice impact. One-third of the decisions in which DIPCs were involved
(10 microcases) concerned products with a ‘medium’ or ‘high’ budget impact and products with a ‘low’ or
‘medium’ evidence strength on efﬁcacy. In 11 cases in which DIPCs were involved, products were either
implemented trust-wide (six cases) or adopted and made available for ad hoc use in the trust either in
selected wards or trust-wide (ﬁve cases). Three decontamination products of ‘high’ or ‘very high’ practice
impact were rejected.
Trust DIPCs were involved in the adoption decision stage of 15 product microcases. Only ﬁve of these
products were classiﬁed as ‘low’ for evidence strength on efﬁcacy, whereas seven were identiﬁed as having
a ‘high’ evidence strength on efﬁcacy. Of these 15 decisions, 10 involved products with a ‘medium’ or
‘high’ budget impact for trusts, and 9 were on products of ‘medium’, ‘high’ or ‘very high’ practice impact.
The involvement of the DIPC at this stage of the process was associated with a positive outcome:
10 decisions resulted in trust-wide implementation, whereas one decontamination product was rejected in
two trusts, and, in three cases, decision-making was ongoing. In addition, six of decontamination and
inspection products with a ‘medium’, ‘high’ or ‘very high’ practice impact were adopted, two were
rejected and one decision was yet to be made.
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In nine technology microcases, the DIPC was involved in all three stages. Six of these microcases involved
products with a ‘low’ or ‘medium’ evidence strength on efﬁcacy: the DBO commode in T1; clinell sporicidal
wipes in T9; ASP GLOSAIR in T2 and T7; and DIFFICIL-S in T4 and T7. Eight of these microcases related to
products of ‘medium’ or ‘high’ practice impact, namely Bioquell VHP RBDS in T5; OTEX in T6; ASP
GLOSAIR in T2 and T7; DBO commode in T1; clinell sporicidal wipes in T9; and the 3M Clean-Trace and
Hygiena SystemSURE II ATP hygiene monitoring system in T2.
In our trust sample, the DIPC was involved in the initiation stage of 11 innovation journeys, and the
implementation stage of 12 journeys.
Product adoption and implementation were facilitated by the identification of an appropriate hospital team or
group to act as the ‘prime user’ of the new product. For example, OTEX is operated by the trust domestic
services partner in T6 and T9, which took ‘ownership of the practice’. In T7, involvement of domestic staff in
the decision concerning the aHP system led to improved understanding of the workload implications for
domestic staff, which in turn resulted in hiring additional staff to optimise the product’s use. In T2, the 3M
Clean-Trace and Hygiena SystemSURE II ATP hygiene monitoring system were successfully adopted for use by
domestic staff, and, by contrast, in T5 there was no group identiﬁed that could potentially incorporate the
routine use of the luminometers into its daily practice. Ownership of the swabbing and data recording process
by domestic staff in T5 was widely viewed as a key facilitating factor in the product’s successful adoption and
implementation, as it generated enthused and interested users among domestic staff.
In T9, the ﬁt of products with the trust’s care systems and processes was reviewed in a local trial, and
emerged as a key determinant of successful adoption and implementation. In T3, active supplier
engagement during the product or service trial and implementation also emerged as a factor conducive to
products being positively perceived and considered for adoption by staff.
Mobilising sources and types of evidence and
innovation stakeholders
Our phase 1 ﬁndings show that several types and diverse sources of evidence were variably reported to be
accessed and used by non-clinical or clinical hybrid managers. Access to and use of evidence was reported
to vary signiﬁcantly among professional groups. Further, synthesis of phase 1 and 2 analyses allowed the
exploration of ‘what managers say they do’ as individual decision-makers and ‘what managers reported to
do’ in cases of collective organisational decisions concerning the use of research-based and other forms of
evidence. Our analysis revealed the complex interplay between diverse stakeholders, in terms of their
professional background and organisational role, and the evolving mix of evidence types accessed from
different sources. At each stage of the product innovation journeys, collection, assessment and
presentation of multiple types and sources of evidence by different stakeholders to address various
audiences and for different purposes were observed.
We found that what managers claimed that they do as individual decision-makers (phase 1 data) was not
followed through in the context of collective decision-making processes (phase 2 data). Speciﬁcally, in
phase 1 three national or central sources of evidence, the NICE, the NPSA and NHS National Service
Frameworks, were reported as being used across the professional groups when adopting innovations
(see Figure 3). An additional source, The Cochrane Library, was also consistently reported as being
accessed and used by all clinical staff respondents, but not by those in the non-clinical group. However,
respondents also noted that evidence types associated with these sources, such as research-based evidence
guidelines or scientiﬁc articles, do not immediately or seamlessly relate to the delivery of health care or
innovation adoption in their own care environment. Our phase 2 data revealed that, across the technology
journeys in all the microcases, none of these sources was actually used when evidence was sourced and
reviewed to inform decisions; nor were journals classiﬁed as health services research and management, or
mainstream organisation and management, used.
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Local types of evidence, for example data generated through local evaluation trials, were more likely to be
mentioned by informants in phase 1 interviews when non-adoption or rejection decisions were made than
other evidence from other trusts, the supplier, and national or international sources. Our phase 2 data
illustrate that locally generated evidence was usually produced in order to critically appraise other evidence
types, and conﬁrm the innovation’s compatibility, or otherwise, with the local care environment.
Our phase 2 data further suggest that research-engaged organisations in our sample (T1, T5 and T7)
tended to conduct local trial evaluations to inform adoption decisions, particularly in cases in which cost
and practice impact were perceived to be substantial. This is in contrast to non-research-engaged trusts,
for which supplier-sourced product documentation and peer-reviewed scientiﬁc articles tended to feature
most frequently across the stages of the innovation journeys. University-afﬁliated organisations showed a
pattern of a somewhat wider range of evidence types utilised, frequently drawing on exchanges with other
trusts, professional conferences and the HPA.
In phase 1, supplier marketing materials were reported to be of low importance in innovation adoption
decisions by respondents across the trusts. However, in our phase 2 technology microcases, product
documentation sourced by suppliers featured very frequently in each of the stages of the innovation
journeys across our macrocases of eight trusts. There appeared to be a more pronounced relationship with
suppliers in less-research-orientated organisations (i.e. T4, T6) than in university-afﬁliated trusts (i.e. T1, T5,
T7), where supplier-sourced evidence was reconciled with other types in the evolving evidence mix.
Overall, research-engaged organisations emerged as those wishing to qualify external evidence vis-à-vis the
adoption of innovative technology products by:
i. generating and drawing on local evidence on these products
ii. engaging a high number of stakeholders from different professional groups involved in order to support
this process of evidence review and customisation.
In less-research-engaged organisations, locally generated data took a minimal role relative to ‘external
evidence’ types, which were research-based and sourced from suppliers, professional networks and other
health-care organisations.
Several salient aspects of these different evidence types featuring in each of the innovation journey stages
in trusts were interwoven in discourses shared among members of different professional groups. In these
discourses, locally generated evidence, research-based evidence, professional experience, subject-matter
knowledge, supplier-sourced materials and other evidence were other mediating factors. These discourses
were again principally framed, and emerged from, within the professional background of stakeholders.
This underlies the importance of professional background vis-à-vis evidence plausibility to self and others in
collective decisions.
As reported earlier (see Chapter 4), what counted as evidence for doctors and non-clinical managers
differed, but what mattered most was that they themselves (doctors and non-clinical managers) were
satisﬁed with the evidence. For the nurses, what counted as evidence to others mattered equally and
sometimes more than own satisfaction with the evidence. This shaped the types and sources of evidence
used by nurses at each stage of the innovation journey.
When professionals came together as stakeholders to review evidence and enact decision-making, the
professional background and organisational role of the evidence presenters, and those of members of their
audience, were of prime importance. Members of all professional groups recognised that doctors have a
unique position, either as presenters or as the audience, when evidence is being considered (Table 43).
This, coupled with the relative lack of involvement of this group in the product innovation journeys
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explored in phase 2, partially explains the slow adoption of innovations, particularly in IPC, as the ﬁeld is
dominated ‘by default’ by the nursing group:
The infection control agenda was almost entirely run through the nursing staff. So it was the nursing
staff who knew that if an infection occurred on their ward they were going to be hold up in front of
the senior nurse and have to account why it might have happened. The medical staff we are not
subject to that sort of view at all [. . .]. ‘Why are the medical staff not part of the analysis of why
these things happen?’ And it was really partly because, [. . .] there was a level of hostility amongst
consultant staff towards changes. And I think even the senior nurses in the trust felt it would be
counterproductive dragging consultants into these meetings. And the result of that was that the
infection control agenda became perceived as a nursing agenda. And the consultants were able to
stand back from it even more and say, ‘It’s nothing to do with us, it’s all to do with the nurses, it’s
nothing we have to be involved in’, and that sort of you could see the implementation of a lot of
infection control stuff faltering on that basis.
Doctor
There is the added complexity of organisational role versus professional role. For example, non-clinical
managers as an organisational group have a diverse ‘professional’ background including, for example,
engineers and accountants; hence, the organisational role dominates in evidence-use practices. Nurses
focused in our study on experiential and biomedical forms of evidence based on their professional
background. However, the organisational role of nurses in IPC appeared to override the professional
template as the primary frame of rationality in decisions and was reported to shift according to the audience.
In Chapter 4 we detailed the concepts of plausibility for self and others and how the latter was reported to
be of greater concern to the nursing group. This variance in reported motivation mediated the span of
evidence sourcing along a continuum from ‘narrow to ‘wide’ (Table 44).
TABLE 43 The presenter and audience matter
Theme Exemplar quote
Clinician as
presenter
I always find certain individuals within the team to present it, then it is listened to more. Again this is
my own personal experiences, I can say the same thing as a clinical member of the team, but what I
say is not accepted because I am not clinical. The clinical person can say exactly the same thing,
same words, and they would think it is wonderful. The right people. That is a challenge of being a
manager in a clinical setting.
Non-clinical manager
Although it galls me to say it but I think the medical colleagues within the team are better at
accessing [evidence] and they may come to a meeting and say I have had a look at the evidence. I
don’t think it could necessarily have been a systematic review of the evidence. Stating quite
confidently a particular position and that could be quite influential so that is something they are
more likely to do than nursing members of the team.
Non-clinical manager
Clinician as
audience
Clinicians seem to be the most powerful group. And if you can get them on-board or at least some
of them on-board then generally it makes things a lot easier because the nature of their training they
will ask for hard and fast data.
Nurse
TABLE 44 Motivation and span of evidence sourcing
Motivation
Behaviour: span of evidence sourcing
Narrow Wide
Plausibility to self dominates Medical hybrid manager Non-clinical manager
Plausibility to others dominates Nurse hybrid manager
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Chapter 10 Synthesis and inferences
In this chapter we reﬂect on and synthesise our empirical ﬁndings as to how the individual andcollective sensemaking processes of health-care managers evolved in practice as regards the use of
evidence. Through our comparison of multiple empirical cases, we provide insights into how managers’
sensemaking played out within the multilayered domains of inﬂuence: uniprofessional groups;
multiprofessional groups; health-care organisations; the ﬁeld of IPC and the heath-care sector. First, we
return to our research questions to summarise key learning from our empirically grounded work.
We then reﬂect with some implications for relevant theory.
Reﬂecting on our research questions
Considering our original research questions, we note that the process of ‘managers making sense of
evidence’ was found, not surprisingly, to be a situated social process of individual and collective ‘cognition
in context’. There was retrospective, ongoing interpretation of different types of evidence variably sourced
and assessed by a large group of stakeholders with diverse professional identities. Organisational roles
further inﬂuenced this individual and collective sensemaking by shaping the focus of attention on the
evidence debate. We found that organisational members, through ongoing social interactions with both
immediate peers and seniors and distant comembers of the organisation, iteratively coconstructed
plausible accounts of relevance and credibility to self. In addition, this process involved sensemaking for
others. Notably, the processes of decision-making involved tacit and explicit – and sometimes ‘political’ or
‘tactical’ – sensemaking for others. Captured in this study is the more explicit sensemaking whereby
‘making the case’, for or against, at the different stages of the innovation process was played out by
diverse organisational members. Regulation and policy mandates, perceived decision urgency and service
need, external players, such as the commercial suppliers of technologies, and critical events, such as
infection outbreaks, all inﬂuenced these social, situated processes of collective cognition. Here we
summarise our ﬁndings as regards our original research questions.
How do managers (non-clinical and clinical hybrid managers) make sense
of evidence?
Managers encountered challenges and constraints in accessing and making sense of evidence relevant to
the decision at hand. Managers made sense of evidence by overcoming the conceptual constraints
inherent in the nature of evidence as being multifaceted, diffuse, ongoing and constantly updated (or in
need of updating).
By being mindful of the temporal nature of evidence, particularly in the context of innovations, ‘high
strength’ and ‘established’ scientiﬁc evidence about the efﬁcacy of technologies did not override other
forms of evidence, such as cost and experiential knowledge about ease of use. Equally, ‘low evidence
strength on efﬁcacy’ for a product with an emergent scientiﬁc evidence base did not preclude these
technologies from being adopted trust-wide (e.g. DIFFICIL-S or Chlor-Clean in T7 and T5, respectively).
Managers were faced with and negotiated the map of an ‘incomplete’ evidence base in terms of missing
evidence or poor-quality evidence. The deﬁnition of ‘quality’ varied to some degree according to
professional background.
Managers made sense of evidence in innovation decisions by sourcing evidence which was plausible and
accurate to self but also for signiﬁcant others, that is to convince other members of the organisation for
the case at hand. This function fell within the remit of some organisational members (e.g. nurse hybrid
managers in the context of IPC) more than others. At the same time the managers justiﬁed their own
credibility in the decision-making discourse as presenters of this evidence.
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What role does evidence play in management decision-making when
adopting and implementing innovations in health care?
The articulation and discourse around evidence played a major role in decision-making when adopting
innovations given the newness and risk inherent in innovations. Decision-makers felt the urgency for
sourcing evidence to reduce the uncertainty and ambiguity associated with the introduction of innovations.
Innovation evidence was often perceived as emergent, iterative and changing.
In the early stages of initiation and adoption, those involved drew on a variety of types of evidence, many
of which were available from central sources; managers reported that in early technology considerations
they were not always clear about what types of evidence they needed. Evidence played a different role in
the stage of implementation, as respondents often cited ‘missing evidence’ at this later stage of the
innovation process. Credible and relevant evidence generated from systematic research on the topics of
implementation and management was identiﬁed by the majority of respondents as currently missing from
the NHS evidence base. This is despite the fact that a signiﬁcant body of such research evidence exists in
health services research journals [e.g. Implementation Science, BMJ Quality and Safety, Health Services
Research & Policy, Healthcare Management Review, NIHR Health Services and Delivery Research (HS&DR)
research reports] and mainstream management journals (e.g. Organization Studies, Academy of
Management Journal, Organization Science). When probed, most respondents were not aware of these
journals, and did not report reading them. As a result, decision-makers often drew on more local evidence,
such as evidence from other trusts, or instigated the generation of local trials.
Stakeholder constellations evolved along the innovation stages, shaping the mix of evidence types
reviewed and taken forward at each stage. There was consistency in respondents’ accounts that different
professional groups accessed different sources of evidence because of dissimilar needs for evidence.
How do wider contextual conditions and intraorganisational capacity
influence research use and application by health-care managers?
The presence of standardised evidence from central sources affected all stakeholders involved in decisions
in the context of health care. In addition, pressures of patient safety and performance inﬂuenced the use
of evidence in different ways. In the context of IPC, external pressures, in the form of performance targets,
media scrutiny, patient expectations and fear, were reported as incentives for sourcing evidence on
innovations that would deliver results in speciﬁc organisational contexts. Several decontamination
technologies were introduced as a result of these pressures in our trusts sample. These same pressures,
however, were seen as a barrier to establishing a well-informed and rigorous process of evidence
consideration because of the pressure to act.
Under such intense contextual pressures decision-makers often embarked on a quest for plausible rather
than accurate evidence. The consequent pace of decision-making necessitated a focus on plausibility to
others. Conversely, sometimes the pace inﬂuenced the exclusion of key stakeholders to avoid protracted
decision-making processes with wider involvement delayed to the implementation stage.
In this study, trust infrastructure redevelopment projects, a strong emphasis on patient safety, and strong
and trustful collaboration (especially between IPC teams and other organisational departments) appeared
to widen the scope for the search, and use, of evidence in decision-making. In nearly all phase 2
microcases, the number of evidence types and individuals involved grew as the innovation process
progressed from initiation to early trial use, adoption decision and implementation. These evidence types
were diverse and came from several sources irrespective of whether one or many professional groups came
to be involved. In these discourses research evidence, personal experiences and knowledge, relationships
with the suppliers, politics, resources, national performance targets, national and organisational policies,
organisational and departmental priorities, and clinical pressures (infection outbreaks) were continuously at
play and shaped decision-making outcomes.
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Our ﬁndings also suggest that research-engaged organisations in our sample were more likely to
generate their own evidence, for example conduct local evaluation trials to inform adoption decisions.
Research-engaged trusts tended to assess innovations by drawing on a wider range of evidence types,
and engaging a high number of stakeholders from different professional groups.
Looking across professional groups, what counted as evidence for doctors and non-clinical managers was
different, but what counted most was that they themselves (doctors and non-clinical managers) were
satisﬁed with the evidence. For the nurses, what counted as evidence to others mattered equally and
sometimes more than own satisfaction with evidence. This shaped the types and sources of evidence used
by nurses.
Engagement with evidence unfolded over time through interaction and negotiation. There were diverse,
but closely interlinked, ‘evidence templates’ in circulation and in use, namely ‘biomedical-scientiﬁc’,
‘practice-based experiential’ and ‘rational-policy’ (see Sensemaking in organisations below). These
templates served as frames of reference for the managers and deﬁned what constituted acceptable and
credible evidence in the decision-making process. Informants variably drew on those templates to make
sense of the evidence and of the organisational problems identiﬁed and this is where micro and macro
contextual inﬂuences shaped this process.
Implications for theory
In this section, we suggest some theoretical implications that emerge from our empirical ﬁndings in
relation to the relatively ill-exposed literature we identiﬁed in the concluding section of Chapter 2. We
brieﬂy outline some of the implications to the relevant theoretical debate in three literature streams,
namely, evidence-based health care, organisational innovation and sensemaking in organisations. The ﬁrst
two are considered conjointly as our study focused on the use of evidence in the context of organisational
innovation adoption and implementation decisions.
Evidence-based health care and organisational innovation processes
Much of the current empirical research on innovation adoption and diffusion in health care has generally
been limited to a single level of analysis. Our study explored the innovation adoption process following
a multilayered analysis at micro (individual managers’ sensemaking), meso (collective sensemaking of
evidence in organisational innovation decisions) and macro (interorganisational professional and policy
inﬂuences, evidence templates) levels to provide a holistic understanding of social processes in context.95
In organisational innovation literature, there is also insufﬁcient exploration of how pluralist evidence bases
(and the associated diverse epistemological bases) might be reconciled (or not) in practice to make the
case for or against particular innovations.96 Throughout our empirical cases, we consistently observed that
organisational contexts, and especially the organisational culture and level of research engagement, policy
mandates, perceived urgency of issues, physical infrastructure, social interactions and stakeholder
engagement, and professional identities, exerted a mediating inﬂuence on how decision-makers accessed
and used evidence for non-clinical organisational decisions impacting on clinical-care delivery. We explored
the role and expressed motives of actors and the inﬂuence of context, which mediated the social
construction of evidence in practice.
Nature of innovation evidence
The nature of evidence was conceptualised along a continuum of ‘hard’ to ‘soft’. Hard evidence comprised
cost and efﬁcacy, whereas evidence on practice impact, usability and patient experience was more often
perceived as soft. An emphasis on organisational productivity outcomes was also viewed as linked with
‘hard’ and ‘tangible’ evidence and such claims were prevalent in the evidence discourse of managers with
non-clinical backgrounds.
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The temporal nature of evidence served as both a motivator to seek and generate new evidence and a
constraint. Sourcing evidence for the most up-to-date developments was viewed as part of the
innovation process and a means to improve patient outcomes. At the same time, the delay in availability
of high-quality evidence was seen as a barrier, with decisions being put on hold in the absence of such
evidence. The temporal dimension also emerged as an external pressure generated by performance
measures and targets, particularly in the area of IPC, whereby the necessity or perceived urgency to act
precluded decision-makers having sufﬁcient time to review evidence in a robust manner.
Many organisations in our study sample (especially research-engaged NHS trusts) sought opportunities to
add to the evidence base through local trials, and this may be explained by the high majority of senior
managers interviewed in phase 1 who found it difﬁcult to relate evidence from central sources to
local practice.
We identiﬁed no clear observable pattern between adoption or implementation outcomes and the
‘evidence strength on efﬁcacy’ or ‘expected budget impact’ of the studied technologies when considered
in isolation. A low perceived practice impact was more likely to be linked to successful adoption and
trust-wide implementation. The combination of all three dimensions of evidence better explained
outcomes, and these were consistently considered in tandem by decision-makers across all microcases.
These empirical ﬁndings help innovation researchers to better map the perceived attributes of innovations
(e.g. relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, observability) and innovation knowledge
types (e.g. ‘awareness’, ‘principles’ and ‘how-to’ innovation knowledge)24 along these additional three
domains for improved understanding of innovation uptake within organisations.
Situated evidence
If technology adoption were to follow a purely evidence-based approach, then organisational adoption
decision-making would be an entirely rational process. Our ﬁndings suggest that individual interests,
certain critical shocks, external pressures and the trust’s organisational culture and values had a strong
impact on the use of evidence in the decision-making processes. This was often linked to a sense of
urgency to solve perceived problems, leading to organisational priority shifts in favour of such acute
problem solving. For example, outbreaks, ﬁnancial pressures, performance targets and trusts’ relationships
with commercial suppliers often led to reactive or ‘ﬁre-ﬁghting’ attitudes towards problem solving, or a
less scrutinised approach to evidence use: decision-makers often relied upon an emergent evidence base
adopting a ‘pragmatic’ approach and sourced ‘sensible’ and ‘credible’ evidence; in other cases, a ‘political’
and ‘imperative’ approach dominated the evidence review process.
Extrinsic motivation, such as organisational image and the related pressures (i.e. meeting the expectations
of patients and the public, ‘must-have’ innovations, organisational reputation and being seen as NHS
leaders in IPC or NHS leaders in quality and innovation), exerted a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on decision-making
and was reinforced by certain frames of reference among key decision-makers.
Redevelopment projects, patient-centred organisational values, and relationships of collaboration and
teamwork were linked to a broader range of sources and types of evidence accessed, reviewed and used
by decision-makers. A narrower span in accessing and using sources and types of evidence was often
observed when there was a sudden and drastic change in the magnitude of pressures on the studied
trusts – especially performance-related pressures. In other words, the use or non-use of diverse forms of
evidence became wider or narrower, depending on multilevel contextual inﬂuences.
Innovation adoption decision-making occurs within dynamic and complex contexts (both micro and
macro). Our study found that this has had an effect on how actors perceived evidence (i.e. acute/urgent,
credible, relevant), and whether they actually utilised it in their decision-making. The temporal nature of
evidence per se as well as the diversity of actors’ identities (i.e. professional background, organisational
role) can add further complexity. This is because such evidence requires continuous (re)construction,
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triangulation and interpretation by use of one’s own cognitive ‘template(s)’, which translate evidence to be
deemed plausible to self and/or others.
Within our studied cases the nature of the problems being addressed drove the quest for evidence and
the amount of resources (time, manpower and expertise) expended. The external forces that have been
discussed previously featured as inhibitors or facilitators when considering innovation and supporting
evidence. In addition, the nature of the problem as technical and product based or more processual and
concerned with service delivery and organisation also impacted on the types and sources of evidence
used. For problems of high perceived technical complexity, ‘harder’ evidence was more readily available.
Furthermore, although rated as of ‘low importance’ by clinicians and managers interviewed in phase 1,
information from suppliers was often the point of ﬁrst call in the early stages of technology assessments by
the trusts in phase 2.
Forms of evidence and sources of influence on decisions
Our ﬁndings suggest that there were six main sources of inﬂuence on organisational decision-makers’ use
of evidence during the various stages of the innovation process, and these are summarised in Figure 34.
The various sources of evidence were used at different times depending on the nature of the
organisational problem identiﬁed, but also depending on who was involved in the various stages of the
innovation process.
The ‘size’ of each hexagon-like box – and hence the strength of the source of inﬂuence – varied with each
decision. In some circumstances, evidence from a local trial or the preferences of stakeholders (e.g. patient
expectations and safety assurance for the use of the hydrogen peroxide vapour system) were judged by
the decision-makers to be more important and relevant than research-generated evidence and, thus, were
given much greater emphasis in speciﬁc decisions. In other situations, little evidence was available from
central sources, and thus their inﬂuence on managerial decisions was relatively limited.
Decision
Practitioner
expertise linked
to professional
training and
education
Practitioner
experience and
personal
knowledge
Perspectives and
preferences of
key stakeholders
Research-
generated
evidence
Evidence from
local context
Policy
endorsement
and evidence
from central
sources
FIGURE 34 Main sources of influence on sourcing evidence in organisational decisions.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr02060 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2014 VOL. 2 NO. 6
133
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2014. This work was produced by Kyratsis et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
This conceptualisation builds and expands on the key elements of EBMgt presented by Briner et al.97 by
also explicitly reﬂecting on the inﬂuence of policy and practitioner embodied knowledge and skills as
sources of credible evidence.98
Sensemaking in organisations
This study has provided insights into the sensemaking processes of diverse professional groups in the
context of acute NHS trusts. Although sensemaking is ongoing and iterative by its very nature, this process
becomes more pronounced and easier to capture in the context of uncertainty and change. Our study
examined decision-making in innovation adoption and implementation processes, which are inherently
associated with ‘newness’ and change. The context of IPC is also closely related to issues of operational
uncertainty and clinical risk.
Everyday sensemaking in health care
In organisational sensemaking theory, there is less emphasis on empirical studies that deal with the
day-to-day processes of sensemaking than on those that deal with crises and critical events. There are
fewer inquiries into sensemaking that occurs among many diverse organisational stakeholders as they
address a range of issues.46,62 By applying this theoretical lens to the investigation of managerial decisions
on the adoption and implementation of innovative technologies, we empirically contribute to the ﬁeld.
Collective sensemaking: strategic and operational decision-making
The construction of shared meanings, or collective sensemaking,46 is key for understanding how new types
of evidence may be successfully embedded in certain contexts, or even be rejected under conditions of
innovation uncertainty and ambiguity. However, less attention has been paid to the social processes that
underpin sensemaking at the organisational level.62 In this study we empirically examined issues in which a
large and diverse group of stakeholders was involved, giving rise to differential needs for evidence (i.e. for
strategic or operational decision-making) and dissimilar perspectives on its interpretation.
Connecting micro cognitive processes with macro shared templates
Our ﬁndings highlight the importance of ‘sensemaking in context’. Drawing on our empirical work, we
suggest that sensemaking theorisations that overlook the role of larger social contexts (i.e. in this study the
use of evidence being shaped by diverse professional frames of rationality) in explaining cognition are
necessarily incomplete. This is in line with recent arguments in conceptual papers, which highlight the lack
of an explicit account of embeddedness of sensemaking theory in social space and time.56 We found that
professionals within health-care organisations drew, through sensemaking practices, on existing shared
rationalised frames of reference to make sense of issues in decision-making (this is detailed below.) We
approached sensemaking as an ongoing communication process by which actions, events, situations and
circumstances are talked into existence.46
The emergence of evidence templates
Although the focus of this study was around perceptions and use of evidence in organisational decisions,
this was one dimension of the process. We also note that, although the perceptions and reported use of
evidence in phase 1 interviews may have reﬂected more espoused beliefs rather than what managers
actually did (see the works from McGlynn et al.99 and Runciman et al.100 for a review of what constitutes
evidence by clinicians), this discrepancy is in itself important. What managers think that they ought to be
doing, or what they would like to be doing, is important. In phase 2 we were able to partly relay which
contextual factors impacted on these espoused beliefs. In addition, phase 2 allowed us to capture part of
what happens when the decision-making dynamics change by virtue of those involved, and also to capture
inﬂuences of local organisational priorities and macro-level policy agendas.
We reﬂect here on how decision-making processes compared across professional groups. It is useful to
reﬂect on two contextual issues which contributed to the way different organisational members made
decisions. First, the issue of ‘who is the decision for?’: this could be the individual/patient, unit or ward,
organisational or population level. Second, the issue of ‘who makes the decision?’. Is it essentially an
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individual or a collective decision? By exploring these issues, we understand more about the ‘usual’ role of
evidence in decision-making for these diverse professionals. At one end of the continuum we could
position doctors, who largely make clinical decisions about an individual patient on a case-by-case basis,
sometimes with immediate feedback of the impact on the patient. At the other end of the continuum
we could place non-clinical managers, who make decisions largely for an organisation, usually with
longer-term and often unclear direct impacts. How different organisational members make sense of
evidence is then interlinked to how they make decisions and how well they translate this ‘usual’
sensemaking when considering organisational decisions, which are carried out collectively. We saw from
phase 2 that, with the exception of DIPCs, doctors were not present in collective decision-making.
Given these different professionally dominated ways of doing things, what happens when these members
come together to make essentially organisational-level decisions? Making sense of evidence in the context
of the organisational decisions described in this study can be conceptualised through the use of evidence
templates and the purposeful action of ‘adopting an evidence template’ by different organisational
members to make sense either for self or for others. Speciﬁcally, we consider three apparent templates:
the ‘biomedical-scientiﬁc template’, the ‘practice-based template’ and the ‘rational-policy template’
(described in detail below). These constituted a source of interpretive and legitimating resources in the
cognitive processes of individual professionals making sense of evidence. We discuss below how the
different templates dominated in different contexts and at different times along the innovation process.
We found that adoption of an evidence template was shaped by professional background, current
organisational role, current decision and the presence of other stakeholders in the decision-making process
either explicitly or implicitly.
Tested/proven according to the biomedical-scientific template
The biomedical-scientiﬁc approach ‘minimises risk’ to patients in that a thorough level of ‘testing’ has
been completed. This template formed the ‘basis’ from which medical and other clinical professionals
embarked. Only once this evidence was available would they proceed to look at other levels of evidence.
This template played a central role in the earlier stages of the organisational innovation process. The
degree to which other levels of evidence were considered was shaped by experience and who else was at
the table making the case for any particular decision. Close teamwork among the professional groups and
advances in the way nurses sourced evidence required attention to the biomedical-scientiﬁc template,
but this took more of a balanced, complementary role alongside other evidence templates. The role of
nurses, in particular in convincing a wide range of stakeholders, may have shaped their convergence
towards the biomedical paradigm, given the reported preference of doctors for this template and their
central position in decision-making.
Tested/proven according to the practice-based template
All stakeholder groups gave importance to this approach, but to different degrees and at different times.
Accounts about learning from other trusts and peers featured in making sense of the evidence under this
template. This template followed a logic of practical action and dominated the focus of attention of the
decision-makers in the later stages of the innovation process. Potential adopters wished for extensive
information about the technology, its workings and its anticipated impact; it was not easy to access this.
Considerable (personal) effort and improvisation was needed and informal networking proved invaluable.
However, this type of information retrieval produced information of variable quality and applicability. The
extent of industry involvement in the decision-making was surprising but explained by the dearth of both
skills and accessible information. Technical training for users, on the whole, was the responsibility of the
industrial supplier of the technology and was well organised.
Rational-policy template: tested/proven according to the discourse of
bureaucratic rationality
This was determined by the goals of the organisation, which are shaped by the macro environment,
particularly relevant regulation and policy. The organisational role of non-clinical managers appeared to be
most aligned with this approach, when compared with other organisational members. Their performance
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requirements and remit of responsibility matched this paradigm. Policy endorsement and mandate shaped
cognition and attention of decision-makers to certain forms of evidence. Such issues permeated the whole
organisational innovation process.
Our ﬁndings suggest there are shortcomings of linear evidence-based conceptualisations of innovation
adoption, and a need for context-sensitive, practice and policy contingent approaches.19 We noted the
importance of decision-makers’ and signiﬁcant others’ understandings of the nature of the perceived
problem and the associated risk and safety issues, as well as the perceived need for various forms of
evidence. For example, local trials, and the need for ‘pragmatic evidence’, were deemed important by
decision-makers in the early stages of innovation adoption. For innovations (and especially for those that
require signiﬁcant changes in practices or processes to be implemented), creating an evidence base will
require agreement about what is regarded as a legitimate epistemological basis for verifying and validating
evidence and relevant knowledge. For example, should the evidence base for implementing an innovation
in a speciﬁc context rely exclusively on scientiﬁc reproducibility and explicit, codiﬁed forms of knowledge?
Or, alternatively, should the basis of evidence also account for a wider conceptualisation of valid and
relevant knowledge (including practice-based and experiential tacit forms of knowledge)? How might
pluralist evidence and knowledge bases be reconciled?
Evidence sources and types appeared to be variably prioritised and used by decision-makers depending on
their professional background. Doctors and nurses prioritised evidence on the clinical efﬁcacy and
effectiveness of innovations. High importance was accorded to systematic forms of knowledge by doctors,
whereas non-clinical managers and nurses relied more on their own or peers’ experiential knowledge.
Non-clinical managers and nurses also considered evidence on ‘ease of use’, including local trials of
innovative products and technologies, as highly important. Different evidence hierarchies emerged in
practice and were reinforced through routine enactment. The antecedents and ongoing sensemaking that
shaped interpretive frameworks of different stakeholders were articulated in templates that structured
shared cognition.
The confluence of diverse templates
Within a health-care setting, the evaluation of an innovation can take a number of forms and include
technical, economic and social assessments. Adoption decisions involve a number of stakeholders, and
therefore it is important that the evidence used to support adoption is not just sufﬁcient but also relevant
and perceived as appropriate to address the concerns of all parties.
As described above, different professional members had different roles in decision-making in our empirical
study. Another differentiating feature is the ‘entry point’ of health-care practitioners when compared with
non-clinical managers. Health-care professionals have a well-deﬁned entry point that establishes within
these professionals a common ‘frame of reference’ or ‘template’ through formal training and then through
socialisation within practice. Non-clinical managers in health care come from a variety of professional
backgrounds and may have received no formal management training.2 The fact that management does
not have a commonly shared frame of reference to deﬁne quality criteria of evidence has led to the
prominence of experiential ‘evidence’.101
The various professional groups drew variably on co-existing evidence templates to help them make sense
of the evidence base. In our empirical cases, nurses drew on all diverse ‘templates in circulation’ and aimed
for evidence plausibility to self and others and were the only professional group who explicitly tried to
make the case to other stakeholders. Non-clinical managers also drew on all diverse ‘templates in
circulation’ but aimed primarily for evidence plausibility to self and then sought to justify to others, based
on this evidence template. In contrast, doctors drew primarily on the biomedical-scientiﬁc template and
were exclusively concerned with evidence plausibility to self. The use of evidence templates by health-care
managers aligns with the conceptualisation by Gabbay and Le May102,103 of clinical ‘mindlines’, namely,
internalised, collectively reinforced, tacit guidelines for knowledge use by clinical practitioners. We share
with these authors the empirical experience and conceptualisation of evidence representing ‘knowledge in
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practice in context’ rather than accepting linear rational approaches to explain how knowledge is
mobilised and used as evidence in practice. Unlike ‘mindlines’, evidence templates are socially embedded
frames of cognition collectively shared by groups of organisational decision-makers, rather than being
idiosyncratic cognitive guidelines informing clinical decisions. However, we refer to evidence templates as
abstractions that help organisational decision-makers reconcile and make sense of complex knowledge
that often crosses epistemological paradigms of what constitutes valid knowledge. Clinical decisions
taken within the well-established epistemological biomedical paradigm trigger qualitatively different
sensemaking processes.
Strengths and weaknesses/limitations of the study
Although our study draws on rich empirical data from a large-scale multisite project, which helped
untangle important dynamics on the use of evidence in organisational decisions, more work is needed to
expand our understanding. Our qualitative study is limited to the ﬁeld of IPC; we draw on data from
speciﬁc organisations and technologies, also reporting on a special type of decision, namely innovation
adoption. Generalisations, therefore, from this data set must be treated with caution. We deliberate here
some limitations of our methodology and then reﬂect on some of the strengths of the study, which have
been discussed in detail in the methodology section.
First, we need to acknowledge that most of the primary data in this research are drawn from interviews
and structured questionnaires that explored views, perceptions and self-reported accounts on activity
and practices. The qualitative study is based on our purposeful sample of respondents rather than the
trust population. The interviews were conducted in retrospect for most of the microcase examples,
and as a result we cannot completely mitigate recall bias. The interviews were semistructured, allowing
respondents to elaborate on facilitators, barriers and prevailing conditions at the time of decision-making;
however, the accounts were essentially a reconstruction of events. Potential bias owing to selective
memory for events that occurred in the past and retrospective and attribution bias might have shaped the
responses given by the study participants, and need to be considered when making inferences from the
study. One strategy we used to avoid problems of retrospective bias and also to avoid dominance of one
particular viewpoint was to interview organisational members at several different levels of seniority, from
different parts of the organisations, and from different professional groups. We also used direct questions
in each of the phase 2 interviews, such as ‘who made the ﬁnal decision’; this tactic helped to highlight
discrepancies in the accounts and any perceptions of ‘forgone conclusions’ versus ‘debated and
transparent decision-making’. We further checked, whenever possible, against documentary and other
secondary sources (e.g. websites) regarding timescales and any wider involvement in the decision-making
process. We reported as ﬁndings only those events and relationships that were corroborated by multiple
informants and that were consistent with documentary data, whenever such data were available. We also
purposefully limited the timespan of technologies included in the study to the period after 2007 to
minimise the potential bias of recall and issues of incomplete accounts as a result of staff turnover.
Second, our study context and questions relate to a wide range of possible factors that potentially impact
on evidence use in the organisational innovation processes. We employed an integrated approach to
analysis as opposed to pure grounded theory, which may have given rise to alternative explanations.
The scope and relevance of the study required a balanced approach between external validity through
cross-comparative analysis and an in-depth smaller-scale study employing a more open framework of
analysis. For example, a follow-up in-depth study based on ethnographic work may reveal the interplay
among evidence, knowledge and power. Alternatively, employing a more deductive framework, and using
an explanatory theory such as interprofessional power, would have undoubtedly revealed some ﬁndings
to support the theory but, at the same time, stiﬂed any new or alternative explanations being discovered.
A third important methodological limitation is due to practical constraints of time and accessibility. We
were not able to conduct real-time observations of discussions in meetings and observe instances of
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decision-making and evidence use ‘in action’ across all participating trusts. We were able to attend only
one meeting in T4. Obtaining observational data proved challenging in the high-pressure environment of
busy NHS trusts, in part because of the relatively short window of opportunity for data collection; access
issues were further exacerbated during the winter months owing to ﬂu emergencies and in summer
months owing to staff holidays. Extending the data collection period would have caused important delays
to our project. We were fortunate to complete collection of all other data in eight of the nine planned
trusts. One trust (T8) decided to drop out because of issues of high operational demands during the course
of the study. In some cases, we were not able to observe the ﬁnal outcome of a decision-making process
within the lifespan of this project and these decisions have been reported as ongoing. A careful balance
needed to be maintained to avoid ‘closing the door’ for future researchers.
Despite the limitations described above, the study has important strengths that distinguish it from earlier
research exploring similar issues. First, the study draws on a large sample of informants and investigates
qualitatively multiple and comparable cases, focusing on health innovation technology as the tracer issue.
We followed a phased approach that explored individual and collective processes of evidence mobilisation
in decisions. In the ﬁrst phase we investigated accounts of how individuals, from various professional
backgrounds and organisational roles situated in diverse organisations, reported accessing and using
evidence to accomplish individual tasks in relation to innovation decisions. In the second phase we
contrasted such accounts with experiences in collective decision-making processes.
Second, whereas most previous empirical investigations using sensemaking as a theoretical lens focused
almost exclusively on either individual or organisational processes, this study employed a multilevel
perspective to also account for wider contextual inﬂuences, such as the collective frames of rationality or
evidence templates, we identiﬁed in this research. This aligns well with the nature of complex health-care
organisations, such as the NHS, which are distinctively multilayered entities. It also responds to repeated
calls for multilevel organisational research.95,96
Third, the study allowed for tracing the possible relationships between the quality of decisions and ﬁnal
outcomes. We looked at full processes, namely the innovation process from initiation to adoption decision
and implementation, and linked this process to adoption and implementation outcomes for speciﬁc
technology products in speciﬁc trusts. We purposefully sampled for innovation rejections and
discontinuances, which are rarely empirically studied.
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Chapter 11 Implications and suggestions for
future research
In this chapter we conclude with a discussion of the potential implications of our ﬁndings for policy andpractice and suggestions for future research.
Implications for policy and practice
In our empirical ﬁndings we presented systematically and in detail a large number of innovation decisions
which unfolded across diverse health-care organisations. We described in detail 27 microcases of the
‘what’, ‘who’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ along the decision-making and implementation process. This included the
level of involvement of diverse stakeholders at different stages of the process, the issues they encountered,
the sources and types of evidence mobilised at each stage and the ﬁnal outcomes of these decisions. The
varied role played by different professionals in how evidence is collectively used has implications for ‘who
to involve’ and ‘for what purpose’. An EBMgt approach that inﬂexibly applies the principles of EBM
neglects how evidence is actioned in practice. The nuanced and processual consideration of evidence gives
rise to an iterative exchange between codiﬁed, systematised knowledge generated from research and
other forms of evidence that are also valued by decision-makers. This research demonstrates that
experience, personal knowledge and expertise, perspectives and preferences of stakeholders, policy
mandates and endorsement, and evidence from the local context all may contribute as credible and
relevant evidence sources.
Clinicians and managers were inﬂuenced by central or national-level institutions (e.g. The Cochrane
Library, NICE, National Service Frameworks, the NPSA), some of which have been active in producing
research and disseminating knowledge about the organisation and delivery of health care. There was,
however, disconnect between what was perceived as credible (as these sources were) and what was
deemed relevant to the decision-making process. How do managers use the research produced by these
institutions or inﬂuence its production? Our ﬁndings showed that the impact of these central institutions
differed greatly owing to varied awareness and perceptions of these sources. This leads to the question:
is there a need for a central evidence database/depository for managerial practice? Although some
informants were aware of NHS Evidence, they rarely used it to source evidence in decisions. The NIHR
HS&DR and the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement were rarely mentioned and never used
(phase 2). There appears currently to be a gap in credible evidence sources relevant to managerial practices
in the studied context. The open-access HS&DR journal, which is part of the new online NIHR Journals
Library, has the potential to play the role of the management decisions evidence portal, provided that the
awareness, credibility and relevance of the journal can be established among practitioners.
The issue of who in organisations searches for, synthesises and presents evidence to others is important.
As doctors invariably hold the unique position of being perceived as highly credible at the decision-making
table, they need to be engaged. The case of IPC puts nurses at the frontline; in our cases, nurses were the
most involved group in innovation processes and charged ‘by default’ with making the case within
organisations. The lack of involvement of key stakeholders (e.g. doctors, procurement, the research and
development department) was perpetuated in some of our cases to avoid ‘counterproductive interactions’
among professional groups. Nonetheless, the delayed involvement of key stakeholders gave rise to
the possibility of decisions being challenged at a later stage. This differential engagement positioned the
evidence templates (biomedical-scientiﬁc, rational-policy, practice-based) in competition, unless the
organisational culture mediated a consensus approach. This lack of involvement of doctors (phase 2) not
only contributed to slowing the adoption of innovations, but also curtailed opportunities to draw upon
diverse evidence templates.
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The NHS and other health systems have explicit policy goals to promote the uptake of innovations and
systematise new practices across health-care organisations.10 Our ﬁndings suggest that local processes, and
professional and microsystem considerations, play a signiﬁcant role in adoption and implementation. On
the basis of this, and signiﬁcant other research,16,104–106 this policy goal of systematisation appears to be
infeasible, because of the idiosyncrasies of situated circumstances and cultures. This has substantial
implications for the effectiveness of large-scale projects and systems-wide policy.
Reported missing research
Respondents in phase 1 reported that areas of missing research comprised behavioural studies,
implementation research and organisational studies or management research. They were particularly
interested in how to tackle non-conformance behaviour and better understand implementation challenges.
In particular, pharmacists reported a lack of research in this area, followed by nurses and non-clinical
managers. Doctors were less attuned to this aspect of organisational change. Frequently reported medical
resistance towards IPC practices conﬁrm this ﬁnding – doctors representing the professional group least
aware of behavioural change. T1, T3, T6 and T9 appeared to be more behavioural-change conscious than
other trusts. This could be linked to their proactive organisational culture or relevant research strategies set
up through collaboration with local universities, as documented in Chapter 6.
Suggestions for future research
This study has provided original insights into the use of evidence by health-care managers in organisational
technology adoption. Whereas we investigated in detail the individual and collective sensemaking
processes as managers sourced and applied evidence during the innovation journey, future research can
further develop such insights and assess their transferability and relevance to other contexts. We suggest
the following ideas that can inform future research (these are not listed in order of priority or importance):
l While we elicited complex dynamics of the innovation process, from initiation to implementation, our
study draws primarily on data derived from self-reported accounts. An understanding of the discourse
between professional groups and non-verbal cues would provide further insight into the actual
decision-making processes. Direct observation using in-depth ethnographic studies would be the most
appropriate approach.
l Further exploration of the evidence templates and how they link to broader shared cognitive frames of
rationality in the form of institutional logics in the ﬁeld of health care107,108 is needed to address the
following questions: what are the constitutive elements of these templates?; what role do the
templates play in knowledge production as well as utilisation and what are the consequences for
practice?; and how does the interplay of diverse templates occur in practice in different contexts? A
longitudinal research design with multiple case studies at the level of the organisational ﬁeld focusing
on evidence use by health-care managers from diverse professional backgrounds can be a fruitful
option for this stream of inquiry.
l An in-depth study looking at the theme highlighted in this research regarding ‘making sense for
others’ and a more focused research question about interprofessional power dynamics.
l In this study we included technology products bounded within NHS acute trusts. We suggest similar
dynamics are explored for innovations across different boundaries (sectoral, level of care) and with less
clearly deﬁned boundaries (process, organisational innovations). This is particularly relevant given the
restructuring of the English NHS, with public health-functions based in local government.
l We also point out that the dissemination of such research needs to transcend mainstream
management and organisational literature. Respondents cited a lack of relevant empirical studies in
peer-reviewed management journals largely because there is a discord between where such literature
is published and the sources used by these decision-makers.
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l A large-scale population-based survey of the structured questionnaire. Such a survey would help
determine the extent to which the reported differential preferences on access and use of evidence
sources and types by professional groups in our purposeful sample can be generalised.
l Although this study allowed for investigating the full innovation process from initiation to adoption
decision and implementation, as a result of time constraints we were not able to study the later stages
of assimilation and routinisation for all technologies. Moreover, because of the study’s focus on
sensemaking processes, emphasis was given to decision-making rather than practice adaptation and
assimilation. Future research could investigate in more detail how front-line users implement and
assimilate technologies into their established day-to-day routines, which are issues that have received
limited attention in current empirical studies.
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Appendix 1 Sampling options appraisal
(9 May 2011)
Dimension and options Identiﬁed strengths Identiﬁed risks Selection
Temporal To be guided by trusts
Option 1: bound
innovations/technologies
to be considered by time
2007–12
l Captures period of
major policy initiatives
regarding IPC
(The Health Act 2006; EPIC
guidelines 2;71 mandatory
reporting of MRSA and
C. difficile; Saving Lives
programme 2007;
Clean Safe Care 2008)
l Time period sufﬁcient to
observe change in practice
l Allows study of
implementation and
sustainability
l Allows study of rejections
l Allows study of
organisational learning
l Recall bias
l High staff turnover
resulting in gaps in
data
l Change in policy and
social context of a
5-year period
Possible – if trust staff and
records available
Particularly
useful for ‘successful’
implementation of
innovations/technologies
Option 2: bound
innovations/technologies
to be considered by time
X–2012 (where X > 2007)
l Higher data quality owing
to shorter recall time and
staff consistency
l Shorter time period to
study the process of
implementation and
rejections
Possible – to be guided by
trust – (2010–2012). Going
back earlier if trust staff
and records available
HCAI
Dimension not to be
used as inclusion/
exclusion criterion
Option 1: bound
innovations/technologies to
be considered by one type
of infection, such as MRSA
or C. difficile
l Focused
l Logistically manageable
within project timeline
l Depth rather than breadth
l MRSA and C. difficile are
subject to mandatory
reporting
l Good comparative data
l Broad scope of
technologies
l More opportunities for
comparison across trusts
l May be difﬁcult to
differentiate
technologies aimed at
one microorganism
(e.g. hand hygiene
applies to all)
l Narrow scope of
technologies
l May not be a priority
and therefore low
investment in some
trusts
l Large time implications
for participating trusts
Innovations/technologies
are not mutually exclusive
to infections – for example,
hand hygiene and
environmental hygiene
prevent MRSA and
norovirus
Option 2: consider
innovations/technologies
for all mandatory reported
HCAI microorganisms in
that time frame (MRSA and
C. difficile)
l Broader scope of
technologies
l Large time implications
for participating trusts
l Unmanageable within
project timeline
Option 3: consider
innovations/technologies
for wider selection of HCAI
microorganisms (MRSA and
C. difficile and norovirus,
and VRE, and
Acinetobacter, etc.)
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Dimension and options Identiﬁed strengths Identiﬁed risks Selection
High impact
interventions (HII)
Dimension not to be
used as inclusion/
exclusion criterion
Option 1: bound
technologies to be
considered by one HII
aimed at prevention of SSI
or CAUTIs, etc.
l Look at key high-risk
clinical procedures or care
processes
l Good comparative data
l Mandatory only for
orthopaedic SSIs but
reported as good practice
for other SSIs
l Narrow scope of
technologies
These technologies may
not be found across the
trusts making comparisons
difﬁcult and increasing the
degrees of freedom
Narrow scope of
technologies excluding
wider stakeholder groups
May feature in second step
of sampling for ‘highly
innovative’ technology
Option 2: consider
technologies for all HIIs
aimed at prevention of SSI
and CAUTIs and VAP, etc.
l Broader scope of
technologies
l Time intensive for
participating trusts
l Feasibility within
project timeline
IPC priority area Option 1 selected
Option 1: bound
innovations/technologies to
be considered by one
particular IPC area
including hand hygiene,
diagnostics, environmental
hygiene/cleaning/
disinfection, antibiotic
prescribing, catheter-related
care, training and
education, medical devices/
equipment hygiene,
information technology
surveillance systems,
patient hygiene
l Focused
l Logistically manageable
within project timeline
l Good comparative data
l Multifaceted approaches
resulting in a broad
sample of technologies
l Compare different
approaches to an IPC
problem with the option
of engaging many
stakeholders
l May not be a
consistent focus across
trusts
l Technology may
address more than one
area
l Feasibility within
project timeline
l Rationale for choice of
IPC area
IPC priority area:
environmental hygiene
Strengths and rationale:
l Environmental hygiene
is a cross-cutting
intervention for various
HCAIs
l There has been
particular attention to
this area in regulation
– deep clean
programme, CQC
l There is a proliferation
of products in this area
l Diverse stakeholders in
trusts are targeted with
marketing material
from companies
l Diverse stakeholders
and teams are involved
in environmental
hygiene
l Interventions range
from basic cleaning
products to ‘new to
NHS’/cutting-edge
products
l Interventions range
from inexpensive to
prohibitively expensive
(i.e. from posters to
hydrogen peroxide
robots)
l From our recent study
of innovation adoption,
environmental hygiene
technologies
represented 50% of
selection decisions
Option 2: Consider all
relevant IPC priority areas
l Broader scope of
technologies
l Feasibility within
project timeline
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Dimension and options Identiﬁed strengths Identiﬁed risks Selection
l Evidence base very
broad from supplier
marketing material to
academic published
articles (e.g. ATP)
l Two out of the seven
RRP1 products focus
on this area; with six
more currently RRP2
products
l Showcase reports are
available for the RRP1
products (ATP and
hydrogen peroxide)
l Many trusts have
invested signiﬁcantly in
environmental hygiene.
Figure from one trust
in our previous study
reported £300,000/
year to deep clean, i.e.
£28/m2
l Has different relevance
for PFI and for non-PFI
buildings (negotiation,
cost implications)
l Hence, will enable in-
depth exploration of
multiple dynamics on
making sense of
evidence within teams,
the organisations and
at the institutional level
Mitigating risks:
l Environmental hygiene
represents an IPC
priority area consistent
across trusts
l We can incorporate an
additional stage 2
sampling: focus on
perceived ‘radically
innovative’ or ‘cutting-
edge’ products within
each of the trusts or a
sample of trusts once
we have this as the
baseline or comparator
for the nine trusts. This
will highlight
differences in
approaches to decision
making and use of
evidence. Potential to
also include
stakeholder groups
that were excluded in
environmental hygiene
l Also explore rejections
l Option not selected
Number of
innovations/
technologies For
further consideration
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Dimension and options Identiﬁed strengths Identiﬁed risks Selection
Number of
innovations/technologies For further consideration
Option 1: one innovation/
technology per trust
l Focused
l Manageable
l Opportunities for
comparison limited
Final decision to be made
once we have the
innovations/technologies
according to dimension D
Option 2: all relevant
innovations/technologies
generated by applying
the selected dimensions
and options
l Broader scope of
technologies
l Feasibility within
project timeline
l Breadth instead of
depth
Potential to cluster by
common innovation/
technology may be greater
with dimension D
Option 3: one common
innovation/technology
across the trusts
l Focused
l Enables comparison
l Structured
l Selected innovation/
technology may not be
of similar priority across
trusts
First, explore all
environmental hygiene
innovations/technologies
considered by each trust
within a deﬁned time
period
Second, select from these
the following cases:
(a) An innovation/
technology that has
been selected but not
implemented yet
(b) An innovation/
technology that has
been selected and
successfully
implemented
An innovation/technology
that has been rejected
Option 4: all common
innovations/technologies
across the trusts
l Focused
l Enables comparison
l Feasibility within
project timeline if
number of common
innovations/
technologies is high
CAUTIs, catheter-associated urinary tract infections; SSI, surgical site infection; VAP, ventilator-associated pneumonia;
VRE, vancomycin-resistant enterococci.
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Appendix 2 Participant information sheet and
consent form
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Appendix 3 Study protocol
SDO Protocol – project ref: 09/1002/38
Version: 2
Date: 19 September 2011
Making sense of evidence in management decisions – the role
of research-based knowledge on innovation adoption and
implementation in healthcare
Chief investigator
Professor Alison Holmes
Sponsor
Imperial College London
Funder
NIHR/SDO
NIHR Portfolio number
SDO 09/1002/38
ISRCTN registration (if applicable)
n/a
Making sense of evidence in management decisions – the role
of research-based knowledge on innovation adoption and
implementation in healthcare
1. Aims/Objectives:
The study aims to investigate how healthcare managers draw upon and make sense of different types and
sources of evidence when they make decisions about innovations. We include general managers and
‘hybrid managers’ (clinicians in a managerial role). Special attention is placed on the role of scientiﬁcally
produced knowledge and its use by these managers during the decision making process under conditions
of innovation uncertainty. The study design incorporates multiple levels of analysis as follows: (a) explores
the inﬂuences of wider ‘macro’ level contextual dynamics on managers’ decision making, (b) explores
decision making processes at the ‘meso’ organisational level, (c) analyses at a ‘micro’ level the processes by
which healthcare managers construct meaning of available evidence and how they might use such
evidence when deciding on the adoption or rejection of innovations.
Our key research questions are:
l How do managers make sense of evidence?
l What role does evidence play in management decision-making when adopting and implementing
innovations in healthcare?
l How do wider contextual conditions and intra-organisational capacity inﬂuence research use and
application by healthcare managers?
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2. Background:
Health service delivery and organisation as well as clinical practice can be improved by applying research
ﬁndings relating to good practice. While there are many evidence-based healthcare innovations available,
new knowledge disseminates slowly, if at all. As a result, health research ﬁndings are not always translated
appropriately into healthcare practice. This reality also raises the pressing question of how to spread best
practices and implement promising innovations within healthcare and speciﬁcally in the NHS.
Our empirical study is theoretically based and grounded in the practical experience of healthcare managers
dealing with innovation processes. The study focuses primarily on the ‘meso’ organisational level and
largely draws on the diffusion of innovations literature. One of the central questions in this body of
literature that aligns with the scope of the proposed project is as follows: ‘Why do innovations not readily
spread, even if backed by strong evidence?’ There is a growing body of evidence, drawing on examples
from healthcare settings, which argues that the adoption of health technologies and practices supported
by sound research evidence is a far more dynamic and complex process than previously suggested. The
classic innovation diffusion model of change has inﬂuenced much healthcare policy and suggests that the
adoption of innovative ideas, practices, or artefacts is conditioned by the interaction among the attributes
of the innovation, the characteristics of the adopter and the environment (Rogers, 1995). This early
innovation diffusion work has been criticised however for adopting a simplistic rational view of change,
ignoring the complexities of the change process and also focusing on individuals rather than organisations.
Later work by Rogers (2003) partly addressed the criticism by having explicitly considered the adoption
process within organisations. Recent studies have departed from the linear model of innovation diffusion
(Rogers, 1995) to offer conceptual notions that are more dynamic and interactive (Williams & Gibson,
1990; Van de Ven, et al, 1999). Building on the latter model it is suggested that innovation adoption is a
process which is highly dependent on the interactions between the innovation, local actors and contextual
factors (Ferlie et al., 2000; Timmons, 2001; Dopson et al., 2002; Fitzgerald et al., 2002; Denis et al., 2002,
Atun, Kyratsis et al. 2007).
In addition, the nature or deﬁnition of ‘evidence’ related to particular innovative technologies or practices
is often ambiguous and contested (Greenhalgh et al, 2004; Fitzgerald & Dopson, 2005). Managers make
decisions relying on experience, personal expertise, judgement, inference, advice, and do not passively
receive new knowledge even if presented as evidence which is scientiﬁcally produced and validated.
Research-based knowledge has to be constantly interpreted and reframed along with the local context and
clinical or managerial priorities, a process that often involves power struggles among various professional
groups (Ferlie et al. 2001). Different professional and managerial groups may interpret evidence differently,
or they may prioritise dissimilar types of evidence partly as a result of their disparate professional role,
training and professionalisation processes. We employ a sensemaking perspective to gain insight to this
inter and intra professional level and how this plays out in the context of decision making and
implementation (Weick, 1995). This lens pays particular attention to the social construction and
co-production of evidence through the interaction of a range of diverse professional and managerial
groups. We will contribute to this body of literature which has been useful in explaining organisational
response to critical events in the heath care setting (Weick et al., 2005; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003).
Our work addresses a signiﬁcant gap in evidence-based healthcare implementation literature. We respond
to the call for more sustained interpretive work, which explores the role and motives of actors and the
inﬂuence of the organisational context and the social construction of evidence (Ferlie & Dopson, 2005).
Overall, we aim to address issues that permeate many stages of the research innovation pathway and
more speciﬁcally will investigate processes that relate to the stages of evaluation, adoption and diffusion.
By contributing to the debate on the aforementioned areas our study will add to the current NHS policy
and practice body of knowledge as articulated in the NIHR/SDO Research Brief which this proposal
responds to. Our work also complements recent and ongoing research commissioned by NIHR research
programmes; in particular, it ﬁts well the NIHR/SDO 2008 call for proposals that also focused on issues of
knowledge utilisation in healthcare management. We complement and add to this work by looking at
different types of decisions, in different healthcare settings.
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3. Need:
This research is important from practice, policy and theoretical perspectives. Below we outline how this
research: (a) addresses a signiﬁcant health need, (b) responds to call for research supported by sustained
intent, (c) has potential to generate new knowledge.
(a) Health need
Infection control is one of the biggest challenges facing the NHS today. In England 8.19% of all patients
within the NHS acquire an infection (Smyth et al, 2008). The reporting of MRSA blood stream infection
and C. difficile are mandatory and there are national and local targets for reduction. New technologies
and interventions have the potential to make a real difference in helping reduce levels of Health Care
Associated Infections (HCAIs) by completing good clinical practice. However, their adoption and
implementation too often proves challenging and slow. Budgets, competing priorities, and monitoring
procedures all play a part in the decision making process when organisations select novel interventions. In
addition, professionals and managers may have differing views of what is the optimum intervention given
access to evidence, as well as perceptions of this evidence by self and others. To provide sustainable
reductions in HCAIs we need to know what has worked, under what conditions, and why. In addition, we
need to learn from those settings where an intervention has not worked.
(b) Expressed need for the research supported by sustained interest and intent
Relevant NHS policy reports (DH, 2003; DH, 2008) and legislation (Health & Social Care Act, 2008) have
highlighted that countermeasures of known effectiveness have not been universally implemented. In
addition, the NHS has commissioned large projects to identify new technologies and products which work
best in the ﬁght against HCAIs. One such example is the Department of Health ‘Showcase Hospitals’
Programme. We build on this work by understanding how and why technologies are adopted and
disseminated across the NHS. This is where our proposed work would make a signiﬁcant contribution to
the NHS and to patient beneﬁt. Our proposed research is supported by sustained intend also due to the
strong political drivers surrounding the control of HCAIs both nationally and internationally. Public and
Patient interest in this issue will continue demand for transparency of investments and resultant beneﬁt to
patients and the NHS.
(c) Capacity to generate new knowledge
The theoretical basis of the research draws on three main streams from the management and
organisational behaviour literature, namely, diffusion of innovations, sensemaking in organisations and
neo-institutional theory in organisations. The potential for learning and creating new knowledge from this
in depth, multi-method study is substantial due to its theoretical grounding, incorporating micro and
macro level perspectives. We will be able to provide a holistic understanding of the phenomenon
under consideration
4. Methods:
Setting & Design
The study aims to build theory inductively from multiple in-depth case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin,
2003). Nine acute NHS Trusts have been selected across three broad geographic regions in England. Our
selected NHS Trusts are equally distributed in three regional clusters: (a) London, (b) Northern and Central
England, (c) Southern England. The nine research case studies will be conducted concurrently.
The selection of cases involved theoretical, rather than random sampling (Yin, 1995). In our sample of
cases we include examples of research-engaged healthcare organisations – such as Academic Health
Science Centres (AHSC), University/Teaching Hospitals – and ‘ordinary’ healthcare service providers – such
as District General Hospitals. To better delineate the impact of contextual factors in research use and
application by healthcare managers on the adoption and implementation of the same innovation we
include more than one ‘showcase hospitals’ (as selected by the Department of Health to evaluate the
in-use value of Health care associated infection related technologies) for comparative reasons.
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As well as individual case studies across the nine acute NHS Trusts, we will conduct cross-case analysis to
identify patterns of convergence and divergence, which will enable us to generate new theoretical
propositions as well as replicate and extend emerging ones (Figure 1).
Data collection
Contextual data collection
Detailed templates have been developed and applied to capture and summarise important contextual
inﬂuences for each of the trusts participating in the study.
Primary data collection: participants recruitment and sampling
Primary data comprise semistructured research interviews and research ﬁeld notes. The study will last two
years and data collection will be longitudinal. Hence the research participants will be involved in the study
for two years.
Inclusion criteria for respondents: Informants will include senior, middle and operational managers,
representatives from different professional groups including medical doctors, infection control specialists,
clinical microbiologists, nurses and allied health professionals, patient representative groups, and
administrative personnel.
Inclusion criteria for events: Trust board meetings, infection control team meetings, procurement action
group meetings, trust based presentation events for new technologies, interventions adopted in the realm
of HCAIs currently or since 2007
Exclusion criteria for respondents: Individuals who are not directly or indirectly involved in the decision
making processes of the interventions under study.
Exclusion criteria for events: interventions adopted in the realm of HCAIs prior to 2007.
Total number of interviews will vary according to the size of the Trust and type and span of the innovation
(selected to be studied in phase 2). A sample of 6–10 respondents per trust is planned, with follow up
interviews and further snowballing to address gaps in the emerging ‘story’. Hence, it is estimated that
approximately 90–100 respondents will be interviewed overall.
Year 1 Year 2
Theory
+
Initial
Emperical
study
propositions
Purposeful
Case
Studies
Selection
(Trusts)
Data
Collection
Protocol
Conduct 1st
Case study
Conduct 2nd
Case study
Conduct
(...3rd 4th 5th 
6th 7th 8th
Case studies)
Conduct 9th
Case study
Individual
case report
Individual
case report
Individual
case report
(9 in total)
Cross-Case
Analysis
Patterns of
Divergence/
Convergence
Study’s Propositions
Theory Modification
Policy
implications
Final
Cross-case
Report
FIGURE 1 Study design diagram.
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Semistructured interview schedules, including short questionnaires with a more structured format,
have been developed and applied for the two phases of primary data collection. All data collection tools
are qualitative in nature. The interview accounts are being audio recorded once consent is given
by participants.
The direct involvement of participants to the study primarily involves their participation in an initial and
follow up interview with one of the researchers, each lasting approximately between 45 to 60 minutes.
Once identiﬁed, potential participants are approached locally via the Director of Infection Prevention &
Control (DIPC) in the trust or another identiﬁed key local collaborator. Either the Chief Investigator Prof
Holmes or Co-PI Dr Kyratsis write to potential participants via e-mail inviting them to take part in the study
and this e-mail is accompanied by a participant information sheet. The scheduling of interviews allows the
collection of primary data with opportunity for further snowballing (and subsequent inclusion into the
study sample of additional potential participants) and follow-up interviews with the same respondents
where appropriate. This process of participant recruitment is illustrated in detail in Figure 2.
Data analysis
Soon after the completion of interviews the content of audio recordings is verbatim transcribed. Upon
completion of transcription, four researchers thoroughly read through the full transcribed text several times
to enable understanding of the meaning of data in its entirety (Pope et al, 2000). The Qualitative Data
Analysis computer software package NVivo 9 (QSR International) is used to systematically code the
collected data and assist analysis. In line with recommendations by qualitative methodologists we will use
multiple coders to enhance interrater reliability of the qualitative study. (Soafer, 1999 Pope et al, 2000).
Our qualitative analysis follows an integrated approach (Bradley et al, 2007). We will employ an inductive
approach to open up new lines of enquiry and then agree a framework for data analysis based on these
ﬁndings together with our theoretical framework (delineating factors which inﬂuence the adoption process
of complex health innovations) and our previous work in 12 NHS Trusts looking at adoption processes for
new technologies. Hence, we will employ both an ‘inductive and ground up’ development of codes as well
as a ‘deductive organising framework as a start up list’ (Bradley et al, 2007: 1762).
DIPC
Key contacts in each directorate
E-mail invitation to prospective participants
Follow up e-mail
Check for representation of key stakeholders
E-mail
Interviews scheduled
Interviews conducted
Suggestions through snowballing
E-mail invitation
Follow-up interviews
scheduled
Key collaborator in trust
FIGURE 2 Participant recruitment process.
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Based on the typology suggested by Bradley et al (2007: 1763), the code types employed in the study are
the following:
(a) Conceptual codes and sub-codes: to identify key concept domains and essential dimensions of
these domains;
(b) Relationship codes: to identify links between other concepts coded with conceptual codes;
(c) Participant perspective codes: to identify whether the participant was positive, negative, or indifferent
in attitude about a particular experience or part of an experience;
(d) Participant characteristic codes: based on professional/occupational group, hierarchical position,
functional role;
(e) Setting codes: including rural urban setting, hospital site, particular geographic region, type of trust,
Strategic Health Authority
The development of the code structure will be ﬁnalised when the point of theoretical saturation will be
reached in each of the empirical cases (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Patton 2002).
Analysis within cases will be followed by the cross case analysis across emergent themes but also against
the more formal organisational ‘type’ used in our purposeful sampling of sites. Individual case study
reports with common formats will be produced as an intermediate research output for each of the nine
trusts studied. Summary tables will be used to simultaneously compare several categories and dimensions
of the content and context of change implied by the adoption and implementation of the innovations
across the 9 trusts.
5. Plan of Investigation:
Individual case studies are being conducted in parallel across all nine participating NHS Trusts. Data
collection started in February 2011 and is planned to be completed by end of March 2012.
l Development of contextual template for each participating trust
l Phase 1: development and application of an interview topic guide targeting senior and middle
managers in the wider trust and within the infection prevention & control team
l Phase 2: identiﬁcation of speciﬁc examples of innovations in the ﬁeld of environmental hygiene.
Development and application of an interview topic guide (different from phase 1) targeting members
of the infection prevention & control team to investigate the decision making and implementation
processes of the selected innovation examples.
l Within & cross-case analysis (started in March 2011 and planned to be completed by end
August 2012)
l Report writing
l Ongoing dissemination of interim & ﬁnal research ﬁndings
6. Project Management:
Our study is being overseen by a project Steering Group which brings together broad expertise from
theoretical and practical perspectives.
(a) Darren Nelson – clinical, managerial and operational issues on infection prevention and control and
expertise in change management and service re-design; also bringing in the perspective of managing
healthcare service delivery in the NHS. In addition his professional nursing background provides
specialist insight to the infection prevention context;
(b) Professor Martin McKee – translating evidence to policy; also bringing in extensive experience on
European and UK public health interventions;
(c) Roy Oliver and Tim Sims – patient advisors to critique and invite comment from existing patient groups
on all processes of the research (from study inception to dissemination of ﬁndings);
(d) Professor Christopher Chapman – organisational performance indicators; his expertise lies in the nature
and role of performance evaluation and control systems. He explores the construction of organisational
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and inter-organisational performance indicators from both a qualitative and quantitative perspective;
these are relevant methods of inquiry for our research context. For NHS trusts, reporting of clinical and
non-clinical performance indicators are important due to mandatory infection prevention and control,
quality of services, as well as ﬁnancial viability and capacity at organisational level.
(e) Professor Sue Dopson – knowledge mobilisation in the public sector, speciﬁcally in healthcare.
Professor Dopson provides additional input through dedicated expert advice to the co-PI Dr Yiannis
Kyratsis and fulltime senior researcher Dr Raheelah Ahmad. Ad hoc specialist guidance is complimented
by a formal arrangement of quarterly meetings between Professor Dopson and the project researchers.
(f) Chris Gush – formerly from the Health Care Associated Infections Technology Innovation programme of
DH. He provides insight of central DH innovation and evidence dissemination structures.
7. Service users/public involvement:
Active public involvement of two patient advisors through Steering Group membership informs the
research team to identify and ask the right questions in the right way, making sure that research is
relevant to patients and people using services and the public at large. Activities of patient advisors include
informing the study design, study management, contribution to dissemination methods as well as
providing diverse perspectives from two different localities and trust types (one an academic health
sciences centre, the other a district general hospital). We also have one service provider on the steering
group (Darren Nelson) bringing in the perspective of managing health care service delivery within the
context of a busy NHS trust.
CIPM 
Administrative 
Support
Project 
Management
• Prof A. Holmes
• Dr Y. Kyratsis
Sponsoring Institution Research Oversight
Imperial College London
Project Steering 
Group
• Prof S. Dopson
• Prof C. Chapman
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Project Field
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FIGURE 3 Project Governance Structure.
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Appendix 4 Interview schedule phase 1
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Appendix 5 Interview schedule phase 2
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Appendix 6 Brief technology product descriptions
Design Bugs Out commode
The DBO commode has been co-developed by the Department of Health, Design Council, Anglia Ruskin
University, industrial partners and participating trusts. The aim was to redesign the portable patient
toilet seat traditionally used in the NHS and deliver a specially designed and constructed product that
prevents growth of pathogens on its surfaces and saves space in wards. It became available to
participating trusts for trial in mid-2009. Commode use is a long-established practice in the NHS.
Clinell universal sanitising wipes (non-sporicidal)
The clinell green, boxed wipe is designed for universal cleaning. It contains 2% chlorhexidine and 70%
ethanol-based alcohol. It is currently licensed for use on medical equipment surfaces. Its use is based on a
protocol presented on a diagrammatic card, detailing the wipe’s use and application on surfaces.
Bioquell VHP RBDS and Steris BioGenie VHP
decontamination system
The Bioquell VHP RBDS involves use of a portable vapour generator, an instrumentation module used to
programme the generator and an aeration unit. The generator and aeration unit are placed in a fully
sealed (including doors, windows, air conditioning outlets, etc.) bay or ward. Vapour of 5% concentration
of hydrogen peroxide, a highly oxidising compound that eliminates air-borne and surface pathogens, is
then released within the sealed area. Items need to be positioned in the area in such a way to ensure
good vapour exposure. The service can be used as and when required or form part of a hospital site
cleaning regime.
A similar device (but not a similar service) is also marketed by Steris BioGenie.
Disposable sterile surgical site gowns
Sterile gowns are a key part of surgical clothing used to prevent contamination or cross-infection between
patients and care staff in operating theatres. They are made with special materials that ensure
microorganisms and any organic residues do not penetrate them. They must be used according to the
manufacturer’s instructions to ensure cross-infection does not occur.
3M Clean-Trace NG and Hygiena SystemSURE II ATP hygiene
monitoring system
The Clean-Trace NG luminometer manufactured and supplied by 3M involves the use of a hand-held test
monitor and a disposable sampling rod. The disposable rod is used to swab a surface and is then inserted
into the hand-held monitor for testing. Results are shown on the screen and are transmitted to a
dedicated company server for access by users and later examination. The luminometer measures adenosine
phosphatase, a compound found in bacteria, yeast and mould, to assess the surface level of environmental
cleanliness. In addition to microorganisms, the device detects the presence of any organic residues left
after ineffective cleaning or decontamination.
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Another system whose operation is based on exactly the same principles, including the use of data
analysis software offering remote monitoring of results, is the Hygiena SystemSURE II ATP hygiene
monitoring system.
ASP GLOSAIR 400 aerosolised hydrogen peroxide system
This is an area decontamination system based on hydrogen peroxide, formerly known as Sterinis SR2 and
presently supplied by ASP, a Johnson & Johnson company. Its dimensions are 1080mm (height) × 512mm
(width) × 620mm (depth) and it has a net weight of 48.8 kg. It creates and releases a gaseous biocide mix,
described as ‘dry mist hydrogen peroxide’ or ‘aHP’, of 5–6% hydrogen peroxide concentration and silver
ions, from a water-based solution. According to Fu et al.,109 this solution bears the name STERUSIL® (Gloster
Santé Europe®, Toulouse, France) and contains a mix of hydrogen peroxide (∼ 5%), silver ions (< 50 ppm)
and orthophosphoric acid (< 50 ppm). The product is recommended for use in patient wards, emergency
areas and infectious disease units ranging from 10m3 to 200m3. It is thought by some to be capable of
accessing area sections (i.e. ceiling, small openings, etc.) not easily reached by normal cleaning.
UV light inspection torch
The UV 35-W torch model marketed by UV Light Technology Ltd is a very high-intensity hand-held torch
designed for area irradiation. It weighs 0.75 kg and is powered by means of a rechargeable battery.
It produces full UV light output in 15 seconds after power-on, its battery can withstand approximately
300 charging cycles and its bulb has an operating time span of approximately 2000 hours. It emits
UVA light radiation with the wavelength range of 315–405 nm. It is, thus, suitable for ﬂuorescent
inspection applications, but not for disinfection, as it is not capable of emitting UVC radiation.
Clinell sporicidal (red) wipes
The clinell sporicidal wipe product is said to be highly efﬁcacious, eliminating C. difficile spores within
1 minute, at a 6-log reduction scale or greater. It has been proven to eradicate all microorganisms, including
spores. Its active ingredient is peracetic acid, which is understood to be a safe alternative to chlorine, and is
activated just by adding water. It is promoted as a simple and easy-to-use wipe product, which requires no
dilution, increases compliance and reduces errors, and a wipe that is environmentally friendly and leaves
no persistent toxic or carcinogenic residuals, such as any fumes posing risks to staff or patients. It has been
tested to a number of European standards and is recommended for use with body ﬂuid spills.
Medixair UV air sterilisation unit
The Medixair UV air steriliser and Medixair Meos compact UV air steriliser units have been marketed by
their supplier, Pathogen Solutions Ltd, as devices that sterilise air in the environment. Air sterilisation is
conducted by means of air intake at the lower end of the unit, application of UVC radiation at a
wavelength of 253.4 nm on that air stream in the unit’s vertical cavity and release of air from the top of
the unit. The devices operate at a standard 110W power rating, provide coverage of 75m3 and 60m3 and
are of 90 cm and 45 cm in height (Medixair and Medixair Meos, respectively). The supplier featured as a
winner in the 2009 Smart Solutions for HCAI awards. The products were issued with a HPA RRP
recommendation 2 in December 2008.
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DIFFICIL-S disinfectant solution
DIFFICIL-S is a disinfectant solution product advertised as ‘a supremely powerful broad-spectrum
disinfectant cleaner developed to target and kill pathogens within 5 minutes, achieving a 5-log reduction of
99.999%’ (Clinimax Ltd, http://www.clinimax.net/difﬁcil-s-clinical.php, accessed 28 January 2014).
It is produced by ﬁlling a mixing container with water to a speciﬁed line marked on the container. Sachet A
is then emptied into the container, followed by sachet B. A plastic rod (supplied) is used to stir the contents
for 10 seconds. The mix is then ready to be dispensed to bottles by means of a pump and hose. It can be
used with a cloth to clean bedside and other surfaces, or diluted at a ratio of two pumpings per litre to
clean ﬂoor space. It retains its efﬁcacy for 14 days; labels are supplied for staff to note the mixing date and
attach to containers. Any liquid left after 14 days can be disposed of at the sink. The container and bottles
need to be replaced after 6 months.
Virusolve+
Virusolve+ is advertised by its suppliers, Amity International (http://www.amityinternational.com/product/
virusolve/), as an environmental disinfectant cleaning product whose chemical composition includes
advanced dodecylamine-based structures, solvents and a fully non-toxic, biodegradable detergent. It does
not contain any hazardous aldehydes or chlorine-generating components. It eliminates viruses, bacteria,
fungi, yeasts and moulds, including MRSA bacteraemia, C. difficile, hepatitis B, human immunodeﬁciency
virus agents, E. coli extended-spectrum beta-lactamase and NDM1 (New Delhi metallo-beta-lactamase 1)
and non-enveloped-type viruses, such as polio, adenovirus and norovirus, by disrupting the microorganism
ribonucleic acid and preventing resistance. It is odourless, colourless and safe to use on any surface.
Chlor-Clean
Chlor-Clean is a cleaning product combining surface cleaning and disinfection in one operation. Most
detergents, when used in tandem with chlorine, deactivate some of the chlorine’s disinfecting properties.
Therefore, a three-step process is required for cleaning and disinfection. Surfaces would ﬁrst be cleaned
with a detergent. They would then be washed with water to remove any detergent residues, before a
chlorine-based solution is applied. Chlor-Clean tablets utilise sodium dichloroisocyanurate to produce a
dilution of 1000 ppm chlorine, as per the recommendations of the Department of Health and the HPA of
using a hypochlorite cleaning agent of appropriate ppm concentration (2008).110
JLA OTEX laundry system
The JLA OTEX laundry system is a machine washing system suitable for cleaning and disinfecting hotel-type
(sheets, towels, etc.) and domestic equipment (mops, cloths). Its active ingredient is ozone. The system ﬁrst
takes in and converts air to 90% pure oxygen gas. An electrical charge is then applied to the gas, splitting
oxygen molecules into atoms. These then recombine to form ozone molecules. A patented interfusor
chamber pump system collects the ozone and delivers it without interruption into the wash. Ozone
disinfects and destroys bacteria, mould, viruses and yeast by disentangling and fully opening up linen ﬁbres.
Enhanced cleaning, quicker drying and fresh fully disinfected laundry is thus delivered. The system
comprises a specially built washing machine and an ozone safety and validation monitor that stops
operation in cases in which the ozone concentration in the air is measured to be higher than the safety limit
(lower than the Health and Safety Executive limit of 0.2 ppm). JLA suggests those parts needing regular
maintenance are the oxygen concentrator intake ﬁlters and the ozone generator. These need to be checked
on a daily basis and cleaned when necessary.
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UV light inspection cabinet
The UV light inspection cabinet marketed by DaRo UV Systems Ltd has also been trialled at T7. This is a
metal cabinet of approximately 15 cm × 12 cm × 8 cm. An enclosed light source shines UVA light on
objects positioned inside the cabinet. Use of a special hand rub gel illuminates hands and helps
demonstrate the efﬁcacy of correct, or otherwise, hand washing, scrubbing and disinfecting techniques.
Clinell and PDI Sani-Cloth CHG 2% alcoholic chlorhexidine
gluconate wipes
The clinell and PDI Sani-Cloth CHG 2% alcoholic chlorhexidine gluconate wipes are designed for universal
cleaning. They are presently licensed for use on medical devices only. Each wipe contains 2% chlorhexidine
and 70% ethanol-based alcohol.
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Appendix 7 Technology products unit cost
price list
The table below lists the technology products according to their list unit cost price in descending order,from the most to the least expensive.
Prices are extracted from the NHS supply chain portal. Certain prices include costs of add-ons and
accessories required for use. All prices include value added tax at 20%.
These represent the initial capital outlay or upfront costs that trusts would incur when adopting these
technology products. They do not include any maintenance or ongoing costs.
Product Cost (£)
ASP GLOSAIR 400 aHP system 17,955.00
Steris BioGenie VHP decontamination systema 12,500.00
JLA OTEX laundry systema (JLA 40 high-spin machine with OTEX system ﬁtted)b 8756.40
3M Clean-Trace NG luminometera (with board and swab rods) 3027.45
Bioquell VHP RBDSa (one hospital room) 2100.00
Medixair UV air sterilisation unita 1800.00
UV light inspection torcha 1380.00
Hygiena SystemSURE II ATP hygiene monitoring system (with swab rods) 1078.80
Medixair Meos UV air sterilisation unita 600.00
DBO commode 352.58
UV light inspection cabineta (with gel and accessories) 254.40
DIFFICIL-S disinfectant solution (with mixing vessel and four bottles) 114.25
Virusolve+ 102.62
Disposable sterile surgical site gowns (box of 30) 33.20
Clinell universal sanitising wipes (non-sporicidal, six 200-wipe packs) 22.19
Clinell sporicidal (red) wipes (pack of 25) 7.65
Chlor-Clean 7.50
PDI Sani-Cloth CHG 2% alcoholic chlorhexidine gluconate wipes (pack of 200) 2.07
a Prices have been obtained directly from the manufacturer.
b JLA also offers a Total Care Package at £570/month for a single washer ﬁtted with the OTEX system. The minimum
contract term of this package for a NHS site is 60 months.
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